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Police officers kill approximately 10,000 dogs every year in the United States, 
according to an estimate by a Department of Justice official. This amounts to 
police officers killing approximately 25 to 30 dogs every day. Although it is 
difficult to ascertain the actual extent of the problem since many law enforcement 
agencies do not keep track of canine shootings by their officers, the number of 
dogs killed by police during these encounters has government officials declaring 
that an “epidemic” is occurring within policing itself. The degree to which dogs die 
at the hands of police have led some commentators to refer to this trend as 
“puppycide” or “canicide.” The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how 
U.S. law rationalizes canicide, or the police killing of dogs. A key focus of this 
dissertation, then, is how the judiciary’s construction of “dangerous dogs” 
coalesces with justifications and rationalizations of canicide. To do this, this 
dissertation provides a sociolegal analysis and ethnographic content analysis of 
federal court cases and legal decisions on canicide, with a specific focus on the 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
     
  
Police officers kill approximately 10,000 dogs every year in the United 
States, according to an estimate by a Department of Justice official (Griffith, 
2014, para. 13; see also Scott, 2016). This amounts to police officers killing 
approximately 25 to 30 dogs every day (Griffith, 2014). Although it is difficult to 
ascertain the actual extent of the problem since many law enforcement agencies 
do not keep track of canine shootings by their officers (Whitehead, 2017), the 
number of dogs killed by police during these encounters has government officials 
declaring that an “epidemic” is occurring within policing itself (Griffith, 2014). The 
degree to which dogs die at the hands of police have caused some to refer to this 
trend as “puppycide” (Kaatz, 2014), a term that is clearly meant to pull at the 
heartstrings. Officers of the Chicago Police Department have killed or shot at 700 
dogs since 2008 (Main, 2018). For the Atlanta metro area, approximately 100 
dogs were shot between 2010 and 2012 (Coleman, 2012). According to 
departmental records, “dogs were shot 25 times in Atlanta, 32 times in DeKalb 
county, 19 times in Gwinnett County, 10 times in Clayton County and eight times 
in Cobb County” (Coleman, 2012). In Milwaukee alone for the year 2016, it was 
found that 3.82 percent of use of force incidents involved officers using force 




encounters were for dogs running loose or other general complaints about dogs 
(Brandl, 2017).  
Even though the majority of incidents—nationally—in which an officer 
discharges their service weapon occur during police-dog encounters (Bathhurst, 
Cleary, Delise, VanKavage, & Rushing, 2011) and there is an established 
literature focusing on the intersection of animals and criminology (Agnew, 1998; 
Beirne, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2004), this particular practice of state violence has 
received hardly any scholarly attention. This is unfortunate, for reasons that will 
hopefully be clear soon enough. The purpose of this dissertation, then, is to fill 
this gap by taking seriously the politico-legal history of police violence against 
dogs—whether as “pets,” “strays,” or “dangerous dogs” (i.e. constructed as cases 
of “rabies”, or “mad dog syndrome”, etc), or what Bloch and Martínez have called 
“canicide.” 
Answering these questions is done by using ethnographic content analysis 
to examine the ways in which the federal judiciary uses the concept of the 
“dangerous dog” to rationalize and legitimize police violence against dogs. The 
primary document for analysis is the Sixth Circuit’s 2016 decision in Brown v 
Battle Creek Police Department with auxiliary or supplementary documents 
consisting of federal court opinions at all levels confronting the issue of an officer 
involved shooting of a dog. Focusing on how the federal judiciary understands 
police violence against dogs provides a richer and deeper understanding of how 




violence. As an effort to inquire into police violence against dogs, or canicide, this 
dissertation explores the ways law negotiates, rationalizes, and legitimates this 
pervasive form of state violence.  
It is prudent to first describe a few incidents where police have shot or 
killed dogs to give the reader a certain glimpse into this under researched but 
routine form of state violence. First, we should start with the events that 
correspond to the precedent setting Brown vs. Battle Creek ruling, and that serve 
as the baseline for this dissertation. In Brown v Battle Creek Police Department 
(2016), the police searched through the trash of Danielle Nesbit and found 
“baggies with residue of marijuana and cocaine, a small amount of loose 
marijuana, and mail addressed to Plaintiffs and Vincent Jones” (p. 561). The 
police suspected that Vincent was living with Danielle who was the mother of 
Vincent’s child, and the owner of the residence. Living with Danielle was her 
mother, Cheryl Brown, and a Mark Brown. A search warrant was issued for the 
residence based on the items the police found while searching Danielle’s trash. 
On the day of the raid, officers were en route to the Nesbit residence when they 
received information that Vincent had been detained by authorities after leaving 
the residence and that a dog was in the backyard. Officer Case testified that the 
decision to continue with the raid was made because “whether [Vincent Jones] 
got stopped or not, the risk [that others were in the residence] would still be high” 
(Brown v Battle Creek, 2016, pp. 560-561). Mark Brown was walking to his car 




Mark Brown and informed him of the search warrant. Mark Brown offered the 
officers the use of his house key for the front door, but the raid team chose to use 
a battering ram instead. According to the officer’s counsel, “the officers would not 
have used the keys Mark Brown offered to give them because the officers would 
not have had any idea whether those keys were the correct keys” (Brown v Battle 
Creek Police Dept, 2016, p. 576). 
While making their way to the front door, the raid team noticed two pit bull 
dogs in the front window. According to Officer Klein who was leading the raid, the 
dogs were “‘digging and pawing’ and ‘jumping’ at the window” (Brown v Battle 
Creek, 2016, p. 562). After breaching the front door, one of the dogs “jumped off 
the couch, was aggressively barking at the officers, and lunged” at them (p. 563), 
and then Officer Klein shot one of the dogs, who received a nonfatal wound.  
(Brown v Battle Creek, 2016). According to Officer Klein, “the first pit bull ‘had 
only moved a few inches’ between the time when he entered the residence and 
when he shot her” (Brown v Battle Creek, 2016, p. 563). The now injured dog 
made its way to the basement through the kitchen followed by Officer Klein and 
the entry team. The entry team began making their way down the stairs when the 
dog- which was at the bottom of the stairs- started barking at them. Officer Klein 
fired two more shots and killed the dog. 
During the initial entry, the second pit bull jumped off the couch and 
evaded the entry team by making its way to the basement via the kitchen (Brown 




not showing any signs of aggression other than barking at the officers while it 
was standing sideways. Yet, Officer Klein chose to shoot the second dog 
because the officers believed the dog was preventing them from “safely” 
sweeping the area (Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 2016). Again, Officer 
Klein’s first shot was nonfatal, as was the second shot from a different officer; the 
fatal shot came from a third officer who fired on the dog to “put her out of her 
misery” (Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 2016, p. 563). The Sixth Circuit did 
not mention if the police search of Danielle Nesbit’s residence revealed any 
criminal activity occurring within the home. 
Despite Brown vs. Battle Creek being a precedent setting legal ruling, the 
events leading up to this decision are in no way unique. A few more examples 
might be useful to further orient the reader to the legal and cultural politics of 
“canicide.” In 2010, Officer Fike with the District of Columbia Police Department 
shot and killed a festival-goer’s dog, Parrot, at the Adams Morgan festival which 
the police described as a pit bull (Zapotosky, 2010). Parrot’s owner claimed to 
have been subduing his dog the moment the officers arrived. 
That's when a D.C. police officer took over, putting his knee in the middle 
of Parrot's back while he pulled the dog's forelegs behind him, [Parrot’s 
owner] said. He said that the officer then grabbed Parrot by his neck and 
threw him over a banister at the Brass Knob antique store and that just as 
the dog righted itself, the officer pulled out his gun and fired (Zapotosky, 
2010, p. B01). 
 
Parrot’s owner further stated that, “‘The officer drew his gun in an unnecessary 
act of cowboy gunslinging law enforcement and shot my dog amidst a crowd of 




that given by Parrot’s owner. The “commander of the 3rd Police District, said that 
once the officer pushed the dog down the stairwell, ‘the dog immediately turns 
and runs at the officer aggressively’” (Zapotosky, 2010, p. B01). There is no 
further elaboration by the commander (Zapotosky, 2010). The police version of 
events, however, highlights an important aspect of police violence. Namely the 
use of a specialized vocabulary to describe incidents of police violence so that 
the actions of the officer are always justifiable, or at least ambiguous. The state’s 
default when narrating any police-citizen encounter is to perceive any violence 
within an encounter between the police and the citizenry as (1) originating with 
the citizen and (2) as being spontaneous and a threat to officer safety. Threats 
against officer safety come in many forms, even using a camera phone to record 
police activity. 
A video uploaded to YouTube by PS GW (2013) shows a street in 
Hawthorne, California closed off by at least 5 police cars. The camera pans and 
shows Mr. Rosby standing by his vehicle with his dog, Max (a Rottweiler), 
recording the police activity with his phone. Mr. Rosby’s vehicle is parked outside 
the newly established restricted space with what sounds like music playing. After 
the police enter the home, two uniformed officers walk across the street on the 
side where Mr. Rosby is standing, and then walking down the sidewalk away 
from Mr. Rosby. All the while, Mr. Rosby was recording the police activity. 
Another man is also seen recording the officers and Mr. Rosby appears to 




the street just behind the wall established by the police vehicles to a point just 
short of the other side of the road where he continues recording. The video pans 
back to the officers on the other side of the street and the viewer sees that they 
are watching over some individuals who are handcuffed and seating on the 
sidewalk. The camera then pans back to Mr. Rosby who is seen walking back to 
his original location where he continues recording the officers who are at least 50 
feet away from him. It is at this point that we can see the officers notice Mr. 
Rosby recording them. At no time do we see Mr. Rosby walk toward the officers, 
yell at the officers, or otherwise engage with the officers. However, one of the 
officers begins to walk toward Mr. Rosby before stopping after a few feet and 
then returning to his fellow officer. As Mr. Rosby is putting Max into his vehicle 
and saying something like “this is a civil rights violation,” we see the two officers 
begin walking toward Mr. Rosby. It is at this point that we see a space, once 
open to the public, transformed into a restricted zone and Mr. Rosby’s innocuous 
behavior transformed into a threat. Furthermore, at no time do we see Max 
barking, growling, or pulling on his leash at anyone while Mr. Rosby is walking 
around freely. 
After putting Max into the car, Mr. Rosby closes the door and walks 
casually toward the officers (PS GW, 2013). One of the officers appears to tell 
Mr. Rosby to turn around, and Mr. Rosby complies. We do not see Mr. Rosby 
resist the officers; however, Max begins barking as the two officers handcuff Mr. 




not seem to be readying his rifle because of Max; the officer appears 
unconcerned with Max—as the officers begin escorting Mr. Rosby away from his 
vehicle. It is at this point that Mr. Rosby appears to say something to the officer 
who has ahold of him which resulted in the officer pulling on Mr. Rosby and the 
other officer grabbing Mr. Rosby by his shirt. Max is now getting restless in the 
car as he continues to bark; Max jumps from the car and runs toward the officers. 
He stops approximately 6 feet from the officers and Mr. Rosby as a third officer 
comes from around the two detaining Mr. Rosby with his gun drawn. Max barks 
and runs forward; stops and lowers his head. Max is approximately 3 feet from 
the third officer whose gun is at low-ready. This officer reaches out toward Max 
as he sniffs something on the ground. Here we see the officer redefining 
boundaries at will as he slowly encroaches on Max’s space. Max, however, 
resists this redefinition of space by advancing on the encroaching officer, who 
immediately backs away. Max then returns to his spot on the sidewalk close to 
Mr. Rosby. The officer once again encroaches on Max’s space with his hand held 
out, and Max once again advances on the officer. This time, though, Max barks 
and jumps at the officer’s hand. The officer fires his weapon shooting Max at 
near pointblank range. All the while, Mr. Rosby, who was being forcibly detained, 
could only standby and watch helplessly as the officer killed Max because it 
dared to defy the officer’s authority by continuing to protect Mr. Rosby. Mr. Rosby 




Courtney Miller is a resident of Arlington Heights in Fort Worth, Texas and 
she recounts an incident at a city council meeting when local officers entered 
onto her property without warning. Miller begins by setting the scene of the night 
in question by describing to the audience how her living room blinds were raised, 
and the home’s interior lights illuminated. The only conclusion one could draw 
according to Miller is that someone was most likely home at that hour (Now This 
News, 2019). At some point, Miller’s dog wanted to go outside, and 
approximately 5 minutes after letting the dog out, the dog began “barking 
furiously” (Now This News, 2019, 0:39). Miller went to investigate and noticed 
there were flashlight beams moving erratically across her backyard. When Miller 
yelled “who’s back there?” (1:01), the response she received was “it’s the police” 
(Now This News, 2019, 1:04). According to Miller, the police never came to her 
front door to announce their presence. Instead they choose to infiltrate her 
backyard clandestinely and roam her property without her knowledge (Now This 
News). The police only identified themselves when “a white woman in a middle-
class neighborhood” (1:08) demanded to know who was on her property (Now 
This News). The reason given to Miller for the police’s presence on her property 
was because of a barking dog call. Miller then juxtaposes her experience with 
that of Atatiana Jefferson, a woman of color, who was fatally shot by Officer 
Aaron Dean of the Fort Worth Police Department as she stood inside her home 
while he peered into the home through the window from the outside (Ortiz, 2019). 




home and property instead of coming to the front door to investigate the call the 
department received regarding her residence—a welfare check (Ortiz, 2019). 
Unlike Miller’s experience, however, Atatiana Jefferson was not given the 
opportunity to call out and inquire about who was outside her home. Not only was 
Atatiana Jefferson denied the right to her private space, but her harmless 
behavior was transformed into a threat because an officer chose to deem her 
sanctuary as a threatening space to him. Miller reinforces the chasm between 
her experience and that of Atatiana Jefferson by highlighting that her (Courtney 
Miller’s) worry the night the police intruded upon her property was that they could 
have shot her dog. 
Police Violence and Canicide   
Exacerbating the tragedies such as those of Atatiana Jefferson, Leon 
Rosby, Courtney Millers, Mark Brown, and many others, is a lack of data on 
police violence against dogs. This is not surprising given that there is not even an 
official national database that documents police killings of human subjects. The 
non-governmental databases that document lethal police violence in the United 
States—The Guardian, The Washington Post, Fatal Encounters, Mapping Police 
Violence, and a few state databases (Center for Homicide Research, 2017) – fail 
to document police killings of canines even though research suggests that the 
majority of firearm discharges by US police are directed at dogs (Bloch & 
Martinez, 2020). Therefore, the police shooting or killing of dogs is not an issue 




The lack of attention to police violence against dogs, then, is a problem 
that can only be rectified with sustained attention to this particular form of state 
violence. The state is a political organization characterized by compulsory 
membership where government agents use physical coercion as a means for 
ensuring compliance to the governing authority’s will (Weber, 2005). This 
physical coercion ranges from an officer’s use of physical force to mass 
incarceration to the use of derogatory language targeted at marginalized 
populations within American society. As geographers Stefano Bloch and Daniel 
Martinez have recently argued, “The realities of shootings associated with and at 
dogs reveals one of the insidious and rarely acknowledged manifestations of 
state violence enacted in and on vulnerable communities of color” (Bloch & 
Martínez, 2020a). Bloch and Martínez’s (2020b) study, which is essentially the 
only one of its kind, examined incidents of canicide in both Los Angeles and Los 
Angeles County and found that more dogs were shot by police in impoverished 
neighborhoods than other neighborhoods. Geographically speaking, most police 
shootings of dogs were clustered in census tracts where “median household 
incomes [were] below the 25th percentile’ … ‘whereas white majority tracts 
accounted for 91 dog shootings between 2010 and 2017, non-white majority 
tracks experienced 161 dog shootings and acts of canicide by police” (Bloch & 
Martínez, 2020b, p. 145). The implication here is that police violence against 
dogs can map onto police violence against the marginalized communities that 




Second, dogs and other non-human animals have historically been 
subject to legal violence that resembles the legal violence often used to punish 
and police humans. For instance, the punishment and-or execution of pigs for 
infanticide was a normal part of life for at least two centuries. In 1379, two herds 
of pigs were pardoned by Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy upon the request of 
friar Humbert de Poutiers (Evans, 2009/1906); an executioner received 50 sous 
tournois for hanging a pig that “killed and murdered a child in the parish of 
Roumaygne” (Evans, 2009/1906, p. 336); a sow—"who had eaten the face and 
the arm of an infant boy” (p. 5)—was tried, convicted, sentenced, and executed 
for her crime in Falaise in 1396 (Johnson, 2012). Similar incidents occurred in 
1403, 1457, 1494, 1499, and 1567 just to give a brief sampling (Evans, 
2009/1906). Much more than pigs, though, dogs are “transit” in the sense that 
they freely cross the boundaries between culture and nature which places them 
outside the human control over these domains (Skabelund, 2008). Accounting for 
the harms inflicted upon animals by the criminal justice system and its agents 
unfetters our ability to reimagine police violence, policing, and even the criminal 
justice system itself. Incorporating police shootings of dogs into discussions 
regarding police violence opens another, and possibly richer, avenue for 
understanding how power weaves its way across diverse communities and 
populations (Bloch & Martínez, 2020). 
Third, dogs have oftentimes been used as proxies for reinforcing social 




leisure activities…provide a valuable index of [one’s] social status” (p. 229), and 
the dog’s body—in the form of its breed—enhanced or detracted from one’s 
social status (Ritvo, 1986). Where purebred dogs increased their owners’ social 
standings, mixed breed dogs were perceived as the pet of the working-class 
(Ritvo, 1986). It was not uncommon during the Third Reich for the Jewish 
population to be spoken of as animals (e.g., dog, swine, cockroach, etc.) 
(Patterson, 2002). Many of the SS guards would attack prisoners with their dogs, 
and the command used by the guards would identify the dog as “Man” and the 
prisoner as “dog” or another animal (Patterson, 2002). Dogs owned by Jewish 
families were deemed “Jewish” by the Third Reich and subsequently shot (Sax, 
2000). The dog has been used to police the behavior of women. Used as a 
pejorative, the term dog imposes upon women a standard of beauty established 
by a patriarchal society (Dunayer, 1995). Likewise, the term bitch is used to deny 
women an equal footing with men. As Dunayer (1995) points out, bitch is a term 
directed at women that denotes the individual as being malicious and selfish; yet, 
dogs are stereotypically loving. Even sexual violence is an aspect in the linkage 
between women and dogs. Breeding stands, oftentimes referred to as “rape 
stands” (Tsai, 2007; see also PETA, 2020), are used to restrain a female dog so 
that a male dog may breed with her. The use of such devices reinforces the 
perception of female dogs (i.e., bitches) “as a means to a useful, profitable, or 
prestigious litter” (Dayan, 1995). The use of the dog’s body via its breed was 




Class conflicts and a desire to distinguish oneself socially led to the 
creation of the Victorian dog fancy (Ritvo, 1986). The shows in which the dogs, 
and owners, competed had to be secure and meaningful in their hierarchy since 
“excellence” between and within breeds would reflect on the social statuses of 
the individual dog, the dog’s breed, and the dog’s owner (Ritvo, 1986). This 
symbolic transformation of dogs continues today. In the United Kingdom, dogs 
are used as both fashion statements and status enhancers (Davis, 2010). 
However, the current relationship between dogs and status enhancement reflects 
the fears of the middle-class regarding crime and the urban landscape. The term 
“status dog” in the United Kingdom is synonymous with the term “dangerous dog” 
and oftentimes used as shorthand for criminality (Maher & Pierpoint, 2011). The 
linkage between certain dog breeds and criminality is highlighted by the architect 
of the United Kingdom’s Dangerous Dog Act (1991), Kit Malthouse, who happens 
to also be the Minister of State in the Home Office and Minister of Justice at the 
time of this writing: 
 
The dog has a special place in our psyche and the “bull-type” in particular 
has deep cultural resonance. So it is no surprise that one of the biggest 
problems the police face is persuading a magistrate that Satan, the eager 
doggy wagging its tail while a tearful family sobs in the gallery, is a canine 
thug, forcing people to cross the road and cantering round the park 
attacking other dogs and terrifying kids (Malthouse, 2009). 
 
What makes the pit bull dangerous are the populations (e.g., poor whites and 
blacks) who the breed is associated with (Dayan, 2016). This pariah status of pit 




lyrics as a way of celebrating the “otherness” (p. 32) of the breed and 
marginalized communities (Harding, 2010). The pit bull, then, shares the same 
disdain from the middle-class as the working poor who are commonly labeled as 
“white trash” or “thugs” unless someone from the middle-class steps in to “save” 
the pit bull (Dayan, 2016). As such, the dog’s physical body is symbolically 
imprinted with a society’s various social inequalities and forms of oppression. 
Therefore, the “targeting of dogs means the targeting of people” (Dayan, 2016, p. 
80). 
 Police kill a large number of dogs every year with the majority of these 
killings go unnoticed and unrecorded. Some within the policing community are 
apathetic about this aspect of the policing profession. The number of dogs killed 
by officers of the Las Vegas Metro Police Department was viewed as “statistically 
insignificant” (p. 55) by their spokesperson when compared to the number of 
encounters their officers have with dogs, and a deputy from Harris County, 
Texas—which houses the city of Houston—stated, “If a dog turns and comes at a 
citizen, or the deputy, they have all right to use lethal force” (Blainey, 2014, p. 
55). Yet, some officers have donned their dress uniforms in the past and stood 
saluting in a line leading to a veterinarian’s office as a police canine was walked 
inside by its handler to be euthanized (Dogtime, 2021). This contradictory stance 
toward the canine species raises an important question, why are some dogs 
demonized for their potential aggressive nature while other dogs with the same 




dissertation is to examine how U.S. law rationalizes canicide by paying close 
attention to how the judiciary’s construction of “dangerous dogs” coalesces with 
justifications and rationalizations of canicide. Therefore, this research project is 
organized around two broad, open-ended and intertwined research questions. As 
is the norm for much qualitative research, these broader questions lead to more 
narrowed and finer tuned questions as new concepts and narratives emerge 
(Altheide, 1996). The research questions for the current study are: 
1: How does the law construct the police killing of dogs? That is, how do 
federal court cases frame justifications for and prohibitions against the 
police killing of dogs? 
 
2: How does the judiciary’s construction of police killing of dogs help us 
understand racialized police violence against human subjects? 
 
Focusing on the law enables us to answer the aforementioned question, 
and other questions as well, because the law is the visible symbol of a society’s 
social solidarity (Durkheim, 2014). However, “law mirrors a part of social life” (p. 
52) since there may exist social relationships not regulated by law but rather by 
custom, thus making it private. “Above all, however, all law is public, in the sense 
that it is a social function, and all individuals are…functionaries of society” (p. 
55). It is through law that the State forces compliance to the will of the collective 
(i.e., those in power); therefore, it is through law’s approach to canicide that may 
illuminate other pathways for understanding the maintenance and reproduction of 





CHAPTER TWO  
METHODOLOGY 
     
  
The current study focuses on judicial opinions because it through written 
judicial decisions that the judiciary communicates to the police, nation, and other 
courts what the current state of law is regarding a specific legal topic. It is also in 
these written opinions that the judiciary lays out the reasoning for the majority’s 
decision as well as the reasoning for any concurring or dissenting opinion. 
Ethnographic content analysis was chosen over other methods for the current 
study because it combines aspects of other methods (i.e., participant observation 
and content analysis) to create a robust framework for analyzing hidden power 
structures within documents (Altheide, 1996). Ethnographic content analysis also 
goes beyond traditional legal scholarship by providing the researcher the ability 
to illuminate the social relations embedded within the opinions’ word choices, 
word ordering, metaphors, and the other processes that give the article its life. 
Broadly speaking, an ethnography is a “social scientific description of a 
people” (p. 40) and the social realities that they inhabit (Vidich & Lyman, 2000). 
At the heart of any ethnographic work is engagement with people. Using 
Altheide’s (1996) method, I approached each federal decision as if I was 
speaking with the document’s author. This mindset helped me immerse myself 
into the world that each federal decision was creating, much the same way that 
interviewing people allows the researcher to immerse themselves within their 




emotionally connected me to each case. Reading the federal decisions in this 
manner allowed me to address any possible emotional responses (e.g., anger, 
sadness, frustration, etc.) that might arise from reading the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision. Reading the officers’ explanations for why they shot the Browns’ dogs 
elicited a sense of anger because the dogs were trying to escape the officers 
when they were shot. The short amount of time elapsing between the officers 
entering the Browns’ home and the lead officer shooting the first dog likewise 
elicited a sense of frustration that the dogs were not given the opportunity to 
demonstrate that they were not a threat. 
When these emotions began to arise, I would ask myself what I was 
feeling (e.g., anger, sadness, disgust, etc.) and what I believed was the cause of 
these feelings. I would then write down a brief note regarding these feelings and I 
continued reading the decision. These notes allowed me to understand the 
differing social realities emerging from my interaction with the document. One of 
these social realities regarded canicide within the Brown (2016) decision prior to 
my involvement and the other social realty was that which included me in its 
construction as well. Ethnographic content analysis is appropriate for this 
dissertation because it begins with the assumption that social meanings are 
embedded within various formats of communication exchange (e.g., rhythm, 
style, the context of the report, and other nuances) (Altheide, 1987). If the 





When conducting an analysis of a document, the researcher should 
“consider the original purpose of the document…and the [document’s] target 
audience” (Bowen, 2009, p. 33). Ethnographic content analysis (ECA) asks 
researchers to view documents as a symbolic representation of the cultural and 
social power structures that produce social life in the form of someone’s lived 
experiences as a member of a society (Altheide, 1996). Illuminating the cultural 
and social power structures is achieved by situating the investigator as an 
integral component at every stage of the research process. The importance of 
the investigator in ethnographic content analysis arises from the method’s highly 
reflexive design which is itself founded on the belief that documents are “social 
products” (p. 42) of the underlying power dynamics regulating the environment in 
which they are produced. For instance, some pro-police demonstrators in New 
York City wore shirts at a rally adorned with the words “I can breathe” on the front 
and “thanks to the NYPD” on the back (Graaf & Boyle, 2014). On their own, the 
words on these shirts have little to no meaning. However, the underlying cultural 
and social meanings of these shirts emerge when placed within context of the 
social unrest in 2014 which was sparked by the death of Eric Garner by the New 
York City Police Department whose last words were “I can’t breathe.” The 
researcher is asked to look at documents, such as the shirts worn by the pro-
police demonstrators in 2014, in relation to what is known about the social reality 
in which the document exists (Altheide, 1996). The goal of ethnographic content 




understand how the underlying power structures of social life influence and are 
influenced by the document’s existence (Altheide, 1996). 
Documents are defined by Altheide (1996) as any item that is both 
retrievable and embedded with social and/or cultural meaning. Transforming a 
document (e.g., menu, newspaper, or judicial decision) into data occurs when the 
researcher uses a protocol that guides the researcher’s interactions with the 
document as a cultural and social symbol. As a representation of social life, 
documents can alert us to those nuances within social life that regulate social 
interaction by what is included and excluded from the communication process. 
For instance, a receipt is an itemized list communicating what someone 
purchased and how much they spent on the listed item(s). Although receipts are 
both relevant and retrievable which makes them documents, they are not data if 
their purpose is to simply list items for recordkeeping. However, receipts become 
data when the researcher approaches these documents as a cultural marker for 
understanding how gender inequalities are reinforced through economic 
practices such as a pink tax. Although documents are created independent of the 
researcher and are believed to be unaffected by the researcher’s presence 
(Bowen, 2009), the analysis of a document is influenced by the researcher’s prior 
knowledge (Thunstedt, 2017). As Thunstedt (2017) addressed in his study 
examining how the concept of masculinity intersects with the concept of the ideal 
father in magazines who’s target audience is fathers, his analysis of the selected 




Thunstadt’s (2017) attention toward certain topics and concepts. Likewise, my 
sociological knowledge and knowledge of the criminal justice system directed my 
attention toward certain concepts. Taking a few days off between each read-
through of the selected judicial opinions provided more opportunities for themes 
and patterns to emerge that I may have overlooked during the first read-through. 
The purpose of ethnographic content analysis is to “document and 
understand the communication of meaning, as well as verify theoretical 
relationships” (Altheide, 1987, p. 68). Guiding this purpose is ethnographic 
content analysis’ premise that social life is partially constructed from a reiterative 
process of communication and interpretation that defines the subject-object 
relationship along with those aspects of this relationship (e.g., people, places, or 
things) that are important for consideration when constructing a particular 
moment of social life. Even the social and cultural meanings embedded within 
language are themselves influenced by factors such as one’s race, gender, 
sexuality, religion, socioeconomic status, and where one lives (Altheide, 1996). 
As Sandberg (2010) notes, “people situate their stories within certain social 
structures and historical events” (p. 1053) with the social meaning(s) the 
storyteller wishes to convey partially elucidated by their choice of social 
structures and historical events. It is in regard to these contextual factors that 
ethnographic content analysis attempts to understand the social situations 




analysis’ reiterative process that these embedded meanings emerge from a 
document (Altheide, 1996). 
Ethnographic Content Analysis Process 
Ethnographic content analysis is comprised of 12 steps divided into five 
stages:  (a) documents, (b) protocol development and data collection, (c) data 
coding and organization, (d) data analysis, and (e) report (Altheide, 1996, p. 23). 
In the document stage, the researcher defines the issue to be investigated, 
constructs a research question, explores the various types of documents that 
could be used to answer the research question, and determines the appropriate 
unit of analysis. In the protocol stage, the focus is on developing guidelines for 
answering the appropriate questions (Altheide, 1996). For instance, Meyer 
(2001), in studying two mergers within Norway’s financial industry, developed a 
design that guided the “(1) selection of cases; (2) sampling time; (3) choosing 
business areas, divisions, and sites; and (4) selection of and choices regarding 
data collection procedures, interviews, documents, and observation” (p. 332). 
Collecting the appropriate cases allows Meyer (2001) to examine the “sensitive 
issues such as power struggles between the two merging organizations” (p. 332) 
in his study. The protocol phase is also where the researcher determines if their 
design is capable of obtaining the necessary data to answer the study’s research 
question (Altheide, 1996). Bourgois and Schonberg (2009) used collaborative 
photo-ethnography to document the lives of drug users in San Francisco, 




struggles, suffering, and losses. Collaborative photo-ethnography relies on the 
presence of two or more researchers working closely together to collaborate on 
field notes and photographs so that they could later “compare what [they] had 
seen, heard, and felt” (Bourgois & Schonberg, 2009, p. 11). 
Once the appropriate form of document has been chosen and a working 
protocol established, the next phase is to collect the data. The final two stages 
are data analysis and the reporting of findings. In ethnographic content analysis, 
analyzing data consists of repeatedly reading and revising codes as necessary, 
as well as comparing and contrasting any differences which is facilitated by 
noting “surprises and curiosities about…cases and other materials in your data” 
(Altheide, 1996, p. 42). The data analysis stage requires multiple read-throughs 
of documents and refinement of key words, codes, and concepts by comparing 
within categories and between categories looking for themes and patterns. 
During each phase of the coding process the researcher is reevaluating and 
reflecting on the information that is emerging. 
Data 
Data for the current project comes from federal judicial decisions which 
are comprised of the majority’s opinion and any concurring or dissenting opinion 
addressing the constitutionality of an officer’s involvement in canicide. Federal 
judicial decisions from the federal level were chosen as a primary data because 
federal courts have jurisdiction over matters regarding the United States 




laws, and controversies between the states (United States Courts, n.d.). Related 
to the federal judiciary’s jurisdiction, Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v Madison 
(1803), established the judiciary’s authority to declare a law unconstitutional. 
Finally, decisions made at the federal level are binding on the lower courts (i.e., 
states courts and lower federal courts) that fall within a the deciding court’s 
geographical jurisdiction (The Writing Center at Georgetown University Law 
Center, 2017). However, the decisions from one federal district are not binding 
on courts in other federal districts since each federal district holds an equal 
status with the other federal districts. Decisions by the Supreme Court of the 
United States, however, are binding on every court at all levels (i.e., local, state, 
and federal). 
Countries like the United States which uses the common law method 
emphasizes the authority of case law which has the goal of finding an “identical 
case that supports the advocate’s legal reasoning” (Nolasco, Vaughn, & del 
Carmen, 2010, p. 5). In the United States, court decisions establish the paradigm 
within which the law exists and is practiced (Bintliff, 2007). Binding (i.e., stare 
decisis) is important aspect of the American judicial system because it creates a 
sense of uniformity and predictability among cases with similar facts. As Justice 
Frankfurter stated in Helvering v Hallock (1940), the concept of stare decisis 
“represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need 
to satisfy reasonable expectations” (p, 119). That is to say, the American judicial 




outcome (Walker, 2016). For a prior judicial opinion to be binding on subsequent 
cases, the prior decision must be (1) factually similar with the case currently 
before the judiciary with more legal authority given those decisions whose factual 
backgrounds are highly related to the factual background of the current case, and 
(2) the prior decision must come from the same court that is hearing the current 
case or from a superior court within the geographical jurisdiction of the court 
hearing the current case (Walker, 2016). 
Data Collection 
Legal documents were collected using Nexis Uni (formally Lexis Nexis). 
Collecting the federal judicial decisions for inclusion in this dissertation was done 
through a technique similar to “snowball” sampling that is called shepardizing. 
The Shepard’s Citations is a method for verifying information (Danner, 2007), 
and shepardizing is the process by which a judicial decision is vetted to 
determine if that court’s ruling is able to be cited as legal precedent. Through the 
process of shepardizing, a researcher can review any subsequent appellate 
history (e.g., positive, negative, and/or neutral) along with all subsequent judicial 
decisions citing the selected decision(s). I began the shepardizing process with 
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Brown v Battle Creek Police Department (2016). 
This decision was chosen because the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of police killing dogs because of the 
perceived threat arising from a dog’s barking. A read-through of the Brown 




cited as a binding authority addressing the constitutionality of canicide. After this 
initial read-through, the Brown (2016) decision was then shepardized to locate 
(1) more recent cases concerning the constitutionality of police killing dogs and 
(2) to determine how these subsequent judicial decisions refine the decision 
made in Brown (2016). The background of each shepardized decision was 
reviewed to determine if the case itself involved an officer shooting a dog. 
Judicial decisions that did not involve officers shooting dogs (fatally or nonfatally) 
were excluded from analysis. Furthermore, cases were excluded if subsequent 
appellate history overruled the decision. For those cases that have been 
overruled, I used the overruling opinion in lieu of the original case. However, if a 
case was overruled only in part, and the part that was overruled does not 
concern the police shooting the dog(s), then the case was still included in the 
study. 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis began with multiple read-throughs of the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in Brown v Battle Creek Police Department (2016). This first read 
through of the Brown (2016) decision was done to determine what the Sixth 
Circuit specifically decided regarding the killing of the Browns’ dogs by police. 
That is, the focus of the initial read-through was to obtain information on the 
background of the incident, the officer’s version of events, the family’s version of 
events, the judicial decision (e.g., affirmed or reversed), the majority’s reasoning 




this initial read-through, I was able to determine that the dogs’ physical act of 
barking was not what the Sixth Circuit used to justify the dogs’ deaths at the 
hands of the officers. Rather, the dogs’ barking was the vocal representation of 
the dogs’ aggressiveness and threat to the officers’ safety. From this initial read-
through, I was able to determine that the dogs’ physical act of barking was not 
what the Sixth Circuit used to justify the dogs’ deaths at the hands of the officers. 
Rather, the dogs’ barking was the vocal representation of the dogs’ 
aggressiveness and threat to the officers’ safety. I was also able to determine 
from this initial read-through that any perceived or actual threat to an officer’s 
safety, even if it comes from a dog, is justification for the use of deadly force. 
A second read-through was conducted to confirm my understanding of the 
case gained from the first reading, as well as allowing the researcher the 
opportunity to locate any additional information pertinent to the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision missed during the first read-through. The third read-through of the 
decision was a more focused reading that helped me develop a better 
understanding of the social reality that the Sixth Circuit was constructing. 
Through this third reading I was able to see the different forms that law takes. 
One form is the law as a profession while another form is law as a set of codes 
and rules (Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012). A final form is the law as a scholarly 
pursuit (Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012). Knowing these different forms helped me 
better understand the different social realities coexisting within each of the 




similar frames and themes emerging from each judicial opinion. For instance, 
almost every judicial opinion presented the background of the case (e.g., the 
events and circumstances that led to canicide) before moving into discussing 
why the court hearing the case has the jurisdiction to act as an arbiter regarding 
the incident of canicide before them. It was in this background section where the 
judge(s) would lay out the reasons for why they did or did not believe the officer’s 
version of the event was more valid than the version presented by the dog’s 
owner, and it was these facts that the judge(s) relied upon to justify their 
decision. The judicial opinions examined usually had a section were the key 
concepts such as summary judgment or qualified immunity are defined and the 
restrictions, if any, placed on the judiciary by prior judicial decisions. It was also 
noted that the judicial opinion discussed and usually rule on each allegation (e.g., 
does the shooting of a dog constitute a seizure and the intentional infliction of 
emotional destress) separately. These frames and themes were developed and 
refined through subsequent read-throughs because, as Altheide (1996) points 
out, a key aspect of examining documents is illuminating latent meanings 
embedded within the document’s frames, themes, and discourses which are 
themselves influenced by how the author presents the information. The process 
used by ethnographic content analysis to illuminate and refine the latent 
meanings in the themes, frames, and discourses in a document’s story is akin to 




Thematic analysis is a way to examine stories within a document so that 
the researcher can tease out any latent meanings, desires, and/or beliefs the 
storyteller wishes to convey through their story by their choice of which events 
are important for inclusion in the story (Riessman, 2008). For instance, 
Tamboukou (2003) examined the letters and other literary works of women 
teachers in late nineteenth century England and found that simple acts such as 
locking one’s door was viewed as a form of self-empowerment and 
independence. Although the emphasis of thematic analysis is not focused on “the 
telling” of the story (Riessman, 2008, p. 54), the storyteller’s word choices do 
help us locate dominant power structures hidden with the text of a document. 
Again, Tamboukou’s (2003) examination of the literary works of women teachers 
revealed the “women’s self-writings present selves on the move, always 
attempting to go beyond the boundaries of their family, their locality, their town or 
city and, in some cases, their country” (p. 59). The word choices these women 
used, such as “go out, get out, be out, spread my wings, run away, leave” (p. 58), 
highlight the restrictive position English society took regarding women’s 
locomotion. Teaching for these women was a form of resistance to the existing 
power structures at that time (Tamboukou, 2003). Themes and the discourses 
used to construct them may be viewed as the “basic ‘truth’ the story is designed 
to illustrate” (ReadingVine, 2018). 
Determining what is the basic truth in a story is achieved by locating 




phenomena under investigation (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). These 
themes and patterns emerge through a careful reading and re-reading of each 
document (Bowen, 2009). Regarding the current study, themes such as officer 
safety were easy to identify and develop since the Sixth Circuit’s opinion was 
very explicit about its importance to the decision. Other themes, however, 
required multiple read-throughs to tease out. For instance, one of the patterns 
that emerged from multiple read-throughs was the dismissal of the victim’s 
extensive history with their dogs as authoritative regarding the dogs’ behavior 
while giving extraordinary weight to the testimonies of the officers regarding 
dogs’ behavior from their brief encounter with the dogs. Another pattern is the 
extraordinary weight the judiciary gives to officer safety as a justification for the 
killing of another being. A difference between thematic analysis and other 
qualitative methods, however, is that the story is kept intact by developing 
themes from each document instead of developing themes from all the 
documents as a single body of work (Riessman, 2008). This procedure is similar 
to the process put forward by Altheide (1996) in which the researcher is directed 
to return to previous stages and rethink their initial understanding as they move 
forward with analysis of a new document. Using this method as a guide to 
analysis, I returned to the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Brown v Battle Creek Police 
Department (2016) periodically after reading several new cases addressing 
canicide. The goal was to determine if the themes in the Brown (2016) decision 




across time. Following this reiterative method, I noticed a pattern emerging from 
the federal opinions analyzed which indicated that most of the dogs were shot 
and/or killed by police were on their owner’s property. 
The knowledge gained from the fourth read-through was then used to 
reanalyze the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Brown (2016) to (1) determine if Browns’ 
dogs were also on their owner’s property and (2) if so, reevaluate the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in light of this knowledge. Again, the purpose of this reiteration 
process with data analysis was not to determine how well the pattern or theme 
“fit the data,” but to develop a better understanding of how and why a pattern or 
theme exists. Data reiteration continued until a refined pattern or theme was 
developed. This process led to the following patterns or themes: the production 
of space (e.g., private spaces vs public space, personhood, etc.), the four-legged 
serial killer, and dogs as familiars. A final read-through of the Sixth Circuit’s 
Brown (2016) decision was conducted to help refine the social reality the Sixth 
Circuit was constructing regarding police violence against dogs, specifically 
prototypical accounts of how dogs might be legitimately and illegitimately killed 
by police officers. Once this final reading was finished, the themes developed 
from the within-case analysis were used for a cross-case comparison. 
Ethnographic content analysis focuses on the themes, frames, and 
discourses of a document to illuminate those things that make our experiences 
recognizable to others used for communicating social and cultural meanings 




discourses that we use in our everyday lives that help construct our social 
realities. (Abbott, 1992). Ethnographic content analysis is a method that allows 
the researcher to extract the social relations embedded within the document’s 
narrative; that is, the author’s word choices, word ordering, and chosen 
metaphors (Altheide, 1996). In Hirschfield and Simon’s (2010) study of civilian 
deaths by police, they found that a common theme was discussing the 
deceased’s criminal history usually within the first paragraph. Likewise, news 
stories use euphemistic language (i.e., replacing the word “kill” with “fatal 
shooting”) to dilute the act of killing another human being by a state actor 
(Hirschfield & Simon, 2010).  
Comparing themes across different cases and/or formats (e.g., 
newspapers, TV shows, magazines, etc.), or what Altheide (1996) refers to as 
“tracking discourse” (p. 70), highlights the narratives that connects someone’s 
social reality to that of another person. This connection occurs because 
narratives oftentimes involve “relations between relations” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 
3). For instance, in Miller, Carbone-Lopez, and Gunderman’s (2015) examination 
of women methamphetamine users, a dominant theme among their sample was 
redemption from drug user to a traditional cultural perspective of motherhood. 
However, it is practically impossible for an event story to include everything that 
‘happened’; therefore, the individual or group must choose which events they 
believe are the most important. Narrative’s raw materials are extracted from 




comparison used federal judicial decisions addressing the issue of officers 
shooting domestic dogs. An aspect of the cross-case comparison focused on 
determining if the same themes and frames found in the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in 
Brown (2016). 
Appropriate cases for the cross-case comparison were selected by first 
locating those federal decisions cited by the Sixth Circuit in its Brown (2016) 
decision and then shepardizing Brown (2016) to locate decisions citing the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision as precedent. These shepardized decisions also provided an 
opportunity to locate other decisions addressing the issue of officers shooting 
dogs besides that of Brown (2016). A within-case analysis was conducted for 
each of the decisions located via the Sixth Circuit’s Brown (2016) decision. The 
same data-reiteration process used in Brown (2016) was performed on each of 
the selected decisions. Although each within-case analysis was performed with 
the intent of allowing patterns to emerge organically as with Brown (2016), the 
researcher was cognizant that the themes developed in the Brown (2016) 
analysis were operating in the background of my mind which directed my 
attention to specific words or phrases. When these incidents happened, they 
were noted in the column of the case being analyzed, on a piece of paper, or on 
a Post-it note so that the read through could continue without dwelling on any 
possible connections between the case being analyzed and its relationship to 
other cases. This safety measure was loosened with each subsequent re-reading 




the Brown (2016) decision, a truncated data-reiteration was performed to 
determine if a new theme was developing or if the pattern was similar but not the 
same as the already developed themes. Any pattern or theme emerging from the 
latter within-case analyses that was similar to those from the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision helped refine the themes in Brown (2016) by providing the needed 
caveats. The caveats found in the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Brown (2016) 
provided themes and frames that I could look for in subsequent decisions 
addressing canicide which would help illuminate similar thoughts and behaviors 
that arise across locations and individuals (Fetterman, 2010) that justify the killing 





CHAPTER THREE  
VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE 
 
 
One of the obstacles to reimagining the criminal justice system is defining 
the parameters that constitute the criminal justice system. How does the violent 
death of a dog at the hands of the police perpetuate the inequalities within the 
criminal justice system? What does this violent death mean to victims of police 
violence and to society in general? The answer appears to present itself when 
not viewing the criminal justice system simply as cops, courts, and corrections. 
Moving beyond these three pillars of the criminal justice system allows us to 
account for the social relationships that underlie the formation and passage of 
the laws the police enforce, as well as account for the role of the police and the 
court system, as well as the role of the Constitution, the local communities, and 
that of the larger populace. 
Refocusing my perspective to approach the criminal justice system from a 
holistic perspective allows me to rephrase my initial question: How does the 
violent death of a dog at the hands of the police sustain the current state of the 
criminal justice system, as well as ensure its continued survival? How does the 
police killing of dogs shape the lived experiences of those within the larger 
community beyond the individual’s potential interaction with the three main pillars 
of the criminal justice system? Finally, in what ways does violence sustain the 




and many others, is to begin with what we know about the relationship between 
violence and state power. 
Research examining officer involved shootings extends “back more than 
25 years” (p. 238); yet, there is no single governmental repository that can be 
accessed to determine patterns or trends even though police departments collect 
information on officer involved shootings (Alpert, 2015). Although the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation has data on all lethal and non-lethal violence against 
police by citizens, the department has no real data on the reverse (Cohen, 
Gunderson, Jackson, Zachary, Clark, Glynn, & Owens, 2019). Therefore, no one 
knows how many people are killed annually by police (Hirschfield, 2015). 
Although an officer’s decision to use deadly force is the result of “a contingent 
sequence of decisions and resulting behaviors” (p. 116), the final decision is 
made from the information gathered during the police-citizen encounter (Binder & 
Scharf, 1980). Complicating matters, however, is that the police’s use of physical 
force is applied arbitrarily. Typically, the police do not direct their force at the 
elderly, teenagers from the middle- or upper-class, a religious leader, or other 
groups stereotyped as non-threatening (Binder & Scharf, 1980). Rather, the 
target of police violence is “most likely to be a black or Hispanic male, between 
the ages of 16 and 30” (Binder & Scharf, 1980, p. 114) which in turn creates a 
perception within the targeted populations that the police are to be hated and 
scorned. The officer comes to symbolize the oppression and hatred felt by the 




structures (Binder & Scharf, 1980). Even with these nuances and limitations, the 
authority to use force as a means for resolving situations has been a component 
of policing since its inception (Bittner, 1970; Klockers, 1996; Micucci & Gomme, 
2005; Westley, 1953). Any discussion regarding police violence, however, must 
address the fact that a consensus does not exist as to which behaviors constitute 
an act of police violence (Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2005). 
Violence and the Police 
The term violence appears reserved for those instances when some 
believe that the police have crossed an imaginary line demarcating legitimate 
force from police violence. Kania and Mackey (1977) argue that “[f]orce implies 
the exertion of power to compel or restrain the behavior of others, as well as 
physical action” (p. 29). Force, under Kania and Mackey’s (1977) 
conceptualization then, implies a legitimate use of physical coercion while 
violence may be best understood as the illegitimate (e.g., illegal) use of physical 
coercion. Adding another layer of complexity to the definitional quagmire is that 
force comes in many different forms (Klockers, 1996), such as verbal commands, 
handcuffing a suspect, or even using different hold techniques to restrain a 
suspect (Garner, Buchanan, Schade, & Hepburn, 1996; Ristroph, 2017). 
Furthermore, some argue that force may be “both abusive of the rights or dignity 
of citizens and necessary and appropriate police conduct” (Klockers, 1996, p. 7; 
emphasis in original). That is, the level of force used by an officer, along with the 




necessary to effectuate an arrest that falls well within constitutional parameters. 
Even with the difficulties arising around defining what constitutes “force,” a 
pattern emerges which indicates that the application of force comes in three 
general forms: self-defense, limited use, and virtually unrestricted (Bittner, 1970). 
In the first form- self-defense- force is used by an individual (usually a 
non-deputized citizen) to protect themselves from an attacker with some states 
even establishing limitations on when a citizen can use counterforce and the 
degree of counterforce one is permitted to use (Bittner, 1970). The second form – 
limited use – allows individuals working in certain professions (e.g., correctional 
officers) the right to use force as a means of effectuating the performance of their 
duties, but only against those individuals remanded to their care (Bittner, 1970). 
In Whitely v Albers (1986), the United States Supreme Court had to decide if the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited the shooting of 
an inmate during the quelling of a prison riot. According to the Court, the answer 
is no. 
The infliction of pain in the course of a prison security measure, therefore, 
does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it may 
appear in retrospect that the degree of force authorized or applied for 
security purposes was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict 
sense (Whitely v Albers, 1986, p. 319). 
 
The significance of Whitely v Alber (1986) is that the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision continues a judicial trend of providing prison administrators and 
personnel more leeway in dealing with inmates, especially during emergency 




uses force with good faith for restoring order and not done malicious or with 
sadistic intent, then there is no violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment (Whitely v Albers, 1986). The Court 
solidified this decision when it declared that “It is obduracy and wantonness, not 
inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” (Whitely v Albers, 1986, p. 319). It 
should be noted that the Court’s decision in this case only applies to the use of 
deadly force (del Carmen, Ritter, & Witt, 2008). Excessive physical force may 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment even in situations where an inmate 
does not suffer serious injury (Hudson v McMillian, 1992). As with the use of 
deadly force, however, the use of force which does not result in serious injury 
must be done with malicious or sadistic intent on behalf of the correctional 
personnel (del Carmen, Ritter, & Witt, 2008). Again, force applied under good 
faith as a method for restoring order in a correctional facility does not rise to the 
level of a constitutional violation. 
The final form of force—virtually unrestricted—is reserved for those 
individuals working in an official policing capacity (Bittner, 1970). One of the 
biggest misconceptions regarding the application of force by police, however, is 
that the force must be equal to the threat encountered by the officer. 
“[C]onstitutional doctrine does not require proportionality. The officer's force may 
far exceed the suspect's resistance; indeed, that is the point- to overcome 




gradually imparted more authority to the police by broadening the types of 
disputes in which the police have the authority to intervene (Ristroph, 2017). 
Accompanying this broadening of police responsibility is an expanding authority 
to use violence as a resolution technique, and the result of this expanded 
authority is a decrease in the time between actual or perceived resistance and 
the application of force including deadly force (Ristroph, 2017). Although, law 
enforcement agencies provide officers with use of force policies to help guide 
their decision-making processes, these policies operate on “the principle that 
disobedience is not to be tolerated, and force is the logical result of any 
resistance” (p. 1209) and that escalation of force will continue until the suspect 
surrenders or is dead (Ristroph, 2017). The contentious nature of using force as 
a resolution technique has not been lost on the police. “Some police departments 
have sought to jettison the phrase ‘use of force’ altogether; a favored 
replacement is ‘response to resistance’” (Ristroph, 2017, p. 1213). This change 
in terminology may appear innocuous, but it subtly shifts the onus of 
responsibility for a citizen’s injuries or death from the police to the citizenry. The 
term “use of force” implies that the police are proactive in the application of force 
whereas the term “response to force” implies a reactive application.  
Setting aside dissensus on what police violence is, distinctive patterns are 
seen regarding which officers are most likely to engage in problem behaviors. 
First, it has been shown that the “problem” officers are usually younger with less 




Mieczkowski, 2005). Garner, Maxwell, and Heraux (2002) found that younger 
officers use more force than older officers. Second, a pattern emerges which 
shows that male officers receive more complaints of excessive force than female 
officers (Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2005). Again, Garner and colleagues (2002) 
found that female officers use less force than male officers. Third, officers who 
have more complaints lodged against them make twice as many index arrests 
and three times more arrests overall compared to officers who have fewer 
complaints against them (Brandl, Stroshine, & Frank, 2001). Fourth, the 
complaint-prone officers are more likely to work in areas with a high crime rate 
(Brandl, Stroshine, & Frank, 2001), and it is in these high crime neighborhoods 
where younger officers (i.e., less years on the force) are usually assigned during 
the early years of their policing career (Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2005). Using force 
to coerce compliance from the public, though, has left many departments and 
their officers lacking public support (e.g., legitimacy) and appearing corrupt 
(Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2005). 
The legitimacy of a police department and the authority of its officers, 
then, is contingent on the citizenry accepting that the state has the right to dictate 
appropriate behavior and that those whom the state chooses to enforce these 
standards have the approval of the populace to do so (Gerber & Jackson, 2017; 
Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Jackson, 2014). “Once legal authorities are seen 
as legitimate, people will be more likely to engage in normatively desirable law-




perception is not meet, and an officer’s use of force transitions into what some 
might believe is “violence,” cooperation from the citizenry becomes limited. 
Therefore, a police department’s legitimacy is also founded in the belief that each 
citizen is treated the same when interacting with the police (Holmes, Painter, & 
Smith, 2018). Yet, research has found that blacks are more likely than whites—
sometimes 5 times more likely depending on the question—to believe that police 
misconduct happens very often (Weitzer & Tuch, 2004) and that those groups 
who are the least targeted by law enforcement hold a more favorable perception 
of the policing institution (Ross, 2000). Mirroring the findings regarding public 
perception of police misconduct, individuals from marginalized populations are 
more likely to believe that the police consistently use race as a factor in their 
decision-making process (Graziano, Schuck, & Martin, 2010). As such, police 
violence may be one of the symptoms of the “enduring racial and ethnic divisions 
in American society” (Smith & Holmes, 2003, p. 1037). 
For some, the police have an enduring legacy of using state approved 
violence “to protect the power and privilege of certain segments of society” 
(Stults & Baumer, 2007, p. 507). Slave patrols arose during the antebellum 
period as a way to regulate the free movement of slaves and they became the 
all-seeing eye of the slave’s master (Taslitz, 2006). Many whites from the lower 
rung of the white hierarchy were overwhelming selected for patrol duties because 
many plantation owners felt that serving on a patrol regulating their property was 




instrument for regulating the movement of people of color as well as promoting 
conflict between poor Whites and poor Blacks to prevent these groups from 
potentially uniting against those within the dominant classes of American society 
(Alexander, 2012). Stults and Baumer (2007) found that as one moves from all-
white locales to locations where approximately one-quarter of the population is 
black, the number of officers increase by approximately 15 percent. Likewise, 
areas that had a growing population of black residents also had larger police 
departments (Stults & Baumer, 2007). At a certain point, however, this pattern 
seems to reverse. Holmes, Painter, and Smith (2018) found that as the 
percentage of black population increases, police-caused homicides decrease 
(Holmes, Painter, & Smith, 2018). Creating civil discontent among the populace 
allows the dominate group to create a criminal class, which is oftentimes 
racialized, that becomes a viable construct for maintaining the dominant racial 
and economic order of society (Alexander, 2012). 
Bor, Venkataramani, Williams, and Tsai (2018) examined the responses 
from over 100,000 black Americans regarding their exposure to police killings 
and self-reported mental health. Bor and colleagues (2018) found that the more 
exposure respondents had to police killings was associated with a decrease in 
the respondent’s mental health, “specifically, estimates imply that police killings 
of unarmed black Americans could contribute…55 million…excess poor mental 
health days per year among black American adults in the USA” (p. 308). Results 




structural racism on the mental health of black Americans, but indicate that those 
within the affected communities may have “heightened perceptions of threat and 
vulnerability, lack of fairness, lower social status, lower beliefs about one’s own 
worth, activation of prior traumas, and identification with the deceased” (p. 308). 
Although Garner and colleagues (2002) found a difference between white and 
black suspects regarding the use of physical force by police, this difference 
vanished when suspect resistance was added to their model.  
Every police officer is afforded a certain degree of autonomy (i.e., 
discretion) to carry out the duties of the profession. An officer’s discretion—that 
is, the leeway to choose a specific course of action(s) from a variety of choices 
(Mastrofski, 2004)—allows the officer to choose the course of action(s) they 
believe is most effective for resolving the issue at hand. When exercising their 
discretion, officers may use factors beyond the suspect’s behavior (e.g., location, 
weather, or even time of day) in their decision to use a specific course of action. 
The role of discretion is especially important when an officer decides to shoot. 
Correll and colleagues (2007) examined whether police officers were 
better at discerning armed suspects from unarmed suspects compared to non-
law enforcement professionals. Results from Correll et al.’s (2007) study 
demonstrate that officers were more discerning than lay people regarding the 
shooting of Black “suspects,” but they found that officers took less time in their 
decision-making process (i.e., shoot or don’t shoot) when the suspect was either 




officers were not as quick to shot compared to non-law enforcement subjects; 
yet, both officers and the non-law enforcement participants were able to make 
quicker decisions when cultural stereotypes were meet (i.e., Black as threatening 
and White as nonthreatening). Similar results were found by Correll, Urland, and 
Ito (2006); Nieuwenhuys, Savelsbergh, and Oudejans (2012) who found that 
officers were more likely to shoot when anxious; Kleider, Parrott, and King (2010) 
who found that when officers with limited working memory capacity were 
“threatened and experiencing highly arousing negative emotion” (p. 716) were at 
a higher risk of committing a shooting error; and Ma and Correll (2011) who 
found that “target prototypicality moderates racial bias” (p. 395). Even though the 
police have what appears to be unlimited authority to use any level of force 
deemed necessary, the form of force is itself governed by three factors: criminal 
law, civil liability, and fear of a scandal (Klockers, 1996). 
Governing Violence 
Criminal law sets forth the legal parameters that hold officers liable for any 
misuse of their powers; yet, exercising these laws very rarely occurs (Klockers, 
1996; Hughes, 2001). Reasons for the rare enforcement of these laws include, 
but are not limited to, the reluctance of courts to charge officers with a crime and 
the reluctance of juries to find officers guilty when they are charged (Klockers, 
1996). Prosecutors are reluctant to prosecute officers partly stems from fear of 
alienating those very individuals who the prosecutor must rely to effectively 




cases often have personal and legal histories that render them unsympathetic or 
non-credible as victims” (Hughes, 2001, p. 241). Due to the high burden of proof 
and reluctance of prosecutors to bring charges against police, many victims have 
chosen to pursue civil litigation as a means of governing police behavior. Civil 
liability suits, with their lower burden of proof, generally focus on monetary 
rewards instead of the loss of an officer’s liberty. Even with this more lenient 
jurisprudence format, though, it is difficult to hold officers accountable for their 
actions. Hughes (2001) found that approximately 18 percent of officers report 
personal experiences with being sued in civil court for behaviors relating to their 
job. For those officers who do find themselves in court over their actions during a 
police-citizen encounter, research suggests that the outcome is not that bad. 
Kappeler, Kappeler, and del Carmen (1993) found that 52 percent of officers 
prevailed against the lawsuits brought against them between 1978 and 1990. In 
the other 48 percent of cases, the officer lost at least one legal motion they put 
forward, such as a motion for summary judgment (Kappeler, Kappeler, & del 
Carmen, 1993). It should be kept in mind that losing a legal motion, such as a 
request for the suit to be dismissed, does not automatically equate to liability on 
part of the officer or the municipality for which the officer works (Kappeler, 
Kappeler, & del Carmen, 1993). Out of the cases brought against police officers, 
plaintiffs won 44.4 percent and 59.6 percent of their cases between 1978 and 
1990 respectively (Kappeler, Kappeler, & del Carmen, 1993). The average award 




Carmen, 1993). Overall, however, 64.3 percent of officers believe that civil suits 
do not deter officers from violating someone’s civil rights (Hughes, 2001). In other 
words, the judicial system appears to not have any deterrent effect on officer 
behavior even when monetary damages are awarded. 
The third governing factor—fearing a scandal—has the potential to be the 
most effective at regulating an officer’s behavior. Prior to the advent of the 
camera phone and the internet, incidents of police misconduct rarely made it to 
the public’s attention (Brown, 2016). When police misconduct did reach the 
public’s attention, it was usually the officer’s version of events against that of the 
citizen (Brown, 2016). The camera has provided an opportunity to reverse the 
state’s panoptic gaze by allowing the citizen the power to engage the police 
through a media format not controlled by officers. This form of counter-
surveillance—oftentimes referred to as sousveillance—switches the traditional 
roles of the police and the citizen as a way of “preventing the invisibility of police 
violence” (Brucato, 2015, p. 58) by tethering police legitimacy with transparency. 
An aspect of transparency is allowing the public to surveille the activities of state 
agents (Brucato, 2015); therefore, police legitimacy diminishes whenever they 
engage in any behavior that appears to restrict the citizen’s surveillance abilities. 
Brown (2016) examined how officers in two Canadian cities—Toronto and 
Ottawa—perform their duties in a world where a private citizen has the 
technological ability to record the officer’s behavior at any time. Out of the 231 




possibility of being recorded by a random person was always on their minds with 
approximately 69 percent reporting that this was a frequent, if not primary, topic 
of discussion between them and their colleagues. As for an officer’s behavior 
during the performance of his-her duties, approximately 50 percent reported 
using less physical force than they would have prior to the increased ability of 
citizens to record police activities. This sentiment is summed up by one 
participant is quoted as saying, “These cameraphones [sic] everywhere is a 
game-changer and anyone who tells you they are not concerned or they haven’t 
changed how they do some things is full of shit” (Brown, 2016, p303). Results 
from Brown’s (2016) study indicates that this reverse-panopticism has the ability 
to alter an officer’s behavior and potentially prevent both a “black eye” for a local 
police department and unnecessary physical harm to a suspect. “The new 
transparency undergirds the political strategies…most activists and other civil 
society groups focusing on police violence, [as well as] motivates considerable 
political activity on matters of crucial social and environmental importance” 
(Brucato, 2015, p. 51). Yet, the police profession remains resilient against 
change even with all the advancements in audio and visual technologies. 
In the case of Eric Garner, there was amble video footage of Officer 
Pantaleo chocking Eric Garner which eventually led to the latter’s death. 
However, a grand jury declined to indict Officer Pantaleo even after watching the 
footage and hearing from both the officer and witnesses (Goodman & Baker, 




indicted for their role in the 12-year-old’s death (Fantz, Almasy, & Shoichet, 
2015). According to the prosecutor in the case, “Given this perfect storm of 
human error, mistakes and communications by all involved that day, the 
evidence did not indicate criminal conduct by police” (Fantz, Almasy, & Shoichet, 
2015, para. 3). This inability of video footage and other forms of external control 
to govern police behavior highlights what should be another governing factor—
the media. 
In the United States, the ideological perspective regarding the media, is 
that of an autonomous institution searching for the “truth”; yet, the making of 
news is a collaborative process between the reporter and the government official 
(Schudson, 2000). Many journalists, though, cultivate government officials 
because of their access to restricted information and these very government 
officials sometimes seek out journalists so that selected information may be 
passed along to the public (Schudson, 2000). This intimate relationship between 
the government and the media has led some to wonder whether the media is 
simply another political tool for politicians (Cook, 2006). Hirschfield and Simon 
(2010) found that many newspapers use their position as a means of legitimizing 
and normalizing police violence. Although the police and other government 
officials like to complain about the bias of news stories, “the news usually quite 
faithfully reflects the views, concerns, and activities of [the governing authority]” 
(Lawrence, 2000, p. 5). This close relationship between the media and 




also helps in the creation of the Other. News stories about crime simultaneously 
report on the criminal activity within a specific area and help construct the social 
image of the criminal (Lyon, 2009) which oftentimes resembles those individuals 
from marginalized populations, specifically younger males who are persons of 
color (Alexander, 2000). As a consequence, “[w]hiteness mitigates crime, 
whereas blackness defines the criminal” (Alexander, 2012, p. 199). Although 
external mechanisms regulating the use of force by officers (e.g., criminal law, 
civil law, and fear of a scandal) exist, the exceptions (e.g., qualified immunity and 
good faith) built into these external mechanisms are sufficient to provide officers 
with a virtual “blank check” regarding when to use force and to what degree. 
However, the “excessive use of force requires justification that goes beyond 
police legitimacy, and one of such justifications might be ideological in nature” 
(Gerber & Jackson, 2017, p. 91). 
One justification championed by the police and their supporters is the 
rotten apple approach (Weitzer & Tuch, 2004). This justification accounts for the 
fact that the police profession attracts certain types of individuals and from this 
pool a subsample will be drawn to proceed to recruit training (Binder & Scharf, 
1980). The “rotten apple,” then, is nothing more than an anomaly that slipped 
through the proverbial cracks of the department’s safety measures and places 
the responsibility for any police violence at the feet of the individual officer 
(Lawrence, 2000). Others argue that the police profession is more akin to a 




approach, a police subculture begins to develop with distinctive “set of values, 
norms, and lifestyles” (Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2005, p. 560) that views violence 
as a positive identifying attribute of both the police profession the individual 
officer. Regardless, the policing personality seems to exude features of 
“authoritarianism—among them are cynicism, bigotry, conservatism, group 
loyalty, and secretiveness” (Binder & Scharf, 1980, p. 113). 
Another justification for the contested level of force is the characteristics of 
the recipient. The typical target for physical force by the police is not “an old lady, 
teenager at an exclusive boarding school, a minister of an Episcopalian church, 
or a ballerina.’…instead…‘It is most likely to be a black or Hispanic male, 
between the ages of 16 and 30” (Binder & Scharf, 1980, p. 114). In these 
instances, the targeted citizen is portrayed by their possible or real criminal 
history which supposedly highlights their dangerousness to the officer’s safety 
and by extension the safety of the public. The legitimacy of this justification is 
based on the perceived role of the police as crime fighters (Micucci & Gomme, 
2005). In this role, the primary responsibility of the police is the detection and 
apprehension of the felon (Westley, 1953). The consequence of this perception is 
that a certain degree of force may be more acceptable for the felon than for the 
minister. In a recent study, it was found that approximately two-thirds of officers 
(62%) reported viewing their role as both a protector and enforcer (Morin, Parker, 
Stepler, & Mercer, 2017). The significance of this finding is that this view of police 




Violence and the Police-Citizen Encounter 
What these various examinations of police violence fail to account for is 
that violence is not an abnormal event within the police-citizen encounter; it is in 
actuality the foundation upon which the encounter is built. “Academy instructors 
often tell their students, ‘The training is not because you might be involved in a 
violent confrontation; the training is to prepare you for the violent confrontation 
that you will be involved in’” (Bohrer, 2005, p. 8; emphasis added). How the 
officer approaches the scene even helps to introduce violence even before the 
encounter occurs. Officers approach the police-citizen encounter based on the 
information from dispatch, other officers, and their own observations (Binder & 
Scharf, 1980). Garner and colleagues (2002) found that officers use more force 
when “responding to a priority call, more force is used. Similarly, when an officer 
uses the lights and sirens on the patrol car” (p. 736). Once on scene, the officer 
has to “determine the extent of danger, if any, establish his authority, clarify his 
expectations for the citizen, and gather information to supplement his general 
knowledge” (Binder & Scharf, 1980, p. 117). This supplemental information takes 
many forms such as gender, suspect familiarity, criminal history, and a pinch of 
paranoia. Garner and associates (2002) found that the police used more force 
against suspects who were male; suspects who are known to carry a weapon; 
when the suspect is a stranger; when the presence of bystanders increases with 
force becoming more severe when the bystanders are strangers to the suspect; 




the odds of police using force against a suspect who is antagonistic increases by 
163 percent; the odds increase 1800 percent when the suspect uses physical 
force against an officer (Garner, Maxwell, Heraux, 2002). “A somewhat surprising 
finding was that the police use less, not more, physical force if the suspect is a 
member of or associated with a gang” (Garner, Maxwell, & Heraux, 2002, p. 
738). Regarding paranoia, officers are always leery of a citizen’s intentions; how 
a person walks, talks, or even dresses could rouse suspicion regarding any ill will 
toward the officer (Binder & Scharf, 1980). The way paranoia introduces violence 
into the police-citizen encounter is evidenced by how officers, and even potential 
future officers (i.e., “explorers”), are instructed to perform traffic stops. 
The Texas Explorer’s Guide to Law Enforcement Training1 (n.d.) instructs 
students that when removing a motorist from a vehicle to “1) Always be in a 
position to respond to an aggressive act [and] 2) Walk tactfully; never turn your 
back on a violator” (p. 4). The San Antonio Police Department’s General Manual 
(2015) on low-risk traffic stops instructs officers to “6. Exit the vehicle in a safe 
manner while maintaining visual contact with the violator; and 7. Approach the 
violator’s vehicle on the driver’s or passenger’s side. Do not go beyond the 
trailing edge of the driver’s or passenger’s door” (p. 3). Even pro-police websites 
reinforce this belief that danger is always lurking in every traffic stop. One such 
 
1 The Law Enforcement Explorers Program is a program designed to give “young adults a 
personal awareness of the criminal justice system through training, practical experiences, 
competition and other activities” (Exploring, 2019). The explorers program is open to 




website advises officers “[monitor] the suspect for signs that they might be 
planning to flee or launch an attack” (Wood, 2016). On another website 
readers—presumably police officers—are instructed to maintain visual contact 
with the motorist, especially the motorist’s hands since it is “the hands that kill us 
[police], friends. Never forget it” (Hoschouer, 2014); after all, “[e]very traffic 
stop…is a confrontation” (United States v Holt, 1999, p. 1223). This deferment to 
automatic suspicion of non-police is embedded within the law itself. In United 
States v Holt (1999), the Tenth Circuit declared that “An officer in today’s reality 
has an objective, reasonable basis to fear for his or her life every time a motorist 
is stopped” (p. 1223). Going back even further, the Supreme Court of the United 
States (SCOTUS) stated in Michigan v Long (1983) that “investigative detentions 
involving suspect vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers” 
(p. 1047). 
Binder and Scharf (1980) suggest that a possible avenue for reducing the 
likelihood of an officer involved shooting is educating citizens to alter their 
behavior when interacting with the police. This transference of responsibility from 
the officer to the citizenry underlies many public service announcements 
provided by law enforcement. The “Travel Tips” provided on the Texas 
Department of Public Safety’s website provides 10 tips for motorists in the event 
they are stopped by law enforcement. According to tip numbers 6 and 7: 
“6. Wait for the law enforcement officer to give you instructions. An officer 
may approach from either side of the vehicle. 7. Before reaching into your 




license, inform the officer of where the items are located and follow the 
officer’s directions” (Texas Department of Public Safety, 2018). 
 
Tip number 9 advises motorists to tell their “passengers to remain in the car 
unless other instructions are given by the law enforcement officer” (Texas 
Department of Public Safety, 2018). Likewise, Suffolk County, New York advises 
motorists not to reach for documents until requested as well; however, the 
following tip for traffic stop that occur at night— “If the stop occurs during 
darkness, put on your dome or interior lights so the officer can easily see that all 
is in order with no hidden threats” (Suffolk County, n.d.; emphasis added). This 
acceptance and promotion of violence, as well as the sacredness of officer 
safety, is even embedded within the police motto nemo me impune lacessit. 
Roughly translated, the motto means “no one attacks me with impunity” 
(Merriam-Webster, 2016). Others have interpreted to mean “no one injuries me 
with impunity” (Hurtt, 2005) or “no one harms me and gets away with it” (Texas 
Gang Investigators Association, 2016). The phrase, usually used after the death 
of a police officer, is a subtle way of reminding fellow officers that violence and 
the possibility of death is always present and it acts as a warning to the public 
that the police hold the reins of violence and any actual or perceived threat to 
officer safety will not be tolerated. A final way that violence underscores all 
police-citizen encounters is through the militarization of police. 
Police departments have continually incorporated many aspects of the 
military into their daily operations. Approximately 59 percent of civilian law 




This figure rose to 78 percent by 1990, and then to 89 percent by 1995 (Kraska & 
Kappeler, 1997). “By 2014, over 8000 local law enforcement agencies 
participated in the reutilization programs that have transferred $5.1 billion in 
military hardware from the US Department of Defense to local American police 
agencies” (Hughey, 2015, p. 861). Furthermore, between 1980 and 1983, there 
were only 13 calls for service that necessitated the deployment of PPUs; 
however, this figure doubled by 1986, and then quadrupled by 1995 (Kraska & 
Kappeler, 1997). The bread and butter of a PPU’s call, however, are to effectuate 
warrants, primarily no-knock warrants with the majority of no-knock warrants 
being carried out by PPUs is for drug related offenses, and usually involves the 
PPU using a dynamic entry to effectuate the warrant (Kraska, 2007). However, 
this increased use of military-style tactics to perform routine police function, as 
well as the continued exposure of police wearing military-style attire, opens the 
possibility that individuals who are not the target of the police become victimized 
by these military tactics. 
According to a law enforcement respondent in Kraska and Kappeler’s 
(1997) study, who was a part of a PPU dynamic entry, “We did a crack-raid and 
…shots were fired…When we went into the next apartment where the bullets 
were penetrating, we found a baby crib full of holes; thank god those people 
weren’t home” (p. 9). In 2014, police were executing a “no knock” warrant at the 
home of a suspected meth dealer when the police deployed a flash-bang 




the location during the raid, and the grenade landed in an infant’s crib causing 
severe injuries to the infant (Stelloh, 2015). In 2019, “SWAT officers wearing 
‘army fatigues with black cloth covering their faces and wearing goggles’ burst 
through the home’s doors armed with automatic rifles, throwing flash-bang 
grenades as they stormed inside” (Chiu, 2019). The raid ended with a 12-year-
old, sitting on the edge of his brother’s bed and complying with every order, 
having his kneecap shattered by the bullet from an officer’s gun (Chiu, 2019). 
Militarizing the police in this manner not only endangers the local population, but 
the officers as well. In 2012, a “narcotics strike force” comprised of 12 officers 
broke into the home of a Utah man on a tip that he was selling marijuana (Balko, 
2013). The Utah man, who was a military veteran, awoke to the sound of the 
police trying to break in, and believing it was criminals, opened fire with a 9-
millimeter pistol (Balko, 2013). This incident resulted in the firing of 31 shots by 
the Utah man, 250 shots by the narcotics strike force, the confiscation of 16 small 
marijuana plants, and the death of one officer (Balko, 2013). By normalizing 
these tactics, law enforcement is able to establish this form of policing as a 
traditional method of the police culture. 
The creation of normalcy is an important aspect of the militarization of 
police. In one department, the local police not only patrol neighborhoods in full-
tactical gear while riding inside an armored personnel carrier, but they will even 
use their “specialized training” to stop individuals who appear suspicious (Kraska 




the opportunity to walk the thin blue line and interact with a society’s more 
dangerous populations. According to the National Police Association (2019), 
“The purpose of a Citizens Academy is to familiarize citizens with the operations 
of the police department.” Citizens are afforded the opportunity to take “classes 
on patrol procedures, criminal law, narcotics, search and seizure, tactical 
operations, investigations, juvenile law, firearms demonstration, emergency 
vehicle operations, use of force issues, and police canine demonstrations.” 
Furthermore, those citizens selected for the citizen’s police academy may have 
an opportunity to accompany a police officer on a ride along and “witness the 
street-activity officers encounter on a day-to-day basis.”  However, the goal of 
these programs is stated in big, bold type: “Be the eyes and ears of your 
community with Law Enforcement Citizens Academies” (National Police 
Association, 2019). As one can see, the populace itself is turned into a living 
panopticon. 
 These findings should come as a warning for those who champion the 
current use of a military-style policing. As the Orwell Foundation (2021) pointed 
out in his essay “Notes on Nationalism,” nationalism is “the habit of identifying 
oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good and evil and 
recognizing no other duty than that of advancing its interests.” Patriotism, on the 
other hand, is a “devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which 
one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people” 




from nationalism is how force is used. Unlike patriotism which is defensive in its 
use of force, “[t]he abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power 
and more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has 
chosen to sink his own individuality” (The Orwell Foundation, 2021; emphasis in 
original). Conflating patriotism with nationalism creates an ecosystem in which an 
officer is not only seen as “protecting and serving” the community when they use 
violence to coerce compliance, but the individual’s acquiescence to the state’s 
will (i.e., compliance to a state agent) is perceived as doing their civic duty to 
maintaining the natural order of society. That is, the individual is being “patriotic” 
even though their compliance occurs under the threat of violence that may be 
inflicted upon them if their actions are deemed as jeopardizing officer safety. 
Therefore, there is a greater potential that a “routine” police-citizen encounter will 





CHAPTER FOUR  
BROWN V BATTLE CREEK POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE 
LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF CANICIDE 
 
 
On December 19, 2016, the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
filed their decision in the case of Brown v Battle Creek Police Department, 844 
F.3d 556 (2016). The decision ignited a firestorm of controversy in the court of 
public opinion because the ruling was largely interpreted as granting the police a 
blanket authority to shoot a person’s dog for moving or barking (Bergman, 2017). 
For instance, one such article begins with the sentence “A police officer can 
shoot a dog if it barks or moves when the officer enters a home, under a new 
federal court ruling issued this month” (WREG, 2016). In another, Kramer (2017) 
began her article by stating “A recent federal court ruling states that once a police 
officer has entered a home, he or she may shoot a dog if it barks or moves. On 
the other side of the issue, a pro-police website began its discussion of Brown 
(2016) with “Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that 
an individual has a property right in his or her pet, the unreasonable seizure of 
which is a violation of the Fourth Amendment” (FEDagent, 2017). Helping drive 
this firestorm was the belief for some that the Sixth Circuit’s decision was novel. 
Yet, the implications of the Brown (2016) decision for pet owners and police 
officers has not only been oversimplified, but further continued, and hence 
entrenched, the judiciary’s codification of police practices which stem back years. 




Department decision didn’t so much as produce some new legal commonsense 
about canicide as much as it legitimated an already existent legal history of 
courts upholding the police right to shoot and kill dogs. 
The goal of the current chapter, then, is to provide the reader with an in-
depth analysis of the Brown (2016) decision. Of particular interest are the legal 
categories or logics such as officer safety and imminent danger that the court 
used to justify the canicide at issue in the Brown case. This brings to light an 
issue that shouldn’t be normalized or overlooked too quickly, even as it might 
seem like a “commonsense” point: the legal justification of canicide is premised 
on or depends on the very same legal categories the law turns too in the 
justification of police violence against human subjects. In other words, both police 
violence against human “threats” and non-human “threats” like dogs is justified in 
quite similar terms due to what Mark Neocleous (2000) has called the “the 
permissive structure of the law” that grants police what is essentially an unlimited 
discretionary power over life and death.   
Overview 
 
In Brown (2016), a search warrant was issued for the residence of a Mrs. 
Brown, who was living with her daughter Ms. Nesbitt (homeowner) and a Mr. 
Brown (relationship to either Mrs. Brown or her daughter is unknown). The target 
of the search was not the Browns, but a Vincent Jones who was the father of Ms. 
Nesbitt’s daughter. Mr. Jones had a criminal history and was known for having 




Creek Police Department (Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 2016). The police 
searched the trash of the household and retrieved “baggies with residue of 
marijuana and cocaine, a small amount of loose marijuana, and mail addressed 
to [the homeowner] and Vincent Jones” (Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 
2016, p. 561). After the trash pull, officers began planning a raid on the Brown 
residence. During the operation’s planning stage, the police discussed Jones’ 
criminal history, gang affiliations, the possibility of children and-or dogs being 
present when the warrant is carried out, and other details of the upcoming 
search. The city’s Emergency Response Team (ERT) was included in the search 
due to Jones’ criminal history, his associations, and his potential for violence 
(Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 2016). 
On the day of the raid, officers were en route to the Brown residence when 
they received information that Jones had been detained by authorities after 
leaving the residence and that a dog was in the backyard. Officer Case testified 
that the decision to continue with the raid was made because “whether [Vincent 
Jones] got stopped or not, the risk [that others were in the residence] would still 
be high” (Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 2016, pp. 560-561). Mr. Brown was 
walking to his car when the officers arrived to execute the search warrant. 
Officers detained Mr. Brown and informed him that they had a warrant to search 
the residence. Although Mr. Brown offered the officers the use of his house key, 
the raid team chose to use a battering ram to gain entry. While making their way 




Officer Klein who was leading the raid, the dogs were “‘digging and pawing’ and 
‘jumping’ at the window” (Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 2016, p. 562). After 
breaching the front door, the dogs who were at the window went to where the 
officers had entered the residence. It was at this moment that a police officer shot 
one of the dogs with a nonfatal shot.  During this violent encounter, the second 
dog made its way to the basement via the kitchen. 
The dog that was shot upon the officers’ arrival was able to escape the 
entry team and make its way to the basement (Brown v Battle Creek Police 
Dept., 2016). Officers followed the first dog’s path toward the basement where 
officers claim that the injured dog “turned towards them and started barking 
again” (p. 563) when they were midway down the stairs (Brown v Battle Creek 
Police Dept., 2016). Another officer with the entry team fired two more shots at 
the first dog which proved fatal. The second dog—which ran to the basement 
during the breach of the front door—was not showing any signs of aggression 
other than barking at the officers. Yet, the officer who shot the first dog still chose 
to shoot the second dog because the officers believed there could be gang 
members in the basement and the second dog was preventing them from “safely” 
sweeping the area, thus, the second dog was believed to be a threat to officer 
safety. The officer’s first shot was nonfatal, as was the second shot from a 
different officer; the fatal shot came from a third officer who fired on the dog to 




Sixth Circuit concluded that the officers’ actions were reasonable based on the 
following: 
Jones' criminal history, gang affiliations, the types of drugs he was 
suspected of distributing, the fact that the officers had no time to plan for 
the dogs, in addition to the officers' unrebutted testimony that the dogs 
either lunged or were barking aggressively at the officers, the nature and 
size of the dogs, the fact that the dogs were unleashed and loose in a 
small residence, all culminate into a finding that the officers acted 
reasonably when they shot and killed the two dogs (Brown v Battle Creek 
Police Dept., 2016, p. 572). 
 
This perspective by the Sixth Circuit highlights important characteristics 
about police violence against dogs and police violence in general. First it 
highlights that an officer’s safety takes precedence over a citizen’s constitutional 
rights. Second, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling reinforces a long held judicial stance that 
officers are oftentimes placed in situations where they need to make a split-
second decision regarding the use of force. Third, the judiciary restricts who has 
the authority to establish the “facts” of an officer involved shooting. Fourth, the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision highlights how perceived non-submission to the 
government’s policing powers is deemed dangerous and worthy of a violent 
response. Perhaps even most telling, is how both Jones and his pit bulls were 
linked through the category of “threat” or “dangerousness” – Jones’ criminal 
history and alleged gang history is mapped onto the perceived violent threat of 
the pit bull as justification for Officer Klein shooting, then pursing, then killing the 








The category of officer safety is perhaps the most foundational legal 
justifications for police violence. Chappell & Lanze-Kaduce (2010) examined a 
new curriculum of study at a police academy which focused on community 
policing and problem solving. Results indicate that officer safety was a 
fundamental concept which was reinforced in practically every way imaginable 
(Chappell & Lanze-Kaduce, 2010). The official academy textbook included 
scenarios for the recruits to work through. Instructors would divide the recruit 
class into groups and have them work on the scenarios, after which each group 
gave a presentation about their method for resolving the situation. “The 
instructor’s first question was always, ‘How would you deal with officer safety in 
this scenario?’” (Chappell & Lanze-Kaduce, 2010, p. 200; emphasis in original). 
Officer safety is even the paramount concern of the judiciary when determining 
the reasonableness of an officer’s actions. The judiciary’s usual strategy for 
protecting officer safety is to expand when officers are permitted to use force 
against suspects (Ristroph, 2017). Officer safety was sown into Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence when the United States Supreme Court delivered is 
decision in Terry v Ohio (1968). According to the Court in Terry v Ohio (1968), an 
officer is permitted to search someone’s outer clothing for weapons as a means 
of ensuring the officer’s safety: “[an] officer need not be absolutely certain that 
the individual is armed” (p. 27) prior to searching the individual; all the officer has 




following year the U.S. Supreme Court relied on officer safety as the foundation 
for allowing officers to conduct a warrantless search of the area within the 
arrestee’s immediate reach in its Chimel v California (1969) decision: “A gun on a 
table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the 
arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested” (p. 763). 
Officer safety was an exception explicitly stated in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
striking of a Tennessee statute allowing officers to use deadly force against 
fleeing suspects as unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court declared that the 
use of deadly force to stop the escape of an unarmed felon was unconstitutional 
except when “it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable 
cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious 
physical injury to the officer or others” (Tennessee v Garner, 1985, p. 3). The 
fruits from the seeds sowed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry (1968) were 
reaped 21 years later when the Court decided the case of Graham v Connor 
(1989). 
The Graham court declared that lower courts must consider an officer’s 
safety along with other factors of the police-citizen encounter (e.g., suspect 
resistance) when deciding on the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force. 
Even though some argue that it is wrong to equate force with violence (Kania & 
Mackey, 1977), the fact that there does not exist a clear consensus on which 
behaviors constitute an act of police violence (Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2005) 




The U.S Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit established that “Not every push 
and shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s 
chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights” (Johnson v Glick, 1973, p. 
1033). The U.S. Supreme Court in Graham (1989) expanded on the reasoning in 
Johnson (1973) by removing “violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights” and 
substituting “violates the Fourth Amendment” (Graham v Connor, 1989, p. 396; 
emphasis in original). This alteration to Johnson’s (1973) original language 
broadens the type of force an officer may legally use to coerce compliance while 
simultaneously narrowing those actions that could be deemed “police violence.” 
The sacredness of officer safety raises an important question, what does safety 
look like? At every stage of the police-citizen interaction, violence underscores 
the entire encounter which places both the officer and the individual in a 
precarious dance. This concern over officer safety also extends into encounters 
between the police and dogs. 
Responding to the question regarding which behaviors the dogs were 
displaying that led Officer Klein to fear for his safety and the safety of his fellow 
officers, Officer Klein responded: 
[it was the] [d]eep aggressive barking, consistent barking, not just one or 
two barks, but steady, aggressive. Lunging towards the windows as we 
made our approach. The dog moving from the couch directly to the front 
door after it was breached. The fact that the same dog even after it was 
shot stood at the bottom of the stairs and turned towards me, continuing to 
bark aggressively in the same manner, and then the second dog, even 
after that happened, after firing three rounds at the first dog, the second 
dog turning, pausing as it was moving across the basement, it stopped 






Officer Klein’s testimony describes a situation that was intense, chaotic, and filled 
with uncertainties. The Sixth Circuit’s dismissal as to whether the dogs were 
barking or not is strange since the very first behavior that Officer Klein highlighted 
as indicative of canine aggression and threatening behavior was the dogs’ 
barking. Not only did Officer Klein allude to the dogs’ barking, but it distinguished 
their type of barking from “normal,” non-aggressive barking: “Deep aggressive 
barking, consistent barking, not just one or two barks, but steady, aggressive” 
(Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 2016, p. 569; emphasis added). The dogs’ 
barking even took precedence over their “lunging” at the officers when they first 
approached the residence in Officer Klein’s sworn testimony. 
Making the Sixth Circuit’s dismissal of the discrepancies regarding the 
dogs’ barking even stranger is the fact that the Sixth Circuit stated in another 
paragraph that “A jury could reasonably conclude that a 97-pound pit bull, 
barking and lunging at the officers as they breached the entryway, posed a threat 
to the officers’ safety and it was necessary to shoot the dog…” (Brown v Battle 
Creek Police Dept., 2016, p. 570; emphasis added). Here, again, the act of 
barking precedes the physical act that would place the dogs within biting distance 
of the officers (i.e., lunging). Recall that the positioning of words in a sentence is 
indicative of the words or phrases that are important in driving the story (Machin 
& Mayr, 2013). Highlighting the dogs’ barking before highlighting their lunging 
indicates that it is not the physical act itself which is threatening, but rather the 




over the timing between the officer’s breaching the door and the first shots, then, 
becomes problematic when the law is manipulated so that the judiciary can 
codify the killing of dogs by officers. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit’s Brown 
(2016) decision is not unique in its reliance on the dogs’ barking as indicative of 
an imminent threat. It has been settled that the judiciary may take into 
consideration when determining the reasonableness of an officer’s actions “the 
demeanor of the dog at the time of the incident, such as whether it appeared 
aggressive by barking and snarling” (Newman v City of Fresno, 2018, p. 10)”. 
In Carroll (2013), a deputy feared for his safety when confronted with a 
dog that was “growling, barking, and quickly and aggressively approaching him” 
(p. 650; emphasis added). The United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida found that a Broward County deputy’s shooting of a dog was 
reasonable due to the deputy—responding to a call about a barking dog—was 
“confronted by an aggressive dog with a territorial bark” (Esterson v Broward 
County Sherriff’s Department, 2010, p. 12). In Azevedo v City of Fresno (2011), 
an officer shot at and missed a dog who “immediately began to growl and bark, 
and aggressively advanced on [the officer]” (p. 4) after the officer had announced 
his presence; a U.S. District Court in Billingsley v Hunter (2015) found that “the 
uncontradicted facts show…that once the dog, barking loudly and jumping up on 
the screen door, escaped the house, the dog approached [the officer] in an 
aggressive manner…and received gunshot wounds to the front of his body” (pp. 




large dogs ran out aggressively charging, barking and growling” at him and 
another officer (Romero v Bexar County, 2014, p. 661). Finally, an officer’s ride-
along heard a suspect’s dog barking while it advanced on him and the officer. 
This witness account was helped support the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan decision to find the officer’s shooting of the dog as 
reasonable even though the officer himself did not hear the barking (Bateman v 
Driggett, 2012). A dog’s bark, then, has always been considered just as bad as, if 
not worse than, its bite. 
Solidifying the sacredness of officer safety within the fabric of legal 
doctrine also occurs in those decisions in which an officer’s use of force was 
deemed unreasonable. In Villo v City of Milwaukee (2008), police were looking 
for a suspect who was known to be armed and who was accompanied by a pit 
bull. During the search of the house where the suspect was last seen, the legal 
resident’s dog—a Labrador and Springer spaniel mix—was shot 4 times by 
police; the fourth shot proved fatal and was done to end the dog’s suffering from 
the previous 3 shots. Analyzing the officer’s actions, the Villo (2008) court ruled 
that the first two shots were reasonable responses by an officer who was “faced 
with a loose, charging, growling dog, who had just jumped a fence, at a location 
where a pit bull was anticipated” (p. 839). Regarding the third and fourth shots, 
the Villo (2008) court ruled that “there is a genuine issue as to whether [the dog] 
posed no imminent danger at the time the third and fourth shots were fired” (p. 




suggest that the dog needed to be euthanized (Villo v City of Milwaukee, 2008, p. 
842). In other words, the officers were justified in shooting the dog the first time, 
but the reasonableness of their actions became questionable after the second 
shot onward because the officers could not demonstrate that the dog still posed a 
threat to their safety. 
In Kincheloe v Caudle (2009), a police chief was driving his patrol car 
when he spotted a dog walking down the street. The police chief yelled at the 
dog through his open window at the dog. The dog continued walking until it 
reached the property of its owners where it “walked up to the porch and began to 
bark at [the police chief]” (Kincheloe v Caudle, 2009, p. 3). At this point, the 
police chief parked his “patrol car in the middle of the street” (p. 3) and walked 
onto the dog’s owners’ property. When the granddaughter of the dog’s owner 
noticed the patrol car outside the house, she walked out to find the family dog in 
the front yard. Verbal attempts to get the dog back to the house proved 
unsuccessful and the dog “proceeded to walk toward some bushes on the front 
lawn of the house” (p. 3). The police chief pulled his weapon and fired two shots, 
killing the dog. Although the police chief claimed the “dog charged [him] in an 
aggressive manner and that he was therefore forced to fire two shots at the for 
his ‘own protection’” (p. 23; emphasis added), the court found that the dog’s 
owners provided sufficient evidence to call into question the reasonableness of 
the police chief’s actions. The tipping point for the court in this decision appears 




chief knew that the owners of the dog resided at that location and (2) there were 
no exigent circumstances present (e.g., the escape of a suspect, the destruction 
of evidence, or an active threat to officer safety or public safety). A similar 
decision to that in Kincheloe (2009) was reached in Taylor v City of Chicago 
(2010). 
The issue at question in Taylor (2010) regarded the shooting of a family 
dog as a result of a 9-1-1 call concerning a dog wandering loose in the 
neighborhood. According to the facts of the case, the dog’s owner was hosting a 
gathering at her residence when the dog wandered off the property due to a gate 
being left open by accident. At about the same time as the dog’s owner was 
being informed that her dog was wandering loose, an officer with the local police 
department arrived in the neighborhood in answer to a 9-1-1 call about a loose 
dog. “[The officer] immediately drew is gun even though [the dog] was not biting, 
attacking, or threatening anyone and instead just standing still and wagging his 
tail” (p. 2; emphasis added). The Taylor (2010) court concluded that “[a]t the time 
[the officer] prepared to shoot [the dog], [it] had not strayed far from home and 
was standing still and wagging his tail. A seven-year-old girl was close to [the 
dog], looking to retrieve him for [the owners]” (Taylor v City of Chicago, 2010, p.  
8). Finally, the court in Mayfield v Bethards (2016) reasoned that it would have 
been clearly established that shooting and killing a family’s dog—which was not 
acting aggressive and on its owner’s property—by a deputy would violate the 




seizures. Likewise, the court in Bullman v City of Detroit (2018) declared that “a 
jury could reasonably conclude that—given that the dogs were separated from 
the officers and never lunged at or attacked the officers—the dogs did not pose 
an imminent threat to officer safety. 
Overcoming the sacredness of officer safety appears to rest on providing 
evidence that taps into a society’s cultural scripts of safety. There exists a 
culturally held narrative which associates extreme youthfulness and femininity 
with weakness and passivity (Roth & Basow, 2004; see also, Hemelrijk, 2006). 
“Femininity discipline begins working upon females during childhood (perhaps 
even infancy) by transmitting to children a mental connection between 
femaleness and weakness and by forcing girls to embody that weakness in their 
bodies” (Roth & Basow, 2004, p. 249). In Taylor (2010), part of the judiciary’s 
finding regarding the safety of the dog was the presence of a seven-year-old girl 
waiting to take control of the dangerous dog. The Taylor (2010) court’s inclusion 
of the young girl reinforces the cultural narratives that femininity is non-
threatening. Therefore, a dog is evidently not “dangerous” nor “threatening” to a 
grown adult police officer if a seven-year-old girl can control the dog. Another 
cultural script that modern society associates with safety is class. Animals have 
always been a conduit for representing the social position of their owners: 
“thoroughbred horses represented aristocrats, prize cattle represented wealthy 
landowners, foxhounds and gun dogs represented the rural gentry” (Ritvo, 1986, 




Bulldogs were the physical embodiment of the “lower- or dangerous-class” 
since it was mainly used in bullbaiting (Ritvo, 1986). However, through the 
manipulation of the dog’s physical traits and its social history, the bulldog 
became the “darling of the refined and fashionable” (p. 245) by 1880 (Ritvo, 
1986). Not only did bulldogs become the darlings of the social elites, but their 
owners were now perceived as respectable (Ritvo, 1986). Linking class and 
gender, this new “kindliness of disposition” was believed to be supported by the 
large number of women attending an all bulldog show in 1893 (Ritvo, 1986). This 
same connection between an owner’s class and the dangerousness of dogs 
influences modern judicial decisions. In Brown (2016), the Sixth Circuit began 
their justification of the shooting by focusing on “Jones' criminal history, gang 
affiliations, the types of drugs he was suspected of distributing” (p. 572). The 
dogs’ “threatening” behaviors of barking and lunging are listed after Jones’ 
criminal history and gang associations, the lack of time the officers had to 
prepare for the dogs’ presence, and even the Sixth Circuit’s decision to recognize 
any genuine issue of material fact regarding any discrepancy between the 
testimonies of officers and that of the Browns. 
 The importance of the relationship between unsavory people and the pit 
bull breed in justifying the killing of the Browns’ dogs manifests itself in the Sixth 
Circuit’s conclusion regarding the shooting of the first dog. Aside from the first 
dog’s weight and breed, it was also reasonable to shoot the dog according to the 




and that evidence was not being destroyed” (Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 
2016, p. 570). Again, the pit bull “breed” is considered unsavory because the 
breed is sought after by unsavory members of society. In contemporary society, 
the pit bull breed is symbolic of the “urban” (Dickey, 2016) making the pit bull 
persona non grata and the embodiment of America’s fear of dangerous classes 
(Dickey, 2016). Without these cultural scripts, it is difficult to counter an officer’s 
narrative that they feared for their life or that of others. As noted in the 
introduction, violence underlies every police encounter. However, a crucial 
aspect of determining if officer safety was jeopardized relies on the officer 




The eleventh edition of Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (2003) 
defines imminent as “ready to take place” (p. 621) and danger as “exposure or 
liability to injury, pain, harm, or loss” (p. 315). Black’s Law Dictionary (2004) 
defines imminent danger as “1. An immediate, real threat to one's safety that 
justifies the use of force in self-defense. 2.Criminal law. The danger resulting 
from an immediate threatened injury sufficient to cause a reasonable and prudent 
person to defend himself or herself” (p. 1184). This view of imminent danger 
plays into the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v Connor 
(1989) which directs judges to take into consideration the fact that “police officers 




tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving— about the amount of force that is 
necessary in a particular situation” (p. 397). Specifically, the Graham (1989) 
decision focuses on the lack of time an officer has to recognize a threat and 
make a decision. The time between a suspect’s action and the officer’s 
recognition, decision, and reaction, specifically the shortness thereof (i.e., 
immediacy), is a fundamental element in the reasonableness of an officer’s use 
of force. 
Upon seeing [the deputy], Fred [the dog] immediately charged at her. At 
that moment, she felt her life was threatened and even after shooting at 
Fred once, Fred charged her again, forcing [the deputy] to shoot [Fred] 
once more (Esterson v Broward County Sherriff’s Department, 2010, p. 
12; emphasis added). 
 
Thus, there is no material dispute as to whether [the dog] presented an 
imminent threat to [the officer], who was not unreasonable in shooting it 
(Smith v City of Detroit, 2017, p. 27; emphasis added). 
 
The Court, therefore, concludes [defendant’s] decision on whether and 
what type of force to use as well within the realm of reasonableness. 
When confronted with an aggressive dog that made him fearful for his 
safety, [defendant] chose to shoot [the dog] (Pettit v New Jersey, 2011, p. 
23; emphasis added). 
 
Also, unlike scenarios in which a dog might not pose a genuine threat to 
officer safety…there is sufficient evidence here for the jury to find that [the 
deputy] reasonably feared for his safety when the plaintiff’s dog 
aggressively approached him in the entryway (Carroll v County of Monroe, 
2013, p. 652; emphasis added). 
 
In Perez v City of Placerville (2008), the Placerville Police Department received 
notice of a warrant issued for an individual residing in their jurisdiction. Officers (3 
officers and a K-9 unit) went to the location where they believed the individual 




of the residence to secure that area. During their trek to the backyard, the K-9 
officer made noise to elicit a response from any possible dog that might be in the 
backyard. The officer did not receive a response, nor did he see a dog when he 
peeked over the fence; yet, “[t]he head of a Rottweiler immediately pushed 
through the gate and attacked [the officer] and canine Rico” (p. 7) when the 
officer slightly opened the gate (Perez v City of Placerville, 2008). The officer 
shot the Rottweiler three times after pepper spray proved futile. The Rottweiler 
succumbed to its injuries even after being transported to an emergency 
veterinarian hospital by officers. The U.S. District Court in this case reasoned 
that the officer’s use of force was reasonable since his actions were “in defense 
of his fellow officer and police canine” (Perez v City of Placerville, 2008, p. 28). 
Likewise, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, 
Portland Division reasoned that the shooting of a dog was reasonable because 
the officer “reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of physical injury 
from [the dog] at the time he fired his weapon…” (Birkes v Tillamook County, 
2011, p. 22); in another incident, the officer’s use of force was deemed 
reasonable because “out of fear for his personal safety, discharged his firearm 
because he believed he was in imminent danger of being attacked or bitten by 
[the dog]” (Pettit v New Jersey, 2011, p. 20); finally, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division that an officer’s use 
of deadly force against a dog was reasonable because “the dog posed an 




These narratives, along with the wording used in the various state statutes, 
reinforce the narrative set forth in Graham (1989) that an officer’s use of force 
typically occurs in encounters which are “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving 
(p. 397). 
In Brown v Muhlenberg Township (2001) an officer’s shooting of a 
Rottweiler who was “stationary and not growling or barking” (p. 209), and who’s 
owner was nearby and wanting to retain custody of the dog, was deemed 
unreasonable. As the Third Circuit made clear in Brown (2001), a “state's interest 
in protecting life and property may be implicated when there is reason to believe 
the pet poses an imminent danger’ … ‘This does not mean, however, that the 
state may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, destroy a pet when it poses 
no immediate danger and the owner is looking on, obviously desirous of retaining 
custody” (Brown v Muhlenberg Twp, 2001, pp. 210-211). In Robinson v Pezzat 
(2016), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed a lower court’s 
granting of summary judgment for Officer Pezzat because they believed that “[i]f 
the jury believed Robinson's testimony that Wrinkles was lying down, it could 
reasonably conclude that the dog acted aggressively toward Pezzat only after 
being shot” (p. 11). In other words, a jury could conclude that there was no 
imminent danger from a dog lying on the floor and that any alleged aggressive 
behavior was the result of being shot by the police. It is important to note though 
that, by and large, it is the officer’s own story, or the officers’ narrative, that is 




In the same case, however, the D.C. Circuit declared the other officer on 
scene as acting reasonably when he shot “Wrinkles.” According to the D.C. 
Circuit in Robinson (2016), “Given that Wrinkles bit Officer Pezzat hard enough 
to puncture her leather boots, McLeod's belief— just seconds later—that the dog 
continued to pose an imminent threat even absent additional aggressive behavior 
was hardly unreasonable” (p. 12). Clarifying the D.C. Circuit’s decision in 
Robinson (2016), Wrinkles posed no imminent threat to Officer Pezzat prior to 
being shot; therefore, a jury could conclude that her actions were unreasonable. 
However, after biting Officer Pezzat, Wrinkles now posed a danger to the other 
officers on scene which was still imminent when Officer McLeod shot Wrinkles, 
thus making Officer McLeod’s shooting reasonable.  
These cases and others highlight that the judiciary is reluctant to restrict 
the opportunities for officers to use force based on officer safety. This is the 
notion of the permissive structure of the law mentioned earlier (Neocleous 2000). 
The United States Supreme Court in Preston v United States (1968) declared 
that warrantless searches and seizures were permissible “to seize weapons and 
other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well 
as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime” (p. 367). This 
adherence to the destruction of evidence was followed by Chimel v California 
(1969). Even the dissent in Chimel (1969) noted that it would allow the search of 




safety of the officers or to prevent the destruction of evidence” (p. 780; see also 
Sibron v New York, 1968). 
 Returning to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Brown (2016), Officer Klein 
testified that “less than fifteen seconds” (p. 562) elapsed between knocking and 
announcing their presence and the actual breaching of the door (Brown v Battle 
Creek Police Dept., 2016). Once inside the residence, the officers were 
confronted with one dog presenting an active threat to their safety and another 
dog that had ran to the basement (Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 2016). 
Contesting Officer Klein’s narrative, Mr. Brown, in his own deposition testimony, 
argued that approximately 3-4 minutes elapsed between the officers breaching 
the door and the first gunshots, and that the second dog did not bark once 
(Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 2016). The Sixth Circuit concluded that the 
inconsistencies between “[Mr.] Brown’s testimony about the timing of when he 
heard the shots and the lack of barking he heard when the officers approached 
the residence is not material to whether, once inside the residence and out of 
Mark Brown’s viewpoint, the dogs posed an imminent threat to officers’ safety” 
(Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 2016, pp. 571-572; emphasis added). Putting 
this quote into perspective, the Sixth Circuit is stating that Mr. Brown who was 
detained outside of the residency by law enforcement is not authorized to 
establish legitimate facts about the events that unfolded since he was not there 
with the officers inside the home to view the dogs’ behavior. The Sixth Circuit’s 




the D.C. Circuit’s ruling regarding Officer Pezzat and focused on its affirmation to 
the reasonableness of Officer McLeod’s actions when justifying the police 
shooting of the dogs in Brown (2016). The focus on one officer’s testimony over 
that of another highlights the existence of authorized narrators who the judiciary 
legitimizes as having the knowledge necessary to establish the facts surrounding 
the use of deadly force. 
Authorized Narrators 
 
The judiciary’s legitimization of who has the authority to establish the facts 
of a shooting occurs through the concept of a “genuine issue of material fact.” 
The term “genuine issue of material fact” refers to the existence of a dispute that 
requires “a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at 
trial” (First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v Cities Service Co., 1968, p. 289). As the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declared in Maciariello v Sumner 
(1992), “Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for 
transgressing bright lines” (p. 298). Therefore, the police (i.e., the government) 
have a stake in which version of events the judiciary accepts as “true.” As the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated regarding a conflict 
between the police narrative and that of the owner of a shot dog, “There is no 
video here. Instead, we have a conflict of self-serving statements” (Jones v 
Lopez, 2017, p. 341). This analysis is not an accusation of police intentionally 




government (e.g., the judiciary) decides if it wants to accept as true the 
government’s narrative (e.g., the police). 
This conflict is usually resolved in favor of the government and justified on 
the basis that the non-government party failed to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact. The court in Smith (2017) accepted the police version of events 
stating that the “Plaintiffs concededly present no evidence rebutting the police 
officers’ claims that the dog they shot was charging up the stairs against them” 
(p. 27). The judiciary will oftentimes rely on the fact that the contesting party did 
not actually witness the event. In McCarthy v Kootenai County (2009), a United 
States District Court stated, “Plaintiffs maintain the shooting of the dog was not 
reasonable. However, the Plaintiffs did not observe the dogs interacting with the 
officer and this statement alone cannot create a genuine issue of material fact” 
(p. 16). A sentence in footnote 3 of the Esterson (2010) decision states, “In fact, it 
is Plaintiffs who offer no evidence to challenge the evidence that Fred threatened 
[the deputy’s] life” (pp. 12-13). Likewise, a United States District Court in Powell v 
Johnson (2012) declared that “Plaintiffs contend that Blu [the dog] was ‘not in 
attack mode,’ but the record is devoid of evidence to support that assertion” (p. 
876). Finally, in Villo v City of Milwaukee (2008), a U.S. District Court, in a series 
of footnotes, continually dismisses Ms. Villo’s counterclaims to the claims made 
by the officers who were involved in the shooting of her dog; “While Villo disputes 
this finding, she presents no discussion or citation to evidence contradicting that 




avoid the dog” (p. 830, footnote 3). Likewise, Jones v Lopez (2017) stated in a 
footnote that “it is the Plaintiffs who offer no evidence to challenge the evidence 
that Fred threatened Deputy Damiano’s life” (p. 12, footnote 4). 
Determining whether a nonmovant has sufficiently established a genuine 
issue of material fact is done via the “clear-and-convincing” standard of proof 
(Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc, 1986). The clear and convincing standard of 
proof is an intermediate level standard, and it is used when the infringement on a 
defendant’s liberty and rights is more than monetary but still significant enough to 
require a standard of proof that is just below the beyond a reasonable doubt level 
(Addington v Texas, 1979). Requiring judges to apply the intermediate standard 
of proof when deciding summary judgment issues is believed to ensure the 
legitimacy of the jury as the true trier of facts (Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc, 
1986). Although “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and 
the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury, [and] not those of a 
judge” (Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc, 1986, p. 255), the Sixth Circuit in Brown 
(2016) concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to indicate any “admissible evidence 
that creates a genuine dispute that would allow a reasonable jury to return a 
verdict in their favor” (p. 568). What the Sixth Circuit has done in this instance is 
to put itself in the mindset of a potential jury to legitimize the officers’ version of 
events as undisputed even though it had recognized the existence of 
discrepancies between sworn testimonies. This judicial clairvoyance is not 




cases is nothing more than their sworn testimony. Yet, the authority of an officer 
to establish the facts of a case may be suspended if those facts are exculpatory 
in nature.  
Providing testimony from various officers of the Battle Creek Police 
Department, the Plaintiffs in Brown (2016) argued that a custom existed in the 
Battle Creek Police Department which encouraged the shooting of animals via a 
tally system. According to one officer’s testimony, “it was very common that 
officers would talk about [how many animals they shot]’ and that he could not 
identify individual officers who did this because ‘there were so many of them just 
bragging about it’” (Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 2016, p. 574). The Sixth 
Circuit refused to accept this as evidence of a “custom or policy” because the 
“The tally system Plaintiffs mention, while not an example of model police 
behavior, does not provide proof of a pre-existing pattern of similar constitutional 
violations by police officers’ … and that ‘[u]nsubstantiated testimony from a few 
officers generally describing the tally system while not providing details about the 
number of officers participating in it or the number of shootings tallied is neither 
persuasive nor meaningful” (Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 2016, p. 575). 
Yet, the Sixth Circuit sided with the district court regarding the threat posed to 
officer safety by the dogs when declaring that taking “the facts in the light most 
favorable to Plaintiffs, the unrebutted fact that Officer Klein said the large brown 
pit bull lunged at him before he shot her would still establish that his actions were 




The Sixth Circuit’s contradictory stance on officer testimony may appear strange 
at first, but it is a continuation of a judiciary custom for narrowing the list of those 
individuals with the authority to establish the official narrative of the shooting. 
We see that the judiciary protects the sacredness of officer safety by either 
broadening or narrowing the list of authorized knowers relative to where the 
social system stands in the dispute. The judiciary broadened the list of authorized 
knowers by declaring that human experience and common sense as the guiding 
framework when declining to establish a bright-line restricting the discretion of 
the police. Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted itself and lower courts to a 
rigid set of parameters when deciding use of force cases by requiring judges to 
place themselves in the proverbial shoes of the officer: “The ‘reasonableness’ of 
a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable 
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight” (Graham v 
Connor, 1989, p. 396; emphasis added). Stating this differently, the judiciary is 
required to make their determination regarding the reasonableness of an officer’s 
use of force based on whether another officer facing the same situation as the 
officer in question would respond in the same manner instead of hindsight which 
incorporates the perception of citizens who do not have a scintilla of police 
training. Again, this broadening and narrowing of authorized knowers influences 
the facts, and by extension the narrative, the judiciary will consider when 
deciding summary judgment and qualified immunity. This aspect of the Brown 




the shooting of dog by police as reasonable. Although the United States 
Supreme Court has declared that “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant [the one 
disputing summary judgment] is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are 
to be drawn in his favor” (Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc, 1986, p. 255), the 
judiciary tends to favor the police’s version of events over that of the nonmovant 
when an officer’s narrative is being contested on its veracity. 
Non-Submission and Officer Safety 
 
Although dogs cannot be arrested, they can still be non-submissive. 
“[N]onsubmission [sic] includes an attempt to run away, a passive refusal to do 
as the officer orders, or even the mere appearance of dangerousness-a failure to 
dispel the perception of possible attack, one might say” (Ristroph, 2017, p. 1207). 
Once an officer perceives an individual as non-submissive—even if the officer is 
mistaken—the officer is authorized to use force to achieve compliance (Ristroph, 
2017). An aspect of this compliance is doing exactly as one is commanded. The 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey partially justified the 
shooting of a dog by an officer as reasonable because the dog “ignored [the 
officer’s] commands to ‘stop’ and ‘heel’” (Petitt v New Jersey, 2011, p. 20). In 
McCarthy v Kootenai County (2009), the shooting of a dog was declared 
reasonable because “[t]he officer indicated that he felt threatened by the two 
attacking dogs and his verbal commands did not cause the dogs to stop 
attacking” (pp. 15-16; emphasis added). Although deemed unreasonable on 




chief’s attempt of yelling at a dog to get its attention and gain its compliance 
(Kinchloe v Caudle, 2009). In these instances, the judiciary is not suggesting that 
dogs understand or speak English; rather, the dog’s body is a conduit for 
transmitting and reinforcing the sacredness of officer safety to the public. In a 
nationally publicized incident of an officer involved shooting of a human, Officer 
Yanez shot Philando Castile—who was reaching for his identification—because 
the officer believed Castile was reaching for a weapon after informing the officer 
that he was armed (Ali, 2017). According to Officer Yanez, he shot Castile 
because “Castile did not have ‘regard for his commands,’ and he [Officer Yanez] 
felt the motorist would shoot him” (Ali, 2017). 
Ristroph (2017) is correct when she states that the same frameworks 
normalizing traffic stops help normalize deadly force against unarmed suspects. 
However, what Ristroph (2017) does not make explicit in her analysis, although it 
is implied, is that violence underscores every police-public encounter. In other 
words, the possibility of being the recipient of police violence is always bubbling 
under the surface during any police-public encounter. It is this foundation of 
violence which shifts the burden of officer safety onto the motorist much like it 
shifts the burden to dog owners who are expected to alert the police that a dog is 
on the premises. Even then, the dog(s) may be considered a threat to the 
officer’s safety and possibly shot to protect said safety. In Perez v City of 
Placerville (2008), the court was distinguishing the difference between the “facts” 




facts suggested here that the officers suspected a dog might be present at the 
scene but they had no confirmation of that fact” (p. 27; emphasis added); 
similarly, in Smith (2017), the court justified the shooting of dogs by police 
because “[the dogs’ owners] did not register their dogs, which might have alerted 
the police that there were dogs in the residence” (pp. 25-26; emphasis added); a 
district court in Michigan declared the shooting of a reasonable because there 
was no evidence presented which indicated that “[the officer] should have known 
in advance that the dog was present, so that he could have arranged to deal with 
the dog in a non-lethal or less intrusive manner” (Hayes v City of Detroit, 2017, p. 
5); finally, an officer shooting a dog was declared reasonable because the officer 
“did not notice a sign on the wooden gate that warned of a dog on the premises 
and was unaware that Plaintiff had a dog” (Bateman v Driggett, 2012, p. 3; 
emphasis added). Even in a case where the court denied the request by officers 
for summary judgement, the responsibility for alerting an officer to a potential 
danger still exists. Officers in Anderson v City of Chicago (2016) “admit that 
Anderson told the officers about the two girls [who were in the residence] but 
deny that they were told about the dog” (p. 2; emphasis added). 
Unlike these instances, the officers in Brown (2016) were advised of a 
dog’s presence prior to executing the search warrant. When the officers arrived 
on scene, they visually confirmed the presence of dogs via the front window. 
Although the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of Brown (2016) does not indicate if Mr. 




possibility that a dog may be threatening oftentimes overrides the dog’s true 
disposition. In Warboys v Proulx (2004) a canine unit and two other officers were 
tracking a suspected car thief when they came across a “pool of scent” (p. 113) 
believed to be left by the suspect. The scent pool’s location was in a parking lot 
near a multifamily residence building. Warboys brother walked out from one of 
these nearby multi-residential buildings with his brother’s dog. He was 
immediately ordered to return inside for his safety; however, Warboys’ dog got 
out into the parking lot through the open door before Warboys’ brother could 
comply with the officer’s command. The dog went straight for the canine unit in a 
friendly manner but was still shot by the officer from the canine unit. Although the 
court in this case accepted as factual that the dog “was a gentle, loving pet that 
had never attacked an animal or a person” (p. 114), the court relied on belief that 
every police-public encounter is a potential danger to officer safety. 
The court acknowledges that Blitz [the dog] may indeed have approached 
the officer and his police canine merely to greet and sniff them or to 
receive a friendly pat on the head. At the same time, however, the court 
notes that had Proulx refrained from shooting the pit bull when he did and 
had Blitz’s behavior turned out to be hostile, it would have been too late 
for Proulx to use his firearm safely in order to defend himself and his 
police dog (Warboys v Proulx, 2004, p. 118). 
 
Likewise, the United States District Court in Powell v Johnson (2012) relied on 
Warboys (2004) reasoning when deciding that the officer in Powell (2012) acted 
reasonably. 
The incident in Powell (2012) arose from a call concerning a possible 




officers began to walk down the alleyway searching for the suspect when they 
came across Powell’s home. According to Officer Johnson’s testimony, both the 
garage door and the service entrance to the garage were open. Officer Johnson 
believed “this was unusual” (p. 872) and entered the garage where he briefly 
searched the garage before moving into the backyard via the service door. 
Powell’s dog, Blu, noticed Officer Johnson and began walking toward him. The 
officer did not see Blu during his search for the suspect and began to return to 
the alleyway when he heard Blu behind him. Officer Johnson claimed that Blu 
was running at full speed toward him which caused Officer Johnson to shoot Blu 
for his own safety. Relying on Warboys (2004), the court in Powell (2012) 
concluded that Officer Johnson did not have the luxury to wait and discover Blu’s 
real intentions before protecting himself from a possible attack. Although an 
officer’s request for summary judgment was denied, a U.S. District Court took 
into consideration that the officer did not have time to ascertain the intentions of a 
dog prior to shooting (Sneade v Rojas, 2014). Some may argue that the officers’ 
actions in these scenarios are the result of the dogs advancing on the officers in 
an aggressive manner. However, it should be noted that the “lunge” referred to 
by the Sixth Circuit in Brown (2016) was nothing more than the first dog 
“‘[moving] a few inches’ between the time when [officers] entered the residence 
and when [the officer] shot [the dog]” (Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., et al., 
2016, p. 563). Again, the Sixth Circuit decision in Brown (2016) is not unique in 




dog as reasonable. A dog’s mere movement when unrestrained has always been 
indicative of aggression. 
 In Birkes v Tillamook County (2011), a deputy with the Tillamook County 
Sheriff’s Office received a complaint about campers driving their ATVs through 
other campsites at all hours of the night. The deputy noticed three ATVs traveling 
down the highway while talking with the complainant and decided to follow them 
to their campsite. At their campsite, the deputy noticed a group standing around 
a vehicle and a dog walking around unleashed as well. When the deputy 
approached the group, he identified who he was and ordered them to restrain the 
dog. The group tried to grab hold of the dog but failed. The deputy while backing 
away gave two more orders for the group to restrain the dog. According to the 
deputy’s narrative, the dog came within a couple of feet of the deputy’s leg which 
forced the deputy to push the dog with his left hand while reaching for his 
sidearm with his right hand. It was at this moment that the deputy shot the dog 
who later died of his injuries. In Sandoval v Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept. 
(2014), officers were investigating a possible burglary at a house and saw three 
juvenile males who were “listening to music, watching T.V., and playing video 
games” (p. 1159). Officers entered the residence and ordered the three boys to 
leave the bedroom. One boy asked if he could secure the family dog, his request 
was denied by the officers. “As the boys exited the bedroom. [The dog] slipped in 
front of [two boys], but continued to walk behind [the third]” (Sandoval v Las 




request to meet believed his safety was in danger when two dogs on the witness’ 
property started “moving toward him” (Gregory v City of Vallejo, 2014), and two 
other dogs were shot in Erie, Colorado when two dogs “continued to approach 
[the officer]” as he was backing away from the dog’s owner’s property (Moore v 
Town of Erie, 2013, p. 2). The shooting deaths of multiple dogs were deemed 
reasonable because they were running loose and unrestrained (Altman v City of 
High Point, 2003). These decisions and many others like them raise the question, 





CHAPTER FIVE  
FINDINGS 1: POLICE VIOLENCE AND THE “DANGEROUS” DOG 
 
 
Dogs are unique in that they exist in a state of limbo (Sentell v New 
Orleans and C.R. Co., 1897). Although directly descended from wild dogs (e.g., 
wolves, foxes, minks, etc.), they are not perceived of as “wild.” They live and 
work alongside humans, but they are not livestock. Furthermore, dogs, like most 
animals, are portrayed as nonessential to the continuation of modern American 
society (Soron, 2011); yet, dogs have been shaping human social life ever since 
the domestication of wolves over 10,000 years ago (Alves, 2016). Through this 
domestication process, humans are able to use animals—especially dogs—for a 
variety of functions in the preservation and continuation of human society. “As 
pack animals with a social hierarchy, dogs seem to easily embrace the concept 
of friend versus foe or known versus unknown” (p. 3), and with the dog’s natural 
skills for hunting, tracking, herding, and fighting, made the species a suitable ally 
in the protection of humans and their property (Delise, 2007). Eons later, dogs 
are still being used to protect humans and their property. “Ask just about any 
home-safety expert about the best way to protect your home and 
property,…you’re likely to get the same answer: Get a dog” (Rabin, 2016, para. 
4). This view of dogs as personal protectors relies on the dog’s natural ability to 
harm, injure, and-or kill with its bite.  
On average, there are approximately 12 to 24 human deaths per year that 




Health Organization, 2018), and in half of these incidents the victim was a child 
(American Veterinary Medical Association, 2018b). Furthermore, half of all biting 
incidents occur in the home with a dog that is familiar to the human (Centers for 
Disease Control, 2018). Finally, the probability of being bitten increases with the 
number of dogs in one’s residence—households with 2 or more dogs are 5 times 
more likely to experience a biting incident compared to households without dogs 
(Centers for Disease Control, 2018). The American Veterinary Medical 
Association (2018b) has recently stated that “it is not a dog's breed that 
determines whether it will bite, but rather the dog's individual history and 
behavior.” Yet, the misconception that certain breeds are more prone to bite than 
other breeds persists. Constructing dogs as dangerous requires the creation of 
an image that perpetuates a threatening stereotype (Delise, 2007). One avenue 
for constructing this image is through media portrayals of specific dog breeds as 
inherently dangerous. Another avenue, however, is through the judiciary. That is, 
through the legal decisions that form the foundation of modern legal doctrine. 
The judiciary’s responsibility in the creation of the dangerous dog is to 
provide the legal framework for transforming a group of sentient beings into an 
aberration that acts as a focal point for all of society’s biases. The goal of this 
chapter, then, is to demonstrate how canicide – or the police practice of killing 
dogs, whether pets or strays – depends upon the figure of the dangerous dog to 
regulate human behavior. More specifically, this chapter takes on the mediated 




dog” does not exist outside of its politico-legal and historical-cultural construction 
as threat.  This isn’t to deny that dogs, as biological beings, can be harmful in 
their own right. This much should be obvious enough. Rather, the point is to 
underline the fact that for police to shoot and kill a dog the dog has to be 
constructed as dangerous. This construction must not only make the dog a threat 
to the physical safety of a human, but it must also make the dog a threat to the 
society itself. Law enforcement facilitates the dangerous dog construction by 
focusing policing efforts on curbing dog fighting as an insidious practice (Delise, 
2007). It is this association with dog fighting where many of the misconceptions 
about the pit bull’s abilities began to flourish as the popularity of pit bulls began to 
rise. This association of the pit bull with criminality and populations marginalized 
by society has made the pit bull America’s canine version of persona non grata 
(Delise, 2007). 
The Dangerous Dog and Police Violence 
 
Dogs are efficacious for protection because there is a human fear 
attached to dogs (Rabin, 2016). Specifically, it is the fear of being hunted and 
attacked by canines (Delise, 2007). This fear is powerful enough that one expert 
believes dogs have a greater psychological impact on the human condition than 
a gun (Rabin, 2016). Constructing a breed of dog as “dangerous,” then, requires 
the creation of an image that perpetuates a dangerous stereotype (Delise, 2007), 
and this image must tap into that innate fear humans have for dogs. 




those social structures that are intimately connected to the human experience. 
Even the type of dog favored becomes a form of self-identification and class 
identification. Poor blacks and whites are mostly in the same the same boat 
regarding the pit bull. The middle-classes disdain for the poor carries over in its 
disdain for the pit bull; that is, unless someone from the middle-class steps in to 
“save” the pit bull (Dayan, 2016). When talking about the first pit bull police dog in 
New York State, Brad Croft—who is operations director for a company that trains 
dogs and police to be successful K-9 units—stated, “They’re just good, good 
dogs. The Achilles heel is the stigma” (Gutierrez, 2017, para. 10). A K-9 officer in 
Kansas stated, “‘Kano and I plan to get out there and help try to change the bad 
name that so many have given the Pit Bull,’” (WGN 9, 2017, para. 4). “Wildflower 
the pit bull was going to be euthanized before she was given the opportunity to 
serve alongside police officers in Oklahoma” (Alanis, 2018, para. 1). The 
dangerous dog phenomenon facilitates police violence in three ways. 
First, the word “dangerous” quickly narrows the list of dogs down to 
specific breeds officially labeled as such by the courts, legislature, or public 
opinion. In Dahm v City of Miamisburg (1997), the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division upheld the officer’s discharge of 
his service weapon at plaintiff’s dog because of the “Plaintiff’s past criminal 
history, his ownership of a pitbull, and his perceived non-compliant attitude 
toward authority” (p. 14). The dissent in Brown v Muhlenberg Twp. (2001) relied 




officer shooting the dog. The United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Columbia upheld an officer’s shooting of a dog as reasonable partly because 
he “encountered…a medium-sized pitbull, which courts have noted are an 
aggressive breed of dog bred for fighting” (Newman v City of Fresno, 2018, p. 
16). Even when an officer’s actions are deemed unreasonable, they dog’s 
perceived dangerousness still plays a role in the court’s decision. A federal 
district court in Branson v Price (2015) reasoned that an officer acted 
unreasonably when he shot a dog even though the officer “reasonably perceived 
the dog to be a dangerous breed” (p. 17). These judicial decisions and other like 
them highlight that although “police decisions and procedures leave unknown the 
number of deviants not labelled and processed, court decisions and procedures 
enable the next stage of the system to be more precisely observed” (Cohen, 
2002, p. 109). That is, the courts officially apply the label of deviant or 
dangerousness to the selected being which effectuates the symbolization 
process. 
Similarly, an owner’s deviant status taints any of their companion animals 
as equally deviant. What occurs is an endless cycle of humans who have an 
inclination to possess things that are intimidating and frightening searching for 
“dangerous dogs” so that they can increase their own sense of power and 
influence (Delise, 2007; Harding, 2010). For these individuals, “[s]tatus dogs 
provide [a] reputation via a recognised [sic] pedigree of violence or credible 




functions require dogs to retain the aggressive nature of their wolf ancestors. As 
long as dogs perform this protective function within the parameters set by 
humans, then the dog’s aggressive responses are not perceived threatening or 
dangerous (Delise, 2007). Again, these parameters traditionally allow aggression 
against those deemed as social outcasts (Delise, 2007). Dogs that fail to 
adequately discern between who is worthy of aggression and who is not are 
deemed dangerous. The “dangerous dog,” then, becomes an unwitting part of a 
perceived threat to the survival of a society. The pit bull has been transformed 
into both a wellspring for demonstrating one’s “toughness” (Dickey, 2016) and a 
symbol of social decay. 
Second, the dangerous dog construct compounds the effects associated 
with racialized police killings in general. This effect is evidenced by the types of 
public reaction to the killing of dogs as opposed to the killing of humans. 
Traditionally, police are unsuitable enemies because they have the political 
power to downplay and divert any attention focused on them (Cohen, 2002). 
Furthermore, a sizable portion of the public rally to provide “support and 
admiration for the police” (p. 107) in those instances where the actions of the 
police are called into question (Cohen, 2002). This public support for agents of 
social control extends to the media as well. Many newspapers legitimize and 
normalize police violence against marginalized populations by the way they 
narrate the killing of a human by police (Hirschfield & Simon, 2010). When 




individual as a criminal by highlighting their activity and possible history (Lyon, 
2009). This close relationship between the media and the police provides a non-
legal method for creating a folk devil to be opposed. These folk devils, however, 
oftentimes resemble members from marginalized populations. News stories 
reporting on the killing of citizens by police officers do not offer counter-narratives 
to the government’s version of events (Hirschfield & Simon, 2010), thus 
reinforcing the police’s version of events as the truth (Shudson, 2002). This 
unquestioning reliance on the police for the official version, however, does not 
always apply to the killing of a dog by police. 
Using the officer with the New York Police Department who shot a dog 
trying to defend its owner who was having seizure (Sandoval, McNulty, & 
Armaghan, 2012) helps highlight this difference. First, the article’s title—"Shot 
Trying to Save His Master”—indicates that there is some resistance to the 
reasonableness of the officer’s actions. Second, the article places the 
responsibility of the dog’s actions on the officers: “Three cops surrounded the 
man and tried to roust him, angering the dog, according to witnesses” (Sandoval, 
McNulty, & Armaghan, 2012, p. 4; emphasis added). The use of the word 
“angering” removes any possibility of labeling the dog as “vicious” or “dangerous” 
since the word implies the dog is normally passive. Another witness stated that, 
“The homeless guy looked like he was having a seizure - the dog started acting 
defensive” (Sandoval, McNulty, & Armaghan, 2012, p. 4; emphasis added). As 




dog’s behavior was a reaction to the behavior of the officers and that the dog was 
acting naturally by being “defensive” of its owner. Likewise, another witness 
stated, “The dog was just defending its owner and the cops shot it in the head” 
(Sandoval, McNulty, & Armaghan, 2012, p. 4). Not only does this witness also 
view the dog’s behavior as justified, he places the responsibility for the dog’s 
death on the police—“the cops shot.” Juxtapose this view with the statement from 
another witness and one can see how subtle shifts in language alter the narrative 
by altering who is responsible: “The dog barked and jumped at the cop. The cop 
shot him in self-defense” (Sandoval, McNulty, & Armaghan, 2012, p. 4). Here the 
cop still actively shot the dog, but the onus for the shooting was on the dog for 
barking and jumping. 
In 2010, a “D.C. police officer shot and killed a festival-goer's dog amid 
hundreds of onlookers in Adams Morgan on Sunday afternoon in an incident that 
was either completely justified or totally unnecessary, depending on whom you 
ask” (Zapotosky, 2010, p. B01). From this very first sentence of the report, the 
reader is asked to scrutinize the officer’s actions. Witnesses agree that two dogs 
were snapping at each other during the festival when the police got involved 
which resulted in the death of a dog. The owner of the deceased dog claimed to 
have been subduing his dog after he turned and bit a poodle passing by when 
the officers arrived. Immediately following this background information is the dog 
owner’s version of events: 
That's when a D.C. police officer took over, putting his knee in the middle 




owner] said. He said that the officer then grabbed Parrot [the dog] by his 
neck and threw him over a banister at the Brass Knob antique store and 
that just as the dog righted itself, the officer pulled out his gun and fired 
(Zapotosky, 2010, p. B01). 
 
Zapotosky (2010) goes on to quote the dog owner: “‘The officer drew his gun in 
an unnecessary act of cowboy gunslinging law enforcement and shot my dog 
amidst a crowd of thousands’” (p. B01). The dog owner’s “account is supported 
by at least one witness” (p. B01) according to Zapotosky (2010). Here the author 
lends credence to the dog owner’s version of events by highlighting that it is 
supported by another person and that there may be others who witnessed the 
event in a similar fashion (i.e., “at least one witness”). 
As for the police version of events, it begins slightly before the shooting: 
The “commander of the 3rd Police District, said that once the officer pushed the 
dog down the stairwell, ‘the dog immediately turns and runs at the officer 
aggressively’” (Zapotosky, 2010, p. B01). First, the police attempt to control the 
development of the narrative by denying the reader the right to know why the 
officer pushed the dog down the stairs. Beginning with the push, the events 
preceding it are deemed irrelevant to the police. Second, pushing a dog down 
stairs, although not preferred, creates a different perception of events than an 
officer “throwing” a dog over a railing. Third, the commander relies on Graham 
(1989) when describing the incident by implying a version that was quickly 
evolving and requiring a split-second decision via the dog immediately turns and 




safety by describing the dog’s advancement as “aggressive.” Fourth, the article 
closes out the police version of events with the commander proclaiming that “‘It's 
definitely going to be justified based on everything that we know’” (Zapotosky, 
2010, p. B01). Although this should be definitive as to the reasonableness of the 
officer’s actions and a strong argument for accepting the police version as the 
truth, the information comes from a third party entrenched within the halls of the 
police department instead of from the officer themselves. Filtering the narrative 
through the police’s command structure without reference to the officer 
essentially erases the officer from the scene. 
Third, maintaining a system of violence underlying all police encounters 
requires the creation of a narrative that situates the society as constantly under 
attack from internal and external threats. The officer operates as “someone with 
whom you can identify, someone who could have been and one day could be 
anybody” (Cohen, 2002, p. xii). Although the officer operates as a suitable victim 
that is relatable, canicide helps reinforce the idea that the continuation of civilized 
society rests in the hands of a “chosen few” who put the safety of others above 
their own. Constructing the police as sole entity holding the “wall” also situates 
the police and the criminal justice system as outside American society. Dogs 
“contain a latent threat to human safety” and they “can be unpredictable both in 
their actions and in the signals they send” (P.M. v Bolinger, 2011, p. 20). A 
federal district court in Minnesota declared the killing of a dog as reasonable 




and . . . looked extremely aggressive” (Powell v Johnson, 2012, p. 876). The Fifth 
Circuit granted an officer qualified immunity because Officer Duncan was startled 
by a large dog that was showing its teeth (whether baring them aggressively or 
"smiling" [as the dog owner claimed]) (Stephenson v McClelland, 2015, p. 185). 
In Romero v Bexar County (2014), a federal district court granted an officer 
summary judgment because “‘several large dogs ran out aggressively charging, 
barking and growling, at Deputy Phillips and me (sic)’” (p. 661). In these 
incidents, the officer becomes the physical manifestation of the both the society’s 
social control mechanism and the society itself. Therefore, an attack on the 
officer is perceived as an attack on the society by jeopardizing the safety of its 
protectors. Regulating one group means regulating one of the dog’s natural 
abilities that humans both fear and admire—its bite. 
The Bite 
 
Humans have used the dog’s biting ability to terrorize and oppress others. 
“All you gotta do is tell them you're going to bring the dogs. Look at 'em run. I 
want to see the dogs work” (Freedom: A History of Us, 2002, para. 2). This 
statement was made by Theophilus Eugene “Bull” Connor regarding the civil 
rights demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama. The legacy left by Bull Connor 
and his dogs will be remembered for generations; yet, his legacy is a 
continuation of humans appropriating the dog’s bite for their own benefit. Slavers 
would have slaves whip and abuse the dogs under their care, and then the 




Parry, 2021). One of the most feared breeds during this time was the Cuban 
bloodhound (Yingling & Parry, 2021). Bartolome de Las Casas relied on 
bloodhounds to help subjugate and decimate native populations, both the Union 
and Confederacy used Cuban Bloodhounds during the Civil War for tracking and 
guarding prisoners, and the Van Buren administration relied on Cuban 
bloodhounds in the removal of the Seminoles from Florida (Delise, 2007). Even 
the Roman Legion used dogs to harass and intimidate the Legion’s enemies 
during expeditions (Sloane, 1955). Just as the officer’s “badge renders the violent 
work of policing legitimate and justified, but also noble and sacred” (Correia & 
Wall, 2018, p. 115), the dog’s bite becomes symbolic of its virtue and nobility. 
A nine-year-old boy in Nebraska was saved from an intruder by the family 
pit bull (Khan, 2018). After the intruder broke into the house, he began chasing 
the nine-year-old who called for his dog Baby Girl. It was at this point that Baby 
Girl attacked the unwanted man and chased him from the premises (Khan, 
2018). In Texas, a pregnant woman fended off an assailant with the aid of her 
dog Rowdy (Fox4News, 2018). The man, who was swinging a pear knife at her, 
was bit by Rowdy and subsequently fled the location (Fox4News, 2018). A 
family’s dog (Rosie) was shot with a BB gun by a potential intruder in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico after the dog began barking at the individual (Nguyen, 
2018). An Oklahoma City man was arrested on burglary and drug possession 
charges after he broke into a house and was subsequently set upon by the 




crew did a story in which they pretended to be intruders by entering the homes of 
three Houstonians—with the owners’ permission—to see if the families’ dogs 
would attack (Roberson & Spencer, 2017). None of the dogs attacked the 
“intruders”—who were dressed in bite suits, but one dog made any sign that 
further intrusion would result in injury (Roberson & Spencer, 2017). 
The owner of the one dog who showed signs of aggression in the Houston 
example stated that he was “proud of him [the dog]” (Roberson & Spencer, 2017, 
para. 32). Likewise, Rosie’s family was quoted as saying, “She did what she was 
supposed to do. She protected her family and she definitely scared whoever it 
was away" (Nguyen, 2018). According to Prince’s family, “We're big dog lovers. 
And he’s a good boy. But he doesn’t like strangers in his house” (Miston, 2018). 
Likewise, Baby Girl (the dog from the Nebraska incident) was reported as 
“[doing] the job” when she attacked and chased away the intruder. It is apparent, 
then, that a dog’s aggressive responses to humans are not perceived as 
threatening or dangerous so long as the dog’s aggression falls within the 
approved parameters set forth by humans (Delise, 2007). For the Houstonians 
whose dogs did not attack or attempt to harm the intruders, they were “stunned” 
(para. 16) and “disappointed” (para. 22) in their dogs’ behaviors (Roberson & 
Spencer, 2017). What these pleasures and disappointments reveal is that the 
dog’s bite is approved of when it is in the service of humans. 
 The dog’s bite becomes demonized when it no longer serves those in 




was bitten by one of the family’s dogs—a male pit bull (Roustan & Pesantes, 
2018).  In the Sun Sentinel’s write up, the incident was described as such: “The 
mauling happened while the grandmother was transferring Thor from one room 
to another and it overpowered her, Diaz said. That’s when it attacked the baby” 
(Roustan & Pesantes, 2018, paragraph 7; emphasis added). First, what we see 
is that the dog in question went from having a sentient status and an identity via 
the name “Thor” to having both stripped away with the label “it;” all within a single 
sentence. What makes this removal of a living being’s sentient status is that 
sentient beings act and react to stimuli while things just function or malfunction. 
Removing Thor’s sentience and identity with the label it, then, absolves the 
human readers from having to engage in the mental processes associated with 
ascertaining why Thor would act in such a way. Instead, the readers are now 
able to perceive Thor as an abstraction or caricature of the “typical” pit bull. Thor 
is now an object that malfunctioned and caused the death of a human child. As 
an “it,” the Law is now able to direct its power toward the human(s) who were 
“controlling” Thor. This ascription of responsibility and intent to the human is 
evidenced by the Medical Examiner’s conclusion that the incident was accidental 
which led Miramar Officer Diaz to confirm that “no one will be charged in the 
incident” (Roustan & Pesantes, 2018, paragraph 8). The removal of Thor’s 





Folk Devils and the Pit Bull 
 
Folk devils are individuals or groups that serve as a reminder of who or 
what a given society deems reprehensible or threatening (Cohen, 2002). 
Traditionally, a society’s folk devils come from their young, working-class males 
who are portrayed as desiring nothing more out of life than to commit senseless 
acts of violence (Cohen, 2002). The purpose of folk devils is to unify a diverse 
group of people by constructing one group as the cause of society’s troubles 
(Cohen, 2002). In the 1990s, society willingly accepted the idea that a new breed 
of juvenile offenders—the “super-predator”—would arise from “homes where 
unconditional love is nowhere but unmerciful abuse is common” and feast upon 
the soft underbelly of decent society (DiLulio, 1995). Recently, the lawyers and 
supporters of former President Donald Trump have pointed to a group called 
“Antifa” as the cause of the riot on Capitol Hill (Anderson, 2021). Although a folk 
devil can come in many forms, they are often associated with marginalized 
populations and it is the responsibility of the criminal justice system to regulate 
these groups and their members (Stults & Banner, 2007). 
As a focal point, folk devils serve as the catalyst for moral panics. Moral 
panics arise from perceived threats to one’s way of life and are sparked by 
events that are either extreme or rare (Cohen, 2002). Following the spark, the 
community is in a state of limbo—that moment between the conclusion of an 
event and inventory phase. The inventory phase is where one begins taking 




period, rumours and ambiguous perceptions become the basis for interpreting 
the situation” (Cohen, 2002, p. 24). It is during the inventory phase that reports 
(from the media or word of mouth) that the elements of an event might be 
exaggerated or distorted. The more dramatic and shocking a case the more likely 
a moral panic can be created. These traditional folk devils, however, do not 
provide the necessary justifications to sustain the increased use of force by 
police beyond the moral panic’s resolution. Approaching canicide from this 
perspective reveals that each incident is treated by the judiciary as a miniature 
moral panic. 
First, the spark for these miniature moral panics is the shooting of the dog. 
Some may argue that it is the dog’s behavior which is the spark or the officer’s 
fear that sets the moral panic off; however, it is not the dog’s behavior or officer’s 
fear that results in the cascade of lawsuits and public debates regarding the 
reasonableness of the shooting but the actual aiming, trigger squeeze, impact, 
and the dog’s injury or death that resonates with the public and provides the 
grounds for subsequent lawsuits. Second, these incidents have a suitable 
enemy—the dog, especially if the dog(s) happen to fall under the term “Pit Bull.” 
Cohen (2002) defines a suitable enemy as “a soft target, easily denounced, with 
little power and preferably without even access to the battlefield of cultural 
politics” (p. xii). In Taylor v Lott (2018), officers executed a no-knock warrant in 
the early morning hours on December 19, 2013. The officers believed that the 




investigation—was residing at the home when the warrant was executed (Taylor, 
2018). The plaintiff was injured by flying shrapnel when the officers detonated an 
explosive device to breach the home’s front door. 
The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, 
Columbia Division upheld the constitutionality of the no-knock entry based on the 
“drug activity at the plaintiff's residence and the dangerousness of the plaintiff's 
son…and others who either lived at or frequented the residence…provided the 
officers with reasonable suspicion that occupants in the residence would present 
a danger to law enforcement or inhibit the investigation” (Taylor v Lott, 2018, p. 
5). Although not explicitly stated, it is plausible that the term “occupants” includes 
the “vicious dog” who received 10 points on the officer’s threat assessment. 
Putting the dog’s score into perspective, being a suspect in a homicide 
investigation is worth 35 points (Taylor v Lott, 2018). A “vicious dog,” then, is 
one-third the value of being a suspect in the killing of another human being. 
Furthermore, “suspects with a criminal history relating to resisting arrest or 
combativeness with police” also receive a score of 10 points while “suspects with 
a criminal history relating to firearms” and the “existence of handguns at the 
location” both receive 15 points (Taylor v Lott, 2018, p. 8; footnote 3). The First 
Circuit in United States v Jewell (1995) upheld a no-knock entry based on the 
Jewell’s criminal history and the presence of a pit bull at his residence. According 
to the First Circuit, “[t]he Fourth Amendment did not require the police to risk 




States v Jewell, 1995, p. 24; emphasis added). Likewise, the Seventh Circuit 
upheld an officer’s actions because “exigent circumstances certainly existed to 
excuse any requirement of arousing armed defendants, or their dog” (United 
States v Buckley, 1993, p. 558). 
In Davis v State (2007), an officer applied for a no knock warrant for Mr. 
Davis’ residence. The affidavit for the warrant listed Mr. Davis prior criminal 
history, his likelihood to resist based on reports from other officers, and the 
presence of a “pit bull type dog inside the residence” (p. 3). Although the officer 
requesting the no-knock warrant had never interacted with the pit bull at Mr. 
Davis’ residence, the officer listed the dog’s presence as a possible threat 
because in his experience the pit bull “breed is known…to be particularly vicious 
and often used for protection” (p. 3). Analyzing the officer’s statement from 
viewpoint of Adams’ (2010) third way of transforming someone into an absent 
referent (i.e., metaphorical) revels that the dog loses its agency from two 
directions. First, the pit bull at Mr. Davis’ residence is bestowed the label of 
dangerousness based on the popularity of the breed among certain dangerous 
populations. Second, the pit bull in this case loses its autonomy because it is no 
longer seen as an individual dog with a unique character and traits; instead, it is 
a representative of its breed. This view of pit bulls was the conclusion reached by 
the court in Davis v State (2007). According to the court in Davis v State (2007), 
“a reasonable police officer could infer from his knowledge and experience that 




of a dog can be used as a justification for a no-knock warrant, but it cannot be 
the only justification. 
Finally, there must be a “consensus that the beliefs or action being 
denounced were not insulated entities (‘it’s not only this’) but integral parts of the 
society or else could (and would) be unless ‘something was done’” (Cohen, 2002, 
p. xii). The powerholders within a society react according to their “positions, 
statuses, interests, ideologies and values” (Cohen, 2002, p. 217). “As society’s 
officially designated agents of civil power, the police play a crucial role in the 
labeling process, both in the immediate reaction to deviance, as well as the 
ongoing reaction in later stages of the sequence” (Cohen, 2002, p. 97). In these 
miniature moral panics, the dog’s behavior is not viewed from the perspective of 
the dog. Rather, the dog’s behavior is viewed as indicative of its owner’s 
personal traits. The conflation of the dog’s behavior with the owner’s perceived 
personal characteristics forms within the symbolization process of moral panics. 
Symbolization uses communication to help create an event and its narrative 
(Cohen, 2002). The pattern followed by symbolization begins with “a 
word…[becoming] symbolic of a certain status (delinquent or deviant); objects 
(hairstyle, clothing) symbolize the word; the words themselves become symbolic 
of the status (and emotions attached to the status)” (Cohen, 2002, p. 37). The 
power holder’s pushing the moral panic try to establish negative symbolization to 
the event and its participants (Cohen, 2002). What makes the pit bull the perfect 




simulation of a breed which makes the breed’s image malleable enough so that it 
may be shaped into whatever tool (e.g., guardian, companion, or weapon) a 
society’s powerholders need. 
The Pit Bull Effect 
 
The term “pit bull” is an amalgamation of many different breeds such as 
the American Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire Bull Terrier, Dogo Argentino, 
Cane Corse, Tosa Inu, and the Fila Brasileiro (Grider v City and County of 
Denver, 2011). The only commonality connecting these different breeds is that 
they all trace their lineage to the bulldogs of the nineteenth century (Lockwood & 
Rindy, 1987). The bulldog began its existence as a fighting dog and working dog 
intimately linked to the lower-class (Ritvo, 1986). This perception of bulldogs and 
dog fighting overlooks the fact that Queen Elizabeth would use fights such as 
bear baiting to entertain foreign dignitaries (Dickey, 2016). Growing public 
disgust for and legislation against bullbaiting placed the dog in danger of 
extermination until approximately 1880 when it became the darling of the 
aristocracy through the manipulation of its social history and physical appearance 
(Ritvo, 1986). As time passed, bulldog owners were no longer viewed as the 
dregs of society, but instead as respectable members of society (Ritvo, 1986). 
This new image of bulldogs was capped in part by large crowds of women at an 
all bulldog show in 1893 (Ritvo, 1986). This reconfigured image of the pit bull 
lasted throughout the early twentieth century. The pit bull was viewed as being 




wartime hero during World War I (Alonso-Recarte, 2020). However, a series of 
dog bites on children during the 1970s began to alter the pit bull’s image (Reed, 
2007). No longer America’s canine sweetheart, the pit bull became symbolic of 
the urban (Dickey, 2016; Alonso-Recarte, 2020) and became associated with 
gangs (Maher & Pierpoint, 2011), the inner-city (Harding, 2010), and the drug 
trade (Junod, 2014). The malleability of the pit bull’s image allows the judiciary to 
transform the dog at will in service of the government’s policing powers. 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s upward departure from the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines when sentencing two defendants for animal 
fighting (United States v Hackman, 2011). Hackman’s sentence was enhanced 
because the court believed his methods of training, fighting, and even killing 
losing dogs satisfied the criteria for classifying his behavior as extraordinary. The 
Eighth Circuit discussed an incident in which one of the conspirators hosted a 
contract fight which led to the electrocution of the losing dog after it had fought 
for approximately one and a half hours (United States v Hackman, 2011). In 
another example, the Eighth Circuit referred to a dog sold by Hackman and then 
later fought in a contract fight as a “canine victim” (United States v Hackman, 
2011, p. 1081). The Fourth Circuit also affirmed a lower court’s upward departure 
in sentencing based on the lower court’s belief that the dog’s constituted 
“vulnerable victims” (United States v Hargrove, 2012, p. 159). In United States v 
Stevens (2008)2, the dissent argued: 
 
2 The majority’s decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v Stevens, 599 




dogs that are forced to fight are commonly the subjects of brutality and 
cruelty for the entire span of their lives: prior to the fights, they are 
intentionally emotionally abused and physically tortured in order to 
predispose them to violence; after the fights, dogs that do not perform well 
are not infrequently left to die untreated from their injuries or are simply 
executed (pp. 244-245). 
 
Although not explicitly stated as victims, the dissent’s description of a dog’s 
experience in the world of dog fighting is meant to construct the dog as a 
vulnerable victim. Pit bulls are deemed worthy victims when they are used by 
humans for an activity that American society believes is deplorable. On the other 
hand, the judiciary uses pit bulls as threats to society in the nation’s ongoing War 
on Drugs. 
In United States v Wheeler (2003), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a lower 
courts allowance of Wheeler’s status as a dog owner to help establish his role in 
the drug trade. The prosecution used Wheeler’s statement that he would sic his 
dogs on the police as evidence that “showed consciousness of guilt” (United 
States v Wheeler, 2003, p. 301). Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit accepted the 
government’s contention that Wheeler’s ownership of his pit bull was “evidence 
that he possessed ‘tools’ of the drug trade” (United States v Wheeler, 2003, p. 
301). An Oklahoma City police officer testified as an expert drug witness and 
stated that drug dealers commonly use pit bulls as a part of the drug trade 
(United States v Poe, 2009). The Tenth Circuit agreed and believed that a jury 
could infer intent to distribute drugs based on the Poe’s possession of pit bulls 
along with Ziploc bags, surveillance equipment, scales, and other items (United 




the ability to use its natural abilities as it sees fit, and by extension, removing the 
dog’s autonomy. 
What the judiciary is doing is carving out a place for certain breeds of dogs 
within the realm of exigent circumstances. “Absent exigent circumstances, that 
threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant” (Payton v New York, 
1980, p. 590). Officers may forgo the knock-and-announce requirement when 
“‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so 
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment” (Mincey v. Arizona, 1978, p. 394). In their affidavits requesting a no 
knock warrant, all officers have to demonstrate is reasonable suspicion that 
announcing their presence would (1) create an unnecessary threat to officer 
safety, (2) provide the suspect with an opportunity to destroy evidence, or (3) 
knocking and announcing the presence of police would be futile (Richards v 
Wisconsin, 1997). 
When deciding whether the presence of a large dog, or a specific breed of 
dog, is enough to justify forgoing the knock-and-announce requirement, the 
judiciary have directed their focus on the animal’s behavior in relation to the 
government’s interests. The judiciary has held that the presence of a dog alone, 
even if it is a pit bull or other large canine perceived as inherently dangerous 
(Commonwealth v Santiago, 2008), is not sufficient to justify forgoing the knock-
and-announce requirement when the animal poses no imminent threat (Andrews 




Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld a no-knock search warrant 
because officers had prior knowledge that the suspect in question possessed a 
firearm and a pit bull, and that arousing either would create an imminent threat to 
officer safety (United States v Buckley, 1993). This stance was further supported 
by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit when it affirmed the use of a no-
knock warrant because officers had prior knowledge that a suspect not only 
owned a pit bull, but had prior arrests and convictions for violent crimes (United 
States v Jewell, 1995). Once the symbolization process is complete, the 
ownership of a “dangerous dog” becomes indicative of the owner’s moral failings. 
Constructing a breed of dog as dangerous requires the creation of an image that 
perpetuates a threatening stereotype (Delise, 2007), and this process is not 
unlike the construction of the “criminal” figure that is a central concern for critical 
criminologists and sociologists of deviance. 
Policing in the United States has always been a contentious issue, 
especially since a society’s powerholders used the police to enforce their will 
upon the populace of minority communities (Walker, Spohn, & DeLone, 2012). It 
is not uncommon for the police to use aggression as a form of social control 
against minority populations by “stereotyping, dehumanizing, and objectifying” 
them (Bryant-Davis, Adams, Alejandre, & Davis, 2017, p. 866). In one study, a 
third of respondents reported witnessing police violence during their childhood 
while approximately half reported being victims of police violence themselves 




discontent within the targeted populace, especially when the population is 
powerless to prevent the criminalization of their behaviors and activities 
(Alexander, 2012). The purpose of criminalizing the behaviors and activities 
engaged in by the targeted group is to subtly establish the group as “criminals or 
security threats, [so] they can be restrained in their liberty, deprived of their 
rights, and ultimately undone as persons” (Dayan, 2011, p. 73). This tactic 
creates a criminal class, which is oftentimes racialized, that becomes a viable 
folk devil for maintaining the dominant racial and economic order of society 
(Alexander, 2012). As a result, many within these afflicted communities become 
hypervigilant about how they are perceived by the larger society (Lee & 
Robinson, 2019).  
The conflation of a specific dog breed with a specific race should not come 
as a surprise since both breedism and racism are intricately linked (Skabelund, 
2008). Fulfilling this role, pit bulls are “made to perform their stereotypical role as 
ghetto monsters that inhabit the criminal world” (Alonso-Recarte, 2020, p. 854). 
An aspect of constructing the pit bull as a four-legged serial killer that preys on 
society and attacks without warning is associating this image with toughness. For 
instance, the artist Pitbull “got his stage name from a friend who said he was like 
the dog of the same name—a fighter who didn’t understand the word ‘lose’” 
(Robinson, 2016, para. 3). Once the pit bull became symbolic of the inner-city, 
the breed eventually came to symbolize America’s “racial fears about crime and 




iconographic of black masculinity in America (Alonso-Recarte, 2020), and in 
doing so linked “the pariah status of these stigmatised dogs with the low status of 
the stigmatised communities” (Hardin, 2010, p. 32). Isolating one, therefore, 
requires the isolation of the other. 
Social Killing of the Dangerous Dog 
A principle attribute of sovereignty is the ability to determine if another 
being lives or dies (Mbembe, 2019). Death establishes a being as an absent 
referent since whatever essence the animal had while alive is literally absent 
from its body upon death (Adams, 2010). Deeming a canine as a dangerous dog, 
however, does not require the literal death of the dog to make its body 
possessable by humans. Removing a sentient being’s autonomy makes the body 
possessable by other humans like any other form of property (Dayan, 2011). 
Dogs, like living humans, then, cannot be possessed unless they are socially 
dead which is “to be granted a natural life, while encased in unnatural death” 
(Dayan, 2011, p. 57). As such, the term “dangerous dog” condemns a canine or 
breed to a living death. Our identities are formed from our opposition to some 
form of Other (Mbembe, 2019). That is, we are who we are because we are not 
them. This same dynamic plays out in how we define ourselves as humans in 
comparison to dogs. 
Associating humans with animals to elicit certain responses is not difficult 
since—socially speaking—we understand the social meaning(s) of these 




of this breed perceived that strangers treated them with fear and apprehension 
(Twining, Arluke, & Patronek, 2000). Not only was this ostracizing perpetuated by 
strangers, but some pit bull owners discussed how family members would refrain 
from visiting solely because of their dog (Twining, Arluke, & Patronek, 2000). Due 
to this stance taken by society, pit bull owners had to develop coping strategies 
to handle the stigma.  Coping strategies ranged from claiming their animal was a 
breed other than a pit bull or avoiding equipment associated with dog fighting to 
acting as an ambassador for the breed by highlighting its positive traits (Twining, 
Arluke, & Patronek, 2000). Respondents in the study also discussed how many 
in the public fail to identify their dogs as a pit bull at first sight, and the owner has 
to decide whether or not to inform the individual of the dog’s breed (Twining, 
Arluke, & Patronek, 2000). How we “know” ourselves as humans, then, is a 
reflection of how we “know” animals as living beings (Johnson, 2012). Socially 
executing a breed requires altering how society perceives the breed, and this 
alteration occurs by transforming the breed into an absent referent. 
Language allows those in power to strip a sentient being of its autonomy, 
and then reimagine the being as an object that fulfills a societal function resulting 
in what Adams (2010) terms the “absent referent.” According to Adams (2010), 
there are three ways of transforming a sentient being into an absent referent. The 
first method is through death itself. Humans cannot truly possess another living 
Being until that Being is dead. For instance, a wild animal cannot be possessed 




The dangerous dog construct meets this first criterion of Adams (2010) through 
the actual death of the dog. The judiciary has consistently held that shooting a 
person’s dog constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
(San Jose Charter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v City of San Jose, 2005, 
p. 977; hereinafter Hells Angels). The Ninth Circuit held that the “killing of the dog 
is a destruction recognized as a seizure under the Fourth Amendment” (Fuller v 
Vines, 1994) and the Seventh Circuit in Viilo v Eyre (2008) that “the [officers] had 
reasonable notice that killing Bubba would constitute the "seizure" of an "effect" 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment” (p. 710). Therefore, canicide 
reinforces the “dangerous” label applied to the dog because it was perceived as 
an immediate threat to the officer’s safety, and the officer comes to possess the 
dog and its body when they kill it.  
The second method put forward by Adams (2010)—reclassifying a 
sentient being’s status within the machinery of society (i.e., definitional)—is 
evidenced in many court decisions as well. 
“We agree with the reasoning of that case and affirm that the 
trial judge’s holding that under the present facts the 
juvenile’s dog was an offensive weapon” (State in Interest of 
R., 1979, p. 351; emphasis added) 
 
“Here, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could 
lawfully find that appellant’s dog was a deadly weapon…” 
(Morris v State, 1998, p. 850; emphasis added) 
 
“Under these circumstances, a rational trier of fact could 
have concluded that petitioner used the dog as a deadly 
weapon, as defined by California law” (Steward v Sisto, 





Using “dog” as the courts do in these cases replaces the term “it” as the go to 
generic pronoun, and this substitution side steps all negative social meanings 
attached to the term “it” while still maintaining and reinforcing the anthropocentric 
narrative embedded within the term. Moreover, these court decisions and many 
others like them reinforce the narrative that humans are meant to dominate 
nature by making the non-human the possessory interest of the human. Finally, 
the non-humans in these cases experience a double-erasure via the terms like 
“juvenile” and “appellant.” The courts’ use of these latter terms functions the 
same way as “it” or “dog” in that they remove the human’s sentient status. No 
longer are these people autonomous beings, but rather something that the 
criminal justice system must process. By extension, the dogs in these cases do 
not belong to any human but to abstract concepts created by the law. Therefore, 
dogs are the property of the Law. 
Adams’ (2010) third method is metaphorical. A metaphorical approach 
allows humans to take the lived experiences of animals and appropriate these 
experiences to describe the human’s own experiences. “An example of this is 
when rape victims or battered women say, ‘I feel like a piece of meat’” (p. 67), or 
when the potent imagery of rape is appropriated from the “literal experience of 
women and applied metaphorically to other instances of violent devastation” 
(Adams, 2010, p. 68). This process occurs with animals as well. As an Auschwitz 
survivor stated regarding his opposition to a government proposal for rounding 




did I would dedicate it to the geese. I was a goose too” (Patterson, 2002, p. 141). 
This sentiment is not farfetched or hyperbole regarding the blurring of what is 
“human” with what is “animal.” A dog belonging to a Jewish family was racialized 
as a Jewish dog and subsequently shot (Sax, 2000). On the other hand, a dog 
owned by a German family was categorized as “German” and allowed to live 
(Sax, 2000). Likewise, many Britons during the First World War viewed dogs of 
German origin as Germans and thus enemies of the state (Howell, 2012). 
Teckels (a.k.a. dachshunds) were targeted by the British populace because the 
dog was the “national dog” of Teutonic Empire—the national dog of Germany 
(Howell, 2012; Tenner, 1998), and many teckels were abused or killed during the 
early part of World War I simply because of their association with Germany 
(Tenner, 1998). Even inanimate objects were not spared the hatred of the British 
populace. A locomotive was renamed from the Dachshund to the Bulldog as a 
means of making it more “British” (Howell, 2012). 
Conclusion 
 
The dog’s status as property is woven into the nation’s legal fabric through 
the pen of the legislature and judiciary (p. 247) which transforms the dog and its 
body into a deodand—“what must be given to God [Deo dandum]” (Dayan, 2011, 
p. 127). This legal concept traces its origins to the Middle Ages when the 
deodand was an integral part in the development of English jurisprudence 
(Sutton, 1999); reaching its pinnacle during the medieval and Tudor periods 




legal concept operated was that the aggrieving party, almost always an animal or 
inanimate object (e.g., tree, cart, cargo ship, etc.), must answer for the harm it 
inflicted upon a human (Sutton, 1997). Deodands, then, were property 
possessed by another that was for forfeiting to the aggrieved party as restitution 
for the harm committed by the object. “If an ox gore a man or woman, that they 
die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the 
owner of the ox shall be quit” (Exodus, 21:28, King James Bible). In the following 
verse, the human is held accountable for the animal’s actions if the owner had 
knowledge that the animal had harmed on previous occasions. Slaves in the 
antebellum South were used much in the same way. If a slave harmed another, 
the slave’s owner would offer the slave up for punishment thereby absolving the 
slave master of his responsibilities to the aggrieved party (Dayan, 2011). Also, as 
with a slave roaming freely, dogs roaming freely were commonly believed to be 
diseased (McCarthy, 2016). Regulation of the dog’s movement by the state, 
especially the dogs of the lower-class, was necessary to maintain social order, 
even to the point of authorizing the killing of dogs that were caught roaming 
unsupervised (Delise, 2007). 
The imagery of the dangerous dog is so powerful that Peters (2018) article 
in Working Dog magazine advises police officers to be mindful of how they 
present their dog to the public: “If you promote the use of your dog as a deadly 
weapon or involve the dog in an unjustified use of force, the public will blame 




in the dangerous dog armor donned by the judiciary. An article reporting on a 
New York City police officer who shot a dog entitles the article "Shot Trying to 
Save His Master” (Sandoval, McNulty, & Armaghan, 2012). From the outset, the 
article allows the reader to question the reasonableness of the officer’s actions. 
The article places the responsibility of the dog’s actions on the officers: “Three 
cops surrounded the man and tried to roust him, angering the dog, according to 
witnesses” (Sandoval, McNulty, & Armaghan, 2012, p. 4; emphasis added). The 
use of the word “angering” removes any possibility of labeling the dog as 
“vicious” or “dangerous” since the word implies the dog is normally passive. 
Juxtapose this view with the statement from another witness and one can see 
how subtle shifts in language alter the narrative by altering who is responsible: 
“The dog barked and jumped at the cop. The cop shot him in self-defense” 
(Sandoval, McNulty, & Armaghan, 2012, p. 4). Here the cop still actively shot the 
dog, but the onus for the shooting was on the dog for barking and jumping. 
Likewise in 2010, a “D.C. police officer shot and killed a festival-goer's dog amid 
hundreds of onlookers in Adams Morgan on Sunday afternoon in an incident that 
was either completely justified or totally unnecessary, depending on whom you 
ask” (Zapotosky, 2010, p. B01). From this very first sentence of the report, the 
reader is asked to scrutinize the officer’s actions. Zapotosky (2010) lends 
credence to the dog owner’s version of events by highlighting that the dog 
owner’s “account is supported by at least one witness” (p. B01). What makes 




focal point of the narrative instead of the dog’s aggressive behavior. The readers 
are able to empathize with the owner, mourn the loss of the dog, and question 
the reasonableness of an officer’s actions. This contradiction to Cohen’s (2002) 
argument that the police are hardly ever suitable enemies and to the belief that 
pit bulls can never be suitable victims occurs because of the human-dog bond. 
Dogs are the bridge that “joins persons to things, life to death, both in our 
nightmares and in our daily lives” (Dayan, 2016, p. xiii), and it is this bridging 
element that dogs bring to the human-dog bond that allows unknown strangers 
across the nation to form a unified collective that can empathize with the owner’s 
plight. Although breed identification is difficult at best, the news relies on the “one 
drop rule” to assign the label of “pit bull” to a dog (Delise, 2007). As a result, dogs 
classified as “pit bulls” can be segregated from other breeds due to their inherent 
biological and social inferiority (Delise, 2007). Yet, this view of pit bulls and other 
“aggressive breeds” overlooks the fact that it is humans who have bred and 
trained pit bulls and other breeds for aggression, and it is humans who continue 
to breed and train for these traits. 
Finally, the dangerous dog construct brings with it a sense of disease. A 
direct connection between the dangerous dog construct and disease is of course 
the rabies virus. Police have been authorized in the past to kill stray dogs to 
prevent the spread of the rabies virus and other zoological diseases (Altman v 
City of High Point, 2003). An article that appeared in The News-Herald on May 




Street area. Unsure of whether the dog’s issues were due to being sick, dying, or 
mad (i.e., rabid), the neighbors called police who responded to the location. Upon 
arrival, the officer located the dog and shot it (“Dog shot by police after 
complaints”, 1955). In another incident, a dog warden—who refused to go out on 
a weekend to pick up an injured dog—advised local police to dispose of the dog; 
the dog was subsequently shot by “a patrolman and buried in at the town dump” 
(“Stratford to probe claim”, 1960, p. 16). In Gettysburg, PA, police killed a stray 
dog and chased other stray dogs out of a neighborhood because they were 
causing sleepless nights for residents (“Police destroy ‘homeless’ dog”, 1953). 
What makes the rabies virus fearsome is that “there is no effective curative 
treatment for rabies once clinical signs have appeared” (World Health 
Organization, n.d.) and the virus itself “makes a beeline for the nervous system, 
where it begins to modify the behavior of its host in order to facilitate its own 
transmission to other victims” (Weiser, 2015, p. 444). Although rabies is still a 
threat today, the likelihood of contracting the virus is rare. 
According to the Centers for Disease Control (2020), only 1 to 3 cases of 
human rabies are reported annually with a total of 25 known cases between 2009 
and 2018. Ma and colleagues (2020) only 63 (0.3%) of 22,418 dogs submitted for 
testing in 2018 were confirmed rabid. As for human contraction of the rabies 
virus, only 3 out of 23 cases reported were confirmed to have rabies in 2018 (Ma 
et al., 2020). The first was a 6-year-old male who contracted the virus from a bat, 




though no exposure to a raccoons was noted, and the third was a 55-year-old 
male who tested positive for the bat variant of rabies even though no bites were 
reported after he cleaned bats from his home (Ma et al., 2020).  
Dogs exist in a state of nothingness (Dayan, 2011); dogs are alive but also 
dead. The live and have a life cycle, but they are property and therefore dead in 
law. Dogs, then, may best be understood through a zombie trope. Zombies are 
the personification of our own mortality (Bishop, 2006) thereby making 
“[z]ombies…the social-self undone” (Dayan, 2011, p. 22). Similar to the rabies 
virus, the zombie virus transforms its new host into something other than human 
(Moreman, 2010) and this transformation occurs from the contamination of the 
blood traditionally through a bite (Webb & Byrnand, 2008). Zombification refers to 
“the disoriented wanderings, the loss of speech, sense, and will, the perverted 
practices that erase all ties to kith and kin” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2002, p. 798), 
and it is the transformation of something benign into something malignant. The 
dangerous dog construct operates in much the same way. 
The removal of a canine’s agency and then its autonomy allows for the 
transference of traits between humans and canines. Other times, though, the 
transference is from canine to human; yet, even during these times, humans are 
the ones deciding which traits are transferred and how. Once the dangerous dog 
label has been applied, the next step is to tap into a human fear and link it to a 
natural trait possessed by the object to be condemned. This link is made 




defensive mechanism—its bite. Relying on the one drop rule to classify all dogs 
with similar physiological traits to that of a “pit bull” allows for the segregation of 
that dog from other breeds, as well as constructing the dog as biological and 
socially inferiority (Delise, 2007). This construction of pit bulls and other 
“aggressive breeds” overlooks the fact that it is humans who have bred and 
trained pit bulls and other breeds for aggression, and it is humans who continue 
to breed and train for these traits (Delise, 2007). The dangerous dog construct is 
a subtle reminder that the one-drop rule (i.e., contaminated blood) is still alive 





CHAPTER SIX  
FINDINGS 2: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT LABYRINTH 
 
Discussions of police violence mostly revolve around the incident itself 
(e.g., whether the individual was an immediate threat or if they were armed) or 
the subsequent lack of arrests, charges, and convictions of police officers 
following the killing of citizens by police. The target of the public’s anger and 
frustration following the non-indictment or acquittal of officers involved in the 
killing of a citizen is the policing institution itself. This anger and frustration focus 
on the policies, the training, the possible inherit biases of the officers themselves, 
as well as the systemic racism upon which the institution of policing exists. Yet, 
an often-overlooked component of police violence is the Fourth Amendment. The 
Fourth Amendment, though, is the gateway to any excessive force claim (Taslitz, 
2006). This prestige was bestowed upon the Fourth Amendment when the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that the amendment’s objective reasonableness 
standard was the guiding framework for analyzing excessive force claims 
(Graham v Connor, 1989). As a result, any legal challenge to an officer’s actions 
from their search and seizure of property to the intentional and unintentional 
shooting of humans or dogs must pass through this gateway. Getting through this 
gateway, though, is now easy task. Judicial decisions spanning the nation’s 
existence, and even before its existence, have created a strong fortification out of 
the Fourth Amendment itself and a labyrinth of legal obstacles if one is able to 




The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how the judiciary uses the 
Fourth Amendment to protect officers and obfuscate the existence of police 
violence. This chapter begins with a brief history of the Fourth Amendment so 
that the reader can understand how police violence came to reside within the 
framework of the amendment itself. The chapter will then move into a discussion 
of the various legal principles and practices that create the judicial labyrinth 
protecting officers. 
The Fourth Amendment is deeply rooted within the belief that one has a 
right to exclude others from entry into their private spheres. This belief extends 
well back into America’s British ancestry. In his pronouncement condemning the 
English government’s search of John Wilke’s home and seizure of his papers, 
Lord Camden stated: 
No man can set his foot upon my ground without my license, but he is 
liable to an action, though the damage be nothing; which is proved by 
every declaration in trespass, where the defendant is called upon to 
answer for bruising the grass and even treading upon the soil (Lord 
Camden’s pronouncement as cited by Boyd v United States, 1886, p. 
627). 
 
The United States Supreme Court reiterated Lord Camden’s belief centuries later 
when it declared that the “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against 
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed” (Payton v New York, 
1980, p. 585). Although this belief is warm and fuzzy on the surface, the 
amendment’s origins and evolution have focused on narrowing those aspects of 
existence that are protected by the amendment by excluding various police 





Even before stepping foot into the labyrinth that is the Fourth Amendment, 
one must first be deemed legally worthy of passage before the gates to the 
Fourth Amendment’s labyrinth opens. This determination is made by deciding if 
the individual has standing, that is the legal right, to bring a suit against the 
individual officer(s) (Francione, 1995). Specifically, standing refers to one’s 
“personal stake in the outcome of the controversy” (p. 204) that would have a 
direct and potentially adverse effect on that individual (Baker v Carr, 1962). From 
the outset, though, the notion of standing was used to limit who had an 
“inalienable right” to the guarantees and protections of the United States 
Constitution. For instance, Chief Justice Parker of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court declared in 1823 that slaves were not included within the Constitution’s 
refrain “We, the People,” and are, therefore, not afforded any of its benefits 
(Commonwealth v Griffith, 1823). This denial of personhood was continued in the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v Sanford (1857) which 
declared that slaves did not fall within the concepts of “people” or “citizen” and 
are therefore not benefactors of the Constitution’s protections. This denial of 
personhood to slaves was erected on the belief that “property” has no rights 
(Taslitz, 2006). That is, the person may have a right to be free from government 
intrusion regarding their property, but the property itself, even sentient property, 
is devoid of any such rights. Injuries inflected on slaves were considered harmful 




The judiciary follows this same line of reasoning when determining if the 
killing of a person’s dog by police constitutes a seizure, and if so, if that seizure 
was reasonable. Yet, the Fourth Amendment’s protections against excessive 
force apply only to the dog’s owner and not to the dog who suffers the harm 
(Powell v Johnson, 2012). In Nichols v Village of Minerva (2016), a United States 
District Court in Ohio declared that a person “may not assert an excessive force 
claim on behalf a dog” (p. 12) because of the dog’s status as property. Likewise, 
a federal district court in Illinois reiterated that a dog owner cannot bring an 
excessive force claim for their dog’s death when it denied a dog owner’s claim 
that witnessing the police killing of their dog constituted excessive force (Taylor v 
City of Chicago, 2010). According to the judiciary in Taylor (2010), there is no 
precedent for “allowing a person to maintain a vicarious constitutional claim for 
witnessing the alleged excessive use of force on another or an owner to maintain 
a constitutional claim for the use of force on his or her property” (p. 14). Standing, 
then, is an important component for enforcing one’s rights (Francione, 1995); yet, 
as the above examples show, standing itself is a tool used by the judiciary to 
exclude people from participating in the judicial process. Even if one is fortunate 
enough to be granted inclusion under the Constitution’s protections via standing, 
there are limits to how far the judiciary is willing to extend Fourth Amendment 
protections. 
Over time, the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has come to govern 




v Battle Creek Police Department (2016), the Sixth Circuit partially justified the 
shooting of the Browns’ dogs based on the dogs being unrestrained and 
unsupervised within the Browns’ home. On the surface these words create a 
sense of danger for the safety of the officers. However, these words and the 
concepts they evoke are rooted in themselves rooted in slavery. One of the 
driving forces behind maintaining slavery and the belief of white mastery over 
black bodies was the ability to control the movement of slaves (Taslitz, 2006). A 
slave wondering freely was viewed as a threat to the social order of the South, 
and owners were viewed as recalcitrant for allowing such behavior to go 
unpunished. Controlling a slave’s movement limited that individual’s opportunities 
for establishing meaningful relationships that could become more important than 
the will of their owner which in turn may lead to resistance and even revolt 
against the established structure (Taslitz, 2006). Likewise, dogs running loose 
(i.e., without supervision) are deemed both dangerous and a failure of their 
owner to properly manage the dog (Altman v City of High Point, 2003; Brown v 
Muhlenberg Twp, 2001; Fuller v Vines, 1994). One of the ways that Southern 
Whites controlled the movement of slaves was with slave patrols (Brown, 2019). 
Slave patrols accomplished their mission of patrolling the countryside and 
entering slave quarters, which were located on their owner’s private property, to 
search of runaway slaves or contraband (Parénti, 2001). Slave patrollers were 
even allowed to “discipline” slaves for any discovered or perceived infraction 




overreach, especially regarding the damaging of their “property” (e.g., whipping 
of slaves). As such, an early version of qualified immunity was granted to those 
working slave patrollers. Scripted into service, patrollers were given papers 
indicating that they not only had authority to enter onto a slave owner’s land, but 
it also protected the patroller for litigation that might arise from “damaging” a 
slave (Taslitz, 2006). 
The Sixth Circuit’s use of the terms unrestrained and unsupervised in 
Brown (2016) further connects the police violence committed against the Browns’ 
dogs with the violence that befell slaves through the use of geography. The slave 
owner’s home was protected against the arbitrary intrusions of slave patrollers 
while the slave’s own domicile, which was detached and situated away from the 
slave owner’s home, was fair game (Taslitz, 2006). Furthermore, much of the 
slaves’ social lives occurred in those areas beyond the slave owner’s reach such 
as woods, swamps, and buildings erected on the periphery (Camp, 2002). In 
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, we see a similar approach to 
determining which portions of land are excluded from Fourth Amendment 
protections. The United States Supreme Court, however, declared that “the 
special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 
‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields” (Hester 
v United States, 1924, p. 59; emphasis in original). An open field need be neither 
‘open’ nor a ‘field’ as those terms are used in common speech” (Oliver v United 




of “land immediately surrounding and associated with the home” (p. 180), thus 
receiving full Fourth Amendment protection (United States V Dunn, 1987). 
Anything situated beyond the home’s curtilage is not covered by the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibitions against warrantless searches because these areas 
are not associated with promoting that intimate activity that derives from “the 
sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life” (Boyd v United States, 1886, 
p. 630; see also United States v Dunn, 1987). The Sixth Circuit’s use of the terms 
unrestrained and unsupervised, then, not only denied the Browns any 
possessory interest in their dogs, but it temporarily transforms the interior of the 
Browns’ home—where the sanctity and privacy of life occurs—into an open field 
and beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment.  
An analysis of federal decisions addressing the killing of dog by police 
reveals that most canicide incidents occur on the dog’s owner’s property. In 
Fuller v Vines (1994), officers approached a front yard where they encountered 
the owner’s dog and subsequently shot the dog because the dog “charged them, 
barking, and growling” (p. 66); in Kay v County of Cook (2006), an officer, serving 
a summons, shot a dog as he entered an apartment on the grounds of a well-
being check because no one answered when he knocked and the door was 
open; in Perez v City of Placerville (2006), the officer of a canine unit shot Ms. 
Perez’s dog in the fenced in backyard while searching for Ms. Perez’s boyfriend 
who the officers believed was residing at the residence; in Esterson v Broward 




dog complaint—was walking the “grassy area between two homes” (p. 2) toward 
the rear of the Esterson’s house when she shot the Esterson’s dog after it left the 
backyard patio and approached her in an “aggressive manner” (p. 2); in Carroll v 
County of Monroe (2013), police shot dog in its owner’s home during the 
execution of a no-knock warrant; in Jones v Lopez (2017), officers shot the 
Jones’ dog inside the Jones’ home after entering because the front door was 
open and no one answered when the officers knocked and announced their 
presence; in Bullman v City of Detroit (2018), police shot two dogs during the 
execution of a drug warrant; and in Anderson v City of Chicago (2018), shot a 
dog inside the owner’s home during the execution of a warrant for cocaine and 
other drug paraphernalia. These decisions and others like them transform dogs 
into threats to the social order even when they are on their own property. 
For much of the nation’s history, dogs were considered a qualified form of 
property (Altman, 2003). In Sentell (1897), the Court affirmed the constitutionality 
of a Louisiana law requiring that all dog owners register their dogs on their local 
assessment rolls for purposes of taxation (Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R. Co., 
1897). The state’s intent in passing the legislation was to have the owner set the 
dog’s value and then tax that value. In its reasoning, the Court declared that dogs 
exist somewhere “between animals feroe naturoe in which until killed or subdued, 
there is no property, and domestic animals, in which the right of property is 
perfect and complete” (p. 701). Stating this differently, dogs exist in a space 




beyond the capability of humans to claim any possessory interest in the animal. 
In this space, humans cannot exert total control over the animal’s body (i.e., the 
right of exclusion) until death ends any possessory interest the animal has in its 
own skin. As such, the animal is wild. In the other world, animals exist in a space 
that situates them directly under the control of humans, thus giving humans the 
capability of claiming a possessory interest in the animal while it is still alive. 
Animals in this second world are best understood as living stock since the 
animal’s worth to humans is contingent on the animal’s market value. What the 
Court was saying in its Sentell (1897) decision, then, was that a dog’s body and 
its essence have no value in law until death alleviates the dog of any possessory 
interest in its skin (Dayan, 2011). 
Embedding police violence into dogs as private property, however, 
involves more than the stroke of a pen. It entails a social ritual that transforms the 
dog’s skin and body into something possessable by humans while the dog is 
alive. The challenge for the judiciary is devising a way to include dog owners 
under the full protection of the Fourth Amendment with the understanding that 
dogs do not fit into the categories of persons, houses, or papers (Altman v City of 
High Point, 2003). The only reasonable way that dog owners could be afforded 
any possessory interest in their dogs, according to the Altman (2003) decision, is 
to deem them as effects. As effects, dogs no longer exist on the periphery of 
capitalism as “qualified property” (p. 701) where “private interests require that the 




shall be exterminated (Sentell v New Orleans and Carrollton R. Co., 1897, p. 
702). As personal property in the form of effects, dog owners now have full 
possessory interests in their dogs. This new status allows the judiciary to punish 
an individual by removing any possessory interests they have in their dog 
through exclusionary legal terms such as contraband—“When a person owns a 
dog that is unlicensed, in the eyes of the law it is no different than owning any 
other type of illegal property or contraband” (Smith v City of Detroit, 2017, p. 20). 
In Pena v Village of Maywood (2016), the judge denied the Penas any 
possessory interest protected by the Fourth Amendment because “if the Penas 
had followed the law rather than flout it and registered their pit bull, law 
enforcement might have had notice of the dangerous animal on the premises and 
acted differently” (p. 21). The ascension of dogs into the pantheon of private 
property brings with it the same police violence that is woven into the social 
relations underlying the judiciary’s decisions regarding privacy and private 
property in their more traditional forms. 
The Fourth Amendment’s Minotaur 
Patrolling the various pathways of this labyrinth is a nonmythical creation 
that is set loose to strike down anyone who dares challenge an officer’s actions. 
This ever-vigilant sentinel is qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is a judicially 
crafted legal concept that shields government officials from prosecution (Pfeifer, 
2020; Institute for Justice, 2020). Specifically, it is a legal defense that protects 




during the performance of their duties (Klockers, 1996; Institute for Justice, 
2020). The goal of qualified immunity is to “avoid excessive disruption of 
government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims” (Harlow v 
Fitzgerald, 1982) by balancing “the rights of citizens [against] ‘the need to protect 
officials who are required to exercise their discretion’” (Harlow v Fitzgerald, 1982, 
p. 807). The logic behind qualified immunity is that government officials cannot 
always know the current state of the law and should therefore be afforded some 
leniency for actions that they may not know are a violation of law (Saucier v Katz, 
2001; Malley v Briggs, 1986). Overcoming an officer’s invocation of qualified 
immunity requires the individual to demonstrate that the officer knowingly 
“[violated] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known” (Pearson v Callahan, 2009, p. 231). That 
is, a right is clearly established according to the Court when a reasonable official 
knows beyond a doubt that their actions are violating said right (Anderson v 
Creighton, 1987). This stance regarding what constitutes a clearly established 
right has remained consistent over the decades (see Reichle v Howards, 2012; 
Mullenix v Luna, 2015). Determining if a right is clearly established requires a 
judge to begin with the “decisions of the United States Supreme Court, then to 
decisions of the United States Court of Appeals…and other courts within the 
circuit, and finally to the decisions of other circuit courts of appeal” (Daugherty v 
Campbell, 1991, p. 784). This line of progression narrows who has the authority 




right. The judiciary can use this narrow list to justify the granting of qualified 
immunity regardless of how egregious an officer’s actions. 
In 2014, six minor children including a 10-year-old boy (identified in court 
records as SDC) were outside in SDC’s yard along with an adult (Damion 
Stewart) when officers entered their property searching for Christopher Barnett 
who was unknown to the Corbitts or anyone in the yard. The officers chose to 
search the Corbitt yard because Christopher Barnett had “‘wandered into the 
area’” (Corbitt v Vickers, 2019, p. 1308). The officers ordered everyone including 
the children to lay on the ground at gunpoint. Although everyone complied with 
the officers’ demands and there was no immediate threat from the family’s dog, 
“Bruce,” Officer Vickers discharged his firearm at Bruce (Corbitt v Vickers, 2019). 
The shot missed and Bruce temporarily retreated to the safety of the home. 
When Bruce reappeared, Officer Vickers discharged his firearm again; missing 
the dog for a second time. However, the second shot struck SDC in the back of 
his right knee. At the time, “SDC was ‘readily viewable’ and resting 
‘approximately eighteen inches from…Vickers, lying on the ground, face down, 
pursuant to the orders of [Vickers]’” (Corbitt v Vickers, 2019, p. 1308). The 
Eleventh Circuit granted Officer Vickers qualified immunity because “Corbitt's 
Fourth Amendment claim is based on a governmental action not directed toward 
SDC and which only accidentally harmed SDC” (Corbitt v Vickers, 2019, p. 




First, there decision denies that any legal harm exists because there is no 
prior case clearly establishing a citizen’s right not to be accidentally shot by an 
officer who is trying to shoot a dog. That is, the right to be free from harm in 
general does not exist; rather, the judiciary or legislation must specifically 
establish the right to be free from a specific form of harm before it can legally 
exist. Just to clarify, the Eleventh Circuit is not saying that Officer Vickers—an 
adult with the ability of rational thought and who has been through firearms 
training—could not comprehend the possible danger from discharging his firearm 
at a moving dog when both the dog and a 10-year-old child are within 18-inches 
of himself. What the Eleventh Circuit is saying that there is no legal authority 
notifying Officer Vickers that such action violates a 10-year-old child’s right not to 
be shot. Second, the Eleventh Circuit denied the existence of any legal harm 
because Officer Vickers’ intention was not to specifically seize SDC by shooting 
him with his (Officer Vickers’) firearm. Recall from Graham (1989) that an 
officer’s intentions are not allowed to be calculated into the judiciary’s decision 
when determining the reasonableness of the officer’s actions. The Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in Corbitt (2019), although seemingly contradictory to Graham 
(1989), highlights an overlooked aspect of police violence. Namely, police 
violence is not always physical. The judiciary has held steadfastly to the belief 
that a “Fourth Amendment seizure requires ‘an intentional acquisition of physical 
control’ which occurs ‘only when there is a governmental termination of freedom 




218; emphasis in original). That is, an officer must willfully and knowingly intend 
to impede a person’s voluntary movements with the exact methods that impeded 
the person’s movements before the protections afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment can even be considered (Brower v Inyo County, 1989). Therefore, a 
“seizure must occur before an excessive force claim is cognizable under the 
Fourth Amendment” (Dunigan v Noble, 2004, p. 492). 
In Corbitt (2019), the Eleventh Circuit believed that Officer Vickers had 
seized SDC prior to the shooting because he intended to take SDC and the 
others under his control by ordering them all on the ground. Had the Eleventh 
Circuit in Corbitt (2019) believed that Officer Vickers had not intended to use his 
firearm to impede SDC’s right to move about freely, then a seizure would not 
have occurred, and an excessive force claim could not have been brought 
against Officer Vickers. Although the finding that SDC had been seized should 
open the way for a determination on the reasonableness of Officer Vickers’ 
actions, the judiciary will find ways of obfuscating police violence (Duane, 2016; 
Ristroph, 2017). Relying on Brower v County of Inyo (1989), the Eleventh Circuit 
likened the accidental shooting of SDC to someone being pinned by an 
unoccupied police car that slipped its brake. In Brower (1989), the United States 
Supreme Court declared that “if a parked and unoccupied police car slips its 
brake and pins a passerby against a wall, it is likely that a tort has occurred, but 
not a violation of the Fourth Amendment” (Brower v County of Inyo, 1989, p. 598; 




intend to use the car to seize the person; therefore, the officer has not committed 
a Fourth Amendment violation or even used excessive force regardless of the 
harm done to the person pinned by the car. The Eleventh Circuit’s likening 
Officer Vickers unintentional shooting of SDC to a car pinning someone against a 
wall removes Officer Vickers’ autonomy and transforms him into an automaton 
that cannot be held liable for actions. As such, the officer is not acting on their 
own volition; they are executing their programming (i.e., training) and just 
following orders (Duane, 2016). According to the Eleventh Circuit, Officer Vickers 
is deserving of qualified immunity because “[an] accidental shooting, as occurred 
here, does not constitute a clearly established Fourth Amendment violation as a 
matter of obvious clarity” (Corbitt v Vickers, 2019, p. 1320; emphasis in original). 
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit declared in Fuller v Vines (1994) that an officer 
pointing a gun at individual who was a “considerable distance” (p. 67) constituted 
excessive force, and this decision was reaffirmed 6 years later in Robinson v 
Solano County (2000) when the Ninth Circuit again denied qualified immunity to 
officers for pointing their weapons at an unarmed individual whom the officers 
watched walk 135 feet from his home to their position in the street. As a result of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Saucier v Katz (2001), though, the Ninth 
Circuit had to reverse its ruling in Robinson (2000). The Ninth Circuit’s reversal of 
their decision 2 years prior was based in part on the requirement that they 
decided the case based on if the right not to have a firearm pointed at oneself 




2002). This requirement led to the Ninth Circuit granting qualified immunity to the 
officer because there was no controlling precedent in 1995 putting the officer on 
notice that their actions were a violation of law (Robinson v Solano County, 
2002). Seven years later, the Ninth Circuit once again granted qualified immunity 
to an officer even though the officer aimed his gun at an individual who was 
“cooperative, unarmed, and outnumbered two to one” (p. 218) by the police 
(Burke v County of Alameda, 2009). 
This deferment to protecting government agents precedes the nation’s 
founding. Section 46 of the Sugar Act of 1764 protected customs officers from 
liability for seizing a shipping vessel “even when a shipowner [later] proved his 
innocence and suffered ruinous damages” (p. 48) so long as the customs officer 
had probable cause to believe the shipowner was in violation of the law; this 
immunity could also be applied retroactively by the judiciary (Taslitz, 2006). 
Although qualified immunity originated as a protection for government officials 
against liability from exercising their discretion while carrying out their duties. 
However, qualified immunity has become an almost impenetrable fortress 
protecting the officer not only from any liability arising from their actions, but also 
from any criticism of their action (Ziglar v Abbasi, 2017; Justice Thomas 
concurring in part). As such, many have begun calling for the abolishment of 
qualified immunity (Weiss, 2020). The abolishment of qualified immunity, 






Traversing this labyrinth is a perilous journey filled with a variety of pitfalls 
and dead ends. Even a proven pathway toward the goal of overcoming qualified 
immunity may suddenly transform into a dead end through the judicial practice of 
distinguishing cases. The purpose of distinguishing a case is to highlight facts 
within the case that demonstrate how the case is fundamentally different (i.e., 
distinguishable) from a previous decision thereby excluding the case from the 
binding authority of judicial precedent. Distinguishing cases usually occurs 
because there exists precedent which would lead to an adverse outcome for the 
challenging party. Regarding the pointing of a firearm by police at an unarmed 
individual, the presence of an unleashed pit bull standing next to Mr. Burke 
altered the case enough for the Ninth Circuit to deviate from their decision in 
Burke (2009): “We have no cases discussing the use of force where an unarmed 
suspect is standing next to an unleashed and potentially aggressive dog” (Burke 
v County of Alameda, 2009, p. 219; emphasis added). At no point throughout the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, however, does the court describe any behaviors of the 
dog that would suggest aggression. Even the Sixth Circuit in Brown v Battle 
Creek Police Department (2016) relied on the dangerous dog construct and the 
dogs being unleashed in an “unsupervised environment” (p. 572)—the 
unsupervised environment was the inside of the Browns’ home—to grant 
qualified immunity to the officers who shot and killed the dogs. Likewise, a dog 




Officer Driggett’s actions reasonable (Bateman v Driggett, 2012). The judiciary’s 
focus on the dog being unleashed is used to enhance the dog’s potential 
dangerousness and create a visual image that the officer is in a “tense, 
uncertain, and rapidly evolving” (Graham v Connor, 1989, p. 397) situation. 
In Hells Angels (2005), the Ninth Circuit denied qualified immunity to 
officers of the San Jose Police Department who shot and killed the dogs of two 
Hells Angels members during raids at their separate residences. Qualified 
immunity was denied because both raid teams had approximately one week to 
plan the raids and both teams knew that they would have to contend with dogs 
on the property when the raids occurred. This knowledge of the dogs’ presence 
prior to the execution of the raids coupled with the time they had to plan the raid 
afforded the police enough time to develop less lethal strategies for dealing with 
the dogs (Hells Angels, 2005). Furthermore, the officers’ desire to maintain the 
element of surprise was extinguished with the first shot from the officers’ 
weapons (Hells Angels, 2005). The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hells Angels 
(2005) clearly established that individuals have a possessory right in their dogs 
and that the shooting of someone’s dog(s) is unreasonable if the police have 
ample time to prepare for the dog’s presence. The judiciary, however, routinely 
circumvents this decision and others like by arguing that the case immediately 
before them is fundamentally different from the events that led to the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Hells Angels, as well as other federal decisions that have 




In Brown v Battle Creek Police Department (2016), the officers meet 
before the raid to discuss how the warrant would be executed. During this 
discussion, the police discussed “whether there were children or dogs present at 
the residence” (p. 561) along with other factors such as Jones’ criminal history 
and known criminal affiliations (Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 2016). 
Although the Sixth Circuit does not detail how much time spanned the officers 
meeting to discuss the raid and the moment of the warrant being executed, they 
believed that “the officers had no meaningful time to formulate a plan on how to 
deal with the dog” (p. 570) because the officers were informed of the dog’s 
presence while on their way to the residence (Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 
2016). The Sixth Circuit reinforces their belief through by using the words 
“meaningful time” to describe the amount of time the officers between notice of 
the dog’s presence and arriving at the Browns’ home. The use of these words 
allows the Sixth Circuit to imply that there exists a specific amount of time that 
would have made the shooting of the Browns’ dogs unreasonable without having 
to explicitly quantify this amount. In Thurston v City of North Las Vegas Police 
Department (2014) the majority reversed a lower court’s granting of qualified 
immunity because the officers shot the homeowners’ dogs 20 minutes after 
executing the search when there was no clear indication that the dogs were 
behaving aggressively. In Bateman v Driggett (2012), a U.S. District Court noted 
that Officer Driggett was on Bateman’s “porch less than a minute when he 




that the officer was at the home “only 17 minutes from arrival to departure” (p. 
22). Also in Bateman v Driggett (2012), the district court relied on Driggett’s lack 
of familiarity with Bateman’s property and his failure to see a sign indicating that 
a dog was on the premises as justifications for finding the killing of Bateman’s 
dog as reasonable (Bateman v Driggett, 2012; see also, Thurston v City of North 
Las Vegas Police Dept., 2014; Smith v City of Detroit, 2017). Even if a court finds 
that a right is clearly established and that an officer violated one’s right, this alone 
may not be enough to deny an officer qualified immunity. 
Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (2017) states, “[a]ny 
error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must 
be disregarded” (p. 64) and is referred to as a “harmless error.” One of the 
functions of the harmless error rule is “conserving scarce judicial resources by 
avoiding pointless retrials” (United States v Roy, 2017, p. 1142). Overturning a 
conviction based on an error believed to lead to abuses of the judicial process by 
litigants and ridicule from the public (Del v Van Arsdall, 1986).  Furthermore, 
constitutional errors have been deemed harmless (Arizona v Fulminante, 1991), 
so long as their effects would not have changed the outcome of the trial (Weaver 
v Massachusetts, 2017). In United States v Roy (2017), the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the conviction of a defendant even though his lawyer was absent from 
the courtroom for seven minutes because the error was harmless since it did not 
occur at a “critical stage” in the trial. Even though the information disclosed 




Eleventh Circuit’s decision essentially deems certain parts of a trial as less 
important than others with the use of the phrase critical stage. In P.M. v Bolinger 
(2011), a S.W.A.T. team raided a home based on information from a “trash pull” 
(p. 3)—the search of an individual’s trash for evidence of a crime—of the 
Whitworth’s home. The raid resulted in the death of one dog, the injury of another 
dog, and a child having a weapon pointed at them. Among the various issues for 
which the Whitworths sued was intentional infliction of emotional damage. The 
federal district court declared that the Whitworths failed to demonstrate that the 
sole intention of Officer Bolinger was to cause the Whitworths emotional distress 
and that Officer Bolinger was therefore entitled to summary judgement. 
According to the federal district court, Officer Bolinger and the other officers 
would have still been afforded summary judgement “even assuming the police 
officers…intended to cause emotional distress to the Whitworths” (pp. 23-24) 
because each of the contested actions had a legitimate policing purpose of 
enhancing officer safety (P.M. v Bolinger, 2011). 
Another method used by the judiciary to obscure the pathway to justice is 
to establish different frameworks for analyzing similar behaviors. One framework 
governs government agents while the other framework governs non-government 
agents. The United States Supreme Court declared many years ago that a 
person may be “convicted and imprisoned for committing a crime even if you had 
no criminal intent and absolutely no knowledge that your conduct was forbidden 




immunity even if it is shown that the officer violated a clearly established 
constitutional right so long as the harm was a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or 
both (Pearson v Callahan, 2009). That is, a person is still liable for their actions 
even though they did not know their actions were a violation of law (New Jersey 
State Bar Association, 2018) while the police are protected by what they do not 
know. The application of these different frameworks applies to evidence that 
could be condemning or exculpatory to a defendant. 
The law of hearsay prevents an officer from divulging information they 
received from witnesses including statements made by the defendant if this 
information benefits the defendant (Duane, 2016). However, the law of hearsay 
does not prevent an officer from divulging these same statements if, under 
questioning by a prosecutor, the statements are used to demonstrate the 
defendant’s guilt (Duane, 2016). As with witness testimony in court, the 
emotional attachment between a human and dog becomes vital when it is seen 
as beneficial to the criminal justice system. In Pettit v New Jersey (2011), a 
United States District Court upheld a pat-down of a dog owner who reentered his 
home and then came back out after realizing the officer shot his dog. Specifically, 
the district court relies on the dog owner’s statement immediately following the 
shooting— “‘why the fuck did you shoot my dog’”—as grounds for the officer to 
fear for his safety. A consequence of this practice is that judiciary can exclude 
the emotional bond between a dog and their owner when determining the 




officer “does not act unreasonably in shooting [a] dog in order to protect himself 
and his canine companion” (Warboys v Proulx, 2004, pp. 117-118). Although 
these differing decisions appear at odds with each other, they actually bond 
together much like the different polar ends of magnets. 
The Exclusionary Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment is comprised of two clauses, the search and 
seizure clause and the warrant clause (Carpenter v United, 2018; see also Mapp 
v Ohio, 1961, Justice Black concurring). For purposes of this chapter, the 
governing clause is the search and seizure which states that the “right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures” (U.S. Const. amend. IV). Although this 
clause is constructed from 19 words, it is only a few words within in this clause 
that provide the judiciary with the justifications needed to exclude someone from 
Fourth Amendment protections. First, the rights enumerated in the clause are 
given to the “people” instead of the individual. Giving these rights to the People 
opens the pathway to fostering a sense of community and the ability to keep a 
check on the state by monitoring the actions of its agents (Tasllitz, 2006). 
However, the judiciary has used the concept of peoplehood, although not 
explicitly since slavery, to determine what degree an individual is protected by 
the Fourth Amendment. 
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court reiterated the state’s right to 




interference from the Fourth Amendment because the encounter takes place at 
the border (United States v Ramsey, 1977). This longstanding concern by the 
judiciary for protecting the border’s integrity reconfigures the concept of 
reasonableness in such a way that it takes on a different form at the border 
compared to the interior (United States v Molina-Gómez, 2015). “The 
Government's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is 
at its zenith at the international border” (United States v Flores-Montano, 2004, p. 
152). Constitutional protections increase as one moves further into the interior of 
the nation (United States v Montoya de Hernandez, 1985). One notion put 
forward by these decisions is that one becomes more assimilated into the 
nation’s peoplehood the further one moves into the interior of the nation. Yet, as 
we have seen, the judiciary has developed a well-oiled machine of legal concepts 
to strip away said personhood. Similarly, the Fourth Circuity declared that “when 
a dog leaves the control of his owner and runs at large in a public space, the 
government interest in controlling the animal…waxes dramatically, while the 
private interest correspondingly wanes” (Altman v City of High Point, 2003, p. 
205). That is to say, the government’s authority to regulate (e.g., seize and-or kill) 
the dog as it sees fit increases exponentially as the dog moves closer and then 
beyond the property’s borders. 
Through a non-canicide lens, the home and the surrounding property are 
metaphors for the nation and its borders. As was shown with the judiciary’s 




usage. The border, then, may be that area at the edges of a municipality’s or 
nation’s jurisdiction, or it may be the very inner cities of the nation that are 
saturated with police presence, or your own home. As such, this border is 
constructed as full of danger with those beings living beyond its edges 
constructed as a threat to the established social order if not properly monitored. 
As Grossman and Christensen (2012) state when defining their conceptualization 
of the sheepdog, “He is always sniffing around out on the perimeter, checking the 
breeze, barking at things that go bump in the night, and yearning for a righteous 
battle” (Kindle Locations 4297-4298). The police, like a colonizing army, enter 
onto the land and assert their dominance over the land’s current occupants. 
Viewing police violence in this manner shows us that the dog who is resistant to 
the officer’s presence isn't aggressive, it's defensive. The dog is truly a sheepdog 
in that it is using its capacity for violence to protect its fellow citizens from what it 
perceives as a threat to their safety—the officer. Yet, the police are not allowed 
to be perceived as threats in our society regardless of species. Therefore, the 
dog is transformed into something that jeopardizes the current social order and 
the officer is transformed into a warrior defending their fellow citizens from an 
unrelenting horde. The violence perpetrated against the dog is likewise 
transformed. It is no longer a reprehensible act, but it is now a righteous display 
of love for the officer’s fellow citizen (Grossman & Christensen, 2012). This 




Amendment—searches and seizures by their very nature are intrusive ordeals 
that require some degree of force to accomplish. 
The search and seizure clause empowers the state with the authority to 
use violence against its own populace so long as that violence is not 
“unreasonable” (Taslitz, 2006). What constitutes a reasonable application of 
violence, though, is not clearly defined by the judiciary. This ambiguity is 
supposed to allow the judiciary to decide each case on their merits instead of an 
arbitrary and rigid standard (United v Sharpe, 1985). However, this ambiguity has 
resulted in the creation of an everchanging labyrinth of legal barriers that allow 
the judiciary to avoid addressing the issue of police violence. One way the 
judiciary avoids addressing the issue of police violence is by transforming police 
violence from a violent act and into a constitutionally accepted practice (Ristroph, 
2017). The judiciary has held steadfastly to the belief that “[n]ot every push or 
shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s 
chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights” (Johnson v Glick, 1973, p. 
1033). Although the Johnson (1973) decision addresses violence against 
prisoners, recall that the judiciary has held that there is no constitutional violation 
when “an officer shoots at a dog—or any other object—and accidentally hits the 
person” (Corbitt v Vickers, 2019, p. 1318). A federal appellate court for the First 
Circuit used the decision to affirm a state supreme court’s decision granting 
summary judgement to an officer who shoved and yelled at a pedestrian for 




believed that classifying the officer’s action in Cummings (2001) as a 
constitutional violation would “lower the very high threshold for constitutional 
wrongdoing” (p. 347) even though the First Circuit believed the officer’s behavior 
was worthy of condemnation regardless of stress level. Yet, the threshold for 
convicting a non-law enforcement individual for assaults against the police is 
barely higher than a doorstop. 
Federal statute 18 U.S. Code §111 permits the federal government to 
incarcerate someone for up to a year if that individual “forcibly assaults, resists, 
opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes” with any federal official while 
performing their official duties. The penalty increases to 8 years if “such acts 
involve physical contact with the victim of that assault or the intent to commit 
another felony” and 20 years if a “deadly or dangerous weapon” is involved (18 
U.S. Code §111). A required element for convicting someone of violating 18 
U.S.C. 111 according to section 1565 of the Department of Justice’s Archives 
(2020) is the use of force by that individual. However, neither the 18 U.S.C. §111 
nor section 1565 of the resource manual defines the term “force.” Therefore, 
every push or shove by a non-law enforcement individual may result in a prison 
term of 1 to 20 years depending on the circumstances surrounding the 
encounter. Furthermore, “a threat uttered with the apparent present ability to 
execute it, or with menacing gestures, or in hostile company or threatening 
surroundings, may, in the proper case, be considered sufficient force for a 




other proscribed behaviors in 18 U.S.C. §111 as well (Department of Justice 
Archives, 2020). 
What this law demonstrates is that the justifications for police violence are 
already considered and codified into law. This law and many like it take a 
common theme in many use of force policies across the nation—“ the principle 
that disobedience is not to be tolerated, and force is the logical result of any 
resistance” (Ristroph, 2017, p. 1213)—and give it legal weight. Resistance, even 
perceived resistance, requires a degree of force (e.g., pulling away from the 
police during an arrest or pushing against the police to stand one’s ground at a 
protest) to accomplish the feat. What this law also does is provide the police with 
the justification for using violence even when there is no force in any degree 
coming from the individual. The inclusion of the word “opposes” allows the officer 
to use force even if the individual does not actually resist. Noncooperation with 
an officer, or even the mere suspicion of noncooperation, is given the same 
weight as actively resisting or attempting to harm the officer (Ristroph, 2017). 
Viewing noncooperation as equal to actively harming an officer provides the 
officer with the necessary legal justification to use force even if the degree of 
force is disproportional to the degree with which the individual is resisting or 
opposing the officer. This stance allows the judiciary to declare that an officer 
shoving and yelling at a pedestrian for asking the officer street directions does 
not violate the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights (Cummings v McIntire, 




from peoplehood. At one time, there was a recognition and acceptance with the 
United States that a person had the right, if not the duty, to resist unlawful arrests 
(Ristroph, 2017). Criminalizing resistance and opposition deny the individual their 
humanity and thereby their personhood which excludes them from receiving the 
benefits of peoplehood. Denying someone their personhood, and by extension 
their peoplehood, the body becomes property that is possessable by other 
humans (Dayan, 2011). Viewing the search and seizure clause through a 
canicide lens also directs our attention to the relationship between peoplehood 
and personhood. 
The people’s right to be secure in their person, along with the other 
components of the Fourth Amendment, is how the judiciary constructs the legal 
concept of privacy. Although the idea of privacy is founded on the belief that 
certain aspects of human existence fall outside the reach of the state’s policing 
powers, the judiciary has limited the scope of this belief. First, a person must 
establish that they have an expectation of privacy over the object of the search or 
seizure (Katz v United States, 1967). Establishing this expectation is 
accomplished by creating sufficient indications (e.g., walls, fences, locks, 
personal relationships, etc.) that this expectation exists. That is to say, the 
person has put the People on notice that they are excluded from this aspect of 
the person’s life. Second, the People must be willing to accept the person’s belief 
that they have a right to exclude the People from intruding into their lives. Stating 




society’s willingness to accept that this expectation exits (Katz v United States, 
1967) and accommodates it. For instance, society is willing to accept an 
expectation of privacy over one’s unclothed body (Beard v Whitmore Lake Sch. 
Dist., 2005; Brannum v Overton County School Board, 2008), but not when 
someone is engaging in illegal activity regardless of the steps they have taken to 
exclude the People’s gaze (Oliver v United States, 1984). The ability to deny 
someone their expectation of privacy derives from the Court’s declaration that the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment are invested in “people, not places” (Katz v 
United States, 1967, p. 351). In other words, privacy is not confined to an actual 
geographical location. Instead it is embedded within the social relations that exist 
between individuals, and that connect the person to the people. It is these social 
relations that the judiciary uses to deny Fourth Amendment protections to the 
relationship between humans and dogs. 
In Brown v Muhlenberg Township (2001), the Third Circuit found reasoned 
that the officer who shot the Brown’s 3-year-old Rottweiler acted in a manner 
intending to cause emotional distress. According to the Third Circuit in Brown 
(2001), “[g]iven…the substantial emotional investment that pet owners frequently 
make in their pets, we would not expect the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to 
rule out all liability predicated on the killing of a pet” (Brown v Muhlenberg Twp., 
2001, p. 218). A United States District Court in Massachusetts declared that an 
officer acted reasonably when he shot and killed the plaintiff’s dog (Sneade v 




traumatic and emotional” (p. 26). However, “there is no evidence in the record to 
support a finding that any Plaintiff suffered the severe emotional distress (such 
that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it) sufficient to make out 
a claim” (Sneade v Rojas, 2014, p. 26). The Second Circuit in Carroll v County of 
Monroe (2013) likewise recognized this emotional attachment between a dog 
owner and their dog when it stated that “[t]here is no dispute that [the deputy’s] 
shooting of the plaintiff's dog was a severe intrusion given the emotional 
attachment between a dog and an owner” (p. 651). Like the Court in Sneade 
(2014) though, the Second Circuit denied that the deputy’s actions were 
unreasonable. A federal district court in Florida followed the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Carroll (2013) when it upheld the shooting of a dog by an officer 
based on the fact that officer safety outweighs the severe governmental intrusion 
of shooting one’s dog (Shutt v Lewis, 2014). 
Putting these decisions into their proper context, the American Veterinary 
Medical Association (AVMA) (n.d.) estimated that in 2012 there were 
approximately 43.3 million of American households (36.5%) with at least one dog 
and 36.1 million (30.4%) of households at least one cat. On average, each 
household with a dog spent $378 USD on veterinary care (AVMA, n.d.) which 
equates to approximately $16.4 billion USD. The National Retail Federation3 
estimates that Americans spent approximately $440 million USD on Halloween 
costumes for their pets in 2017, an increase of 5 percent from the $420 million 
 




USD spent in 2016 (Stevens, 2017). A little over three weeks later, 24.06 million 
people watched the 91st annual Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade (Porter, 2018) 
with approximately 20 million tuning into the 16th annual National Dog Show 
which aired immediately after the parade (Ingram, 2017). At year’s end, 
Americans had spent $69.51 billion USD on their pets in 2017, up from $60.28 
billion USD in 2015 (American Pet Products Association, 2017). For 2015, it was 
revealed that approximately 95 percent of Americans bought their pets a present 
for Christmas, 61 percent purchased gifts for their pet’s birthday, and another 11 
percent gave their pets a Valentine’s Day gift (New York Daily News, 2015). 
Furthermore, many women find it difficult, or outright refrain from, leaving an 
abusive relationship because many safe locations are not equipped to allow the 
victim’s companion animal to accompany them to safety. Seeking safety means 
leaving a companion animal to the whims and mercy of the victim’s abuser 
(Ascione, Weber, Thompson, Heath, Maruyama, & Hayashi, 2007; Flynn, 2000a; 
Flynn, 2000b). Faver and Strand (2003) found that 26.8 percent of their 
participants delayed leaving out of concern for the welfare of their companion 
animal. 
One survivor of abuse stated that her abusive husband “would sometimes 
do to Boomer [the family dog] what he wished he could do to us” (Flynn, 2000b, 
p. 110). Another survivor recounted an incident when her dog tried protecting her 
from abuse only to be hanged by the abuser with a clothesline; she saved her 




weight of the victim’s actions. She was in a dangerous situation and her dog 
chose to protect her based on the relationship they had formed between them. 
During this violent encounter, the abuser physically takes hold of the dog who is 
resisting the abuser’s authority, wraps a clothesline around the dog’s neck who is 
most likely struggling to break free, and then hoists the dog into the air. It is not 
beyond the scope of this information to infer that the victim, most likely, watched 
as this scene unfolded. Furthermore, the dog is probably yelping and struggling 
as it is being lynched; again, while the victim is most likely watching. Then, 
instead of saving herself by fleeing the location, she locates a sharp object and 
cuts the clothesline to save her companion. In these incidents, the target of the 
abuser’s torture is not the dog itself; rather, it is the underlying social relationship 
that connects the dog to the survivor. Therefore, attacks on the survivor’s 
companion animal is another method by which the abuser attempts to strip the 
survivor of their personhood (Adams, 2010). 
When humans are deprived of social interaction, their personhood is 
annihilated leaving only an outer shell (Dayan, 2011). The individual no longer 
recognizes themselves (Dayan, 2011) which makes them, and the masses, more 
manageable (Foucault, 1995). The Fourth Amendment is touted as one of the 
People’s protection against arbitrary governmental into one’s personal life 
(Taslitz, 2006). Yet, canicide shows that the judiciary constantly carves out 
spaces in the Fourth Amendment thus providing the state with footholds for 




case law and legal principles to create an everchanging labyrinth that provides its 
Minotaur with the avenues to pursue its quarry. So far, though, this chapter has 
not shown how the Minotaur kills its prey. A canicide lens provides this insight. 
The Goring 
The judiciary uses a variety of methods for constructing and framing police 
violence against dogs; however, the most effective is the perpetuation of the Thin 
Bule Line. Just as anthropocentrism situates humans as the most important 
beings and androcentrism situates males as the dominate gender, the Thin Blue 
Line situates the police as the “natural” group in any police-citizen encounter. 
Just as anthropocentrism situates humans as the most important beings and 
androcentrism situates males as the dominate gender, the Thin Blue Line 
situates the police as the “natural” group in any police-citizen encounter. The 
centerpiece of the thin blue line is officer safety which maintains and promotes 
the legitimacy of the state to govern behavior. Maintaining the system of violence 
underlying all police encounters requires the creation of a narrative that situates 
the society as constantly under attack from internal and external threats with the 
continuation of civilized society resting in the hands of a “chosen few” who put 
the safety of others above their own. This is the ideology underlying the term “the 
thin blue line” (Ristroph, 2017). The term “Thin Blue Line” was first used by a 
prosecutor in 1976 at the trial of a man accused of killing a Dallas police officer. 
As it was then, the term is used to champion the idea that the only thing standing 




constructing the police as sole entity holding the “wall” also situates the police 
and the criminal justice system as outside American society. Finally, the term is 
oftentimes invoked after a tragedy to highlight officer vulnerability and move any 
critiques from the officer’s possible use of force. In these incidents, the officer is 
the physical manifestation of the both the society’s social control mechanism and 
the society itself. Officers are always viewed as a deserving victim and anything 
or anyone that jeopardizes an officer’s safety becomes a deserving recipient of 
the police’s full power (Klinger, 1997). Therefore, an attack on the officer is 
perceived as a personal attack and an attack on the society. Canicide highlights 
how the judiciary relies on the ideology of the thin blue line to justify police 
violence. 
First, the term “police violence” does not exist within the vocabulary of the 
thin blue line. Force is either reasonable or unreasonable; it may even be 
excessive and unlawful (Hells Angels, 2003), but it is never violent. In Bush v 
County of San Diego (2016), the judiciary used the term violence in relation to an 
officer’s actions; however, it was not in condemnation of the officer’s actions but 
in summarization of the Bane Act. The United States District Court concluded 
that the officer in Bush (2016) did not violate the Bane Act when he shot the dog 
because he did not use “threats, intimidation, or coercion upon Plaintiffs to effect 
the seizure” of the dog (p. 18). Furthermore, the federal district court did not use 
the term violence or any derivative of the word when it justified the officer 




individual which constituted a seizure (Bush v County of San Diego, 2016). The 
thin blue line also affects how the judiciary determines the constitutional 
protections afforded to an individual. The pattern followed by most judicial 
decisions begins with a review of the case’s background. It is here that the 
judiciary makes its initial foray into justifying police violence by presenting the 
background from the officer’s perspective. Any contestation of the official 
narrative is usually presented as an aside. As mentioned in another chapter, the 
ordering of words and paragraphs direct the reader to perceive the words and 
phrases read first as more important (Machin & Mayr, 2013). Placing the officer’s 
version of events first leads the reader to put more weight to their version than to 
any alternative version provided by the plaintiffs. The next step in this formulaic 
approach is to either establishing the legal authority to hear and decide the case, 
establishing the appropriate legal framework for issues such as qualified 
immunity or summary judgment, or moving into a discussion of the issue. 
Whenever a court begins discussing the issue of an officer shooting a dog, the 
discussion focuses on determining the property status of the dog for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment. The dog’s sentience is removed for purposes of the 










Dogs have saturated American life from its founding (Grier, 2006). George 
Washington’s Mount Vernon estate was well populated with dogs, both pure bred 
and mixed bred (Grier, 2006). Thomas Jefferson brought 3 French dogs with him 
along with his family and his slaves James Hemings and Sally Hemings when he 
returned to America in 1789 (Monticello, n.d.). Even today, Americans are 
obsessed with the dogs of the famous and powerful from Paris Hilton’s 
chihuahua to President Biden’s dog Champ and Major, even President Trump’s 
lack of a canine companion was deemed newsworthy since he was the first 
president in a century to not have a dog at the White House (Farzan, 2019). 
Furthermore, dogs, and other companion animals, are such a vital part of society 
that local governments classified the estimated 3,500 brick-and-mortar animal 
shelters in the United States and 10,000 or so animal sanctuaries and rescue 
groups operating in North America as essential during the 2020 Covid-19 
pandemic so that access to these services would not be denied (Humane Society 
of the United States, 2021a; Humane Society of the United States, 2021b). 
Likewise, the United States Department of Justice has a section within their 
organization that focuses on enforcing federal laws “that provide for the humane 
treatment of captive, farmed, and companion animals across the United States” 
(United States Department of Justice, n.d.). Couple these findings with the 




equal to that of humans (Nast, 2006) and it becomes clear that dogs are an 
integral part of the functioning and reproduction of society in that they are 
functionaries of American society themselves. As functionaries of society, dogs, 
and other companion animals, are also an integral aspect in the construction of 
social solidarity. 
Social solidarity is “preeminently a social fact, [and] is dependent upon our 
individual organism. In order to be capable of existing it must fit our physical and 
psychological constitution” (Durkheim, 2014, p. 54). That is, the desire to 
voluntary substitute our individual identities for that of the larger collective must 
be engrained within our minds and bodies. This assimilation of oneself into the 
larger collective creates a solidarity sui generis which links the individual to 
society by linking those issues common throughout a society with those issues 
important to ourselves. However, the collective identity of this symbiotic is the 
wellspring from which the governmental authority draws its power, and this 
authoritative structure’s “first and main function is to create respect for [the 
society’s] collective beliefs, traditions and practices” (p. 42) thereby making the 
governmental authority the symbol of the collective and providing it with the 
ability to exercise power over the individual. A similar process occurs within wild 
dog packs. 
Prior to the domestication of dogs, and for those canines falling into the 
classification of “wild,” social organization developed around the dog’s diet and 




certain wild dogs (e.g., wolves) is based on their preference for pack living 
(Dunbar, 1979). For these wild dogs, pack living is advantageous because it 
provides a stable food supply through an increased likelihood of a successful 
hunt and the ability to bring down larger game, as well as providing stability in the 
mating process, increased defense through having more members, and the 
ability to share the responsibility of caring for offspring (Dunbar, 1979). A popular 
misconception is that wild dogs form their social organizations on a dominance 
hierarchy; yet, this belief is not entirely accurate (Landsberg & Denenberg, 2014). 
The hierarchies found within wild dog societies are primarily used for dispute 
resolution when disagreements arise within the pack (Dunbar, 1979). The 
enforcement of the pack’s hierarchy may be viewed as a formal means of 
reinforcing the pack’s traditions and practices, as well as the pack’s social 
solidarity. 
Regarding human societies, reinforcing the traditions and practices of a 
society requires the governing authority to hold a monopoly on the use of 
violence as a counter measure to any resistance to the governing authority’s 
power (Bittner, 1967). Although physical in nature, the target of the violence used 
by the governing authority via approved social positions (e.g., the police officer) 
is the individual’s mind (Foucault, 1995). Focusing on the individual’s mind 
transforms the person from a recipient of state power to a conduit of state power 
Foucault’s (1995). Referred to as the “disciplines,” this transformational process 




purpose of the law in American society is to regulate the interaction between 
members of the society which it does by reinforcing the underlying social facts 
that govern the society. 
Social facts are latent forces that provide the framework for how one is 
supposed to act in a society, and these latent forces are applying constant 
pressure on the individual to conform (Durkheim, 1994). What Durkheim is 
referring to is the unseen processes that shape how we view our social realties 
through various interconnected concepts. For instance, someone might feel 
obligated to justify why they are a “good” husband, wife, brother, or friend when 
their behavior does not follow the script set forth by the society in which they live. 
In this instance, a social fact is operating through both the concept of “good” and 
that desire to justify or explain oneself. Furthermore, social facts are reinforced 
formally through laws as well as informally such as being laughed at, ostracized, 
or reprimanded by a loved one (Durkheim, 1994). The informal reinforcement of 
social facts appears to operate much the same way as a dog’s barking or 
whining which are used to achieve a desired outcome (e.g., being feed) without 
the use of physical violence (Dunbar, 1979). However, like the transition from 
informal to formal reprimands, a dog’s whining and barking may escalate into 
growling or biting depending on the degree to which the pack’s rules and 
hierarchy are being resisted. 
Transitioning from informal to formal means of reinforcing a society’s 




identities. That is, the law will divorce the social aspect of being human (i.e., the 
collective identity) from the emotional aspect (i.e., the individual identity) thereby 
preventing someone from exercising their personal agency. “In removing the 
social and emotional conditions necessary for agency, radical isolation creates 
the stigma of ineligibility” (p. 110) which excludes the individual from receiving 
empathy for violence and harms perpetrated against them (Dayan, 2011). This 
process of divorcing these two identities is evidenced through the judiciary’s 
refusal to account for in their decision-making process the grief a human 
experiences after learning of or watching their beloved pet die at the hands of 
police. One of the most negative emotional experiences associated with pet 
keeping is having to navigate the death of a pet (Grier, 2006; Ryback, 2016). 
Depending on the breed and species, a pet may live for a few years or decades 
which allows the animal “enough time to truly enter and live in your heart” 
(Ryback, 2016, para. 2). Cordaro (2012) found that the grief cycle that a pet 
owner goes through is the same as the one people go through after the loss of a 
human companion. Planchon, Templer, Stokes, and Keller (2002) found that, 
much like a human death, the manner in which a pet dies affects the degree of 
grief felt by the animal’s human companion with the grief becoming more intense 
if the pet had died because of an accident. Therefore, the bond between human 
and dogs even allows us to grieve their deaths. 
Regarding canicide, the judiciary recognizes that the “emotional 




furniture” (Hells Angels, 2003). Furthermore, the owner is present in many 
canicide incidents when the dog is shot by police (Billingsley v Hunter, 2015; 
Brown v Battle Creek Police Dept., 2016; Moore v Town of Erie, 2013; Reyes v 
City of Austin, 2017), and they are in some instances forced to remain near their 
dead pet (Hells Angels, 2003; P.M. v Bolinger, 2011). Yet, as the previous 
chapter noted, the judiciary continually dismisses this emotional bonding by 
denying a pet owner from bringing excessive force claims on behalf of their dog 
and by downplaying the emotional state that occurs when someone learns of 
their dog’s death. This dismissal of the emotional connection between someone 
and their beloved pet is what Attig (2004) referred to as disenfranchised grief 
which occurs when a society or group “actively discount, dismiss, disapprove, 
discourage, invalidate, and delegitimate the experiences and efforts of grieving” 
(p. 198). The grieving process over the loss of a dog and the judiciary’s dismissal 
of this emotional connection in their decision-making process demonstrates that 
humanity has never been separated from the plight of animals. “Everything that 
has happened to them has happened to us” (Baudrillard, 2017, p. 133). 
Therefore, examining the social lives of domestic dogs provides us an insight into 
our social realities. 
Domestic dogs, unlike their wild dog brethren, do not form packs as a 
habit, and the pack’s members are generally different with each new formation 
when packs do emerge (Dunbar, 1979). Furthermore, most interactions between 




fluidity of domestic dog packs is not surprising when one considers that in 2016 
approximately 60 percent of dog owning households only had one dog (American 
Veterinary Medical Association, 2018a). That is to say, humans are the only form 
of socialization for many domestic dogs. Therefore, most domestic dog pack 
formations are simulations of the packs formed by wild dogs. However, all 
simulations need an element of the Real upon which to build (Baudrillard, 2017). 
For these domestic dog packs, the Real upon which the simulation is built is the 
individual dyadic interactions between dogs. These dyadic interactions are the 
foundations for the social organization of dog packs (Dunbar, 1979). 
Viewing animals as inherently different prevents us from forming any type 
of intimate bond with Beings other than humans. The result of this separation is 
that humans have nowhere to turn to for relaxation and restoration other than the 
simulation, and the purpose of this simulated rejuvenation enable the re-creation 
of the models necessary to maintain the simulation. Restorative locations of the 
Real, however, are locations which typically remove the individual from their 
stressful environment, and they are able to maintain the individual’s attention with 
little cognitive effort (Clayton & Meyers, 2009). 
Self-determination will be real to the extent to which the masses have 
been dissolved into individuals liberated from all propaganda, 
indoctrination, and manipulation, capable of knowing and comprehending 
the facts and of evaluating the alternatives. In other words, society would 
be rational and free to the extent to which it is organized, sustained, and 






This is the power of the human-dog bond, and it is the power of dog’s body which 
threatens the hyperreal. It is that intimate connection between humans and dogs 
that allows the individual to exercise “a right to self-possession that no one can 
take away” (p. 136). As such, humans encase a part of themselves within their 
dog(s). Law is not directed toward the person; rather, it is directed toward the 
person’s social relations. The regulation of dogs is the regulation of the social 
which in turn regulates human identity. 
Approaching the criminal justice system from the perspective of canicide 
reveals that we were born into a legal system that was created centuries ago that 
has become rigid and unwavering much like Weber’s (2002) cloak with “a shell 
as hard as steel” (p. 121). Although Weber’s (2002) work on the Protestant Ethic 
centered on the pursuit of wealth as the origin of the social cosmos in which we 
find ourselves, underlying this pursuit is the attempt to escape punishment 
manifested in the form of poverty. This conceptualization of punishment finds 
itself in the works of Marx (1978) as well: “the less you are, the more you have; 
the less you express your own life, the greater is your alienated life—the greater 
is the store of your estranged being” (p. 96). Under alienation, the punishment 
derives from knowing the truth about yourself but not being able to express this 
truth in society. This denial of one’s truth leads to a hyperreality where the Real 
exists in a spectral state between who a person truly is and who they have to be 
based on the roles set forth by society. For this hyperreality to continue its 




Baudrillard (2017) stated, “Never again will the real have a chance to produce 
itself—such is the vital function of the model in a system of death, or rather of 
anticipated resurrection, that no longer even gives the event of death a chance” 
(Baudrillard, 2017, p. 2). Attacks on dogs, then, are attempts by the hyperreal to 
eradicate, or at least silence, the Real—those social relations voluntarily 
developed between two Beings and that are beyond the control of the state. So 
long as dogs and other animals exist in one’s life, then we exist as humans and 
maintain a sense of personhood, however slight, which prevents the hyperreal 
from completely culling our humanity from existence. 
Weaponizing the Dog 
The weaponization of the dog occurs on various levels. One level is the 
literal weaponization of the dog. Ancient societies would outfit dogs with spiked 
collars or other pieces of armor and send them into an enemy’s oncoming 
cavalry (Sloane, 1955). There were 15,000 dogs sent to war by France between 
1917 and 1918, and just over a third (5,321) died during the war (Pearson, 2013). 
The military functions performed by dogs during this time were delivering 
messages, running telegraph wires, and guarding posts (Pearson, 2013). Dogs 
have been and are still used in law enforcement functions as well. According to 
the National Police Dog Foundation (2018), there are four main uses of dogs in 
law enforcement: sentry and apprehension, search and rescue, detection (e.g., 
explosives), and arson investigations. Yet, the most effective venue for 




they communicate through language even though the process of communicating 
may manifest in different forms such as the way someone holds their arms (e.g., 
body language) or the pitch of one’s voice which alters a sentence’s meaning 
(Delise, 2007). Regardless of its form, language transmits a collective’s beliefs, 
values, and culture to the various group members both new and old. Language, 
then, unifies the various groups of society into a single collective against a 
common enemy (i.e., folk devil). 
On November 23, 1972, Michael Tarrant walked into the bedroom of a 
stranger while carrying a knife and accompanied by a German Shepherd 
(Commonwealth v Tarrant, 1975). Once in the bedroom, Mr. Tarrant began 
taking money and other items and allowed the dog to roam freely throughout the 
room where it came within a few feet of the victim at one point. Mr. Tarrant 
threatened to kill the victim if the victim lied about any valuables in the house. Mr. 
Tarrant was caught, charged, and convicted of entering someone’s home and 
committing an assault in the commission of a felony and armed robbery. The 
basis for charging Mr. Tarrant with armed robbery was the presence of the 
German Shepherd during the encounter. On appeal, Mr. Tarrant argued in part 
that a dog cannot be a weapon because “a dog is a neutral instrumentality and is 
not per se dangerous as is a gun.” (Commonwealth v Tarrant, 1975, p. 413). On 
appeal, the judiciary agreed with the defendant that a victim’s subjective 
perception is not enough to transform a neutral instrumentality which was not by 




German Shepherd is a member of a well-known breed that is recognized for the 
ability to inflict harm and “dogs may be trained to attack persons” 
(Commonwealth v Tarrant, 1975, p. 418). A New Jersey court upheld the 
conviction of a juvenile for assault with an “offensive weapon” because he used 
his German Shepherd to intimidate a father and his 6-year-old daughter (State in 
Interest of R., 1979). 
In 1982, a man used his German Shepherd against two store employees 
as a means of evading apprehension for shoplifting. After being convicted for 
assault with a dangerous weapon, the defendant appealed arguing that a dog 
could not be a dangerous weapon since it is not an inanimate object (People v 
Kay, 1982). The judiciary reasoned that a dog constitutes a deadly weapon by 
“the manner in which the [dog] is used and the nature of the act which 
determines whether the [dog] is dangerous” (People v Kay, 1982, p. 444). 
Likewise, in State v Bowers (1986), the court reasoned that “a Doberman 
pinscher is not a deadly weapon per se, but an ordinary object used in a deadly 
manner is a deadly weapon within the meaning of [the statute]” (p. 425; 
emphasis in original; see also State v Sinks, 1992). Even if one is not present 
during an incident with their dog(s), they may still be charged and convicted for 
wielding a dangerous weapon. In State v Bodoh (1999), the owner of two 
Rottweilers was charged and convicted for the negligent handling of a dangerous 
weapon—his dogs—after the two dogs attacked a 14-year-old boy who was 




his dogs, then, that was the determining factor in the court’s decision. In State v 
Cook (2004), the court affirmed the conviction of James Cook for assault on a 
police officer with a deadly weapon (a dog). The “[d]efendant pushed [the] dog 
toward Officer Linstad, called the dog by name and said ‘bite him’” (p. 140) 
thereby inciting the dog to bite the officers (State v Cook, 2004). As the previous 
chapters pointed out, similar behaviors by law enforcement are narrated with a 
different language. 
On March 8, 2001, Officer Noble of the Kalamazoo Police Department 
responded to a parole officer’s request for police assistance in the apprehension 
of Quincy Dunigan (Dunigan v Noble, 2004). According to the judiciary in 
Dunigan v Noble (2004), Officer Noble requested backup and Officer Jenkins 
responded with his K-9 Kojak. Officer Jenkins and Kojak set up position on a 
landing just inside the backdoor while Officer Noble took up position at the 
kitchen stairs and a Sergeant O’Connor positioned himself at the stairs to the 
basement; Ms. Dunigan was on the second step of the kitchen stairs in the 
middle of the three officers (Dunigan v Noble, 2004). Officer Jenkins saw 
someone in the basement move and order Kojak to begin barking after his 
commands for the individual to show their hands failed to bear fruit. At this point, 
an individual who was not Quincy proceeded up the stairs pass Officer Jenkins 
and Kojak without provoking the police dog. “Immediately thereafter, Officer 
Noble pushed [Elois Dunigan] in the back” (p. 489) causing her to stumble down 




brought an excessive force claim against the officers arguing in part that Officer 
Jenkins seized her by knowingly, willfully, and intentionally bringing “a dangerous 
animal, Kojak, into the narrow entranceway of her home” (Dunigan v Noble, 
2004, p. 492). The court, however, disagreed with Ms. Dunigan’s argument. 
First, the Sixth Circuit in Dunigan v Noble (2004) never used the word 
dangerous when discussing Kojak. Second, the Sixth Circuit concluded that no 
seizure had occurred since Officer Jenkins did not enter the home to intentionally 
seize Ms. Dunigan with Kojak. Furthermore, Officer Jenkins did not command 
(i.e., intentionally order) Kojak to bite (Dunigan v Noble, 2004). In other words, no 
seizure occurred because Officer Jenkins had no intention of seizing Ms. 
Dunigan by means of having Kojak bite her. Officer Jenkins’ testimony that 
“Kojak perceived a threat when [Ms. Dunigan] stumbled…into the dog’s 
defensive perimeter. Kojak responded, as trained, by defending his handler. 
Officer Jenkins quickly restrained and refocused Kojak once the dog began biting 
[Ms. Dunigan]” (pp. 492-493; emphasis added) was enough for the court to 
conclude that Officer Jenkins was exercising control over Kojak (Dunigan v 
Noble, 2004). What the court is saying, when taken in its entirety, is that Ms. 
Dunigan does not have Fourth Amendment rights to invoke since Officer Jenkins 
did not intend to produce such rights through his actions. This reluctance of the 
court to recognize the harm done to Ms. Dunigan by Officer Jenkins bringing a 
dog into the encounter becomes even more important when one recalls from the 




excessive force claim is cognizable under the Fourth Amendment” (Dunigan v 
Noble, 2004, p. 492). The judiciary’s use of legal language to mold and transform 
what constitutes intent allows for the exclusion of many police canine bites from 
Fourth Amendment protections. 
Jessica Dennis, an eighteen-year-old, was bitten by a police canine when 
the dog and its handler along with another officer were searching nearby woods 
for an individual who fled from a party when the police showed up for a loud 
noise complaint (Dennis v Town of Loudon, 2012). Although Ms. Dennis was 
subjected to being bitten several times across her body (e.g., arms, legs, and 
shoulder) and did not resist the officer’s commands, “the [police] dog clamped its 
teeth on her tightly and began to drag her across the ground” (Dennis v Town of 
Loudon, 2012, p. 9). The court in Dennis v Town of Loudon (2012) believed that 
the police canine’s actions were justified because the canine unit’s presence in 
the woods was to “track the scent of the partygoer who had fled into the woods, 
and not to acquire physical control of that person” (Dennis v Town of Loudon, 
2012, p. 14; emphasis added). Again, the physical and emotional trauma 
suffered by the 18-year-old legally does not exist because the officer did not 
intend to seize the teenager via the police dog’s bite. The employer of Roy 
Wilson, a bus driver, allowed him to use a backroom for sleeping and showering 
at a company warehouse since he had to commute 90 miles from his home for 
his shifts (Wilson v Phares, 2015). This is what Mr. Wilson was doing when 




arrived at the location and contacted the Dothan Police Department because he 
saw a strange car and did not want to confront the car’s driver. After entering the 
warehouse and giving three loud commands identifying their presence, the police 
began searching the warehouse and the office space in the back. It was in the 
office space that Kazan (the police canine) alerted to human scent, and the K9 
officer entered the room indicated by Kazan (Wilson v Phares, 2015). 
According to Corporal Phares, Kazan “lunged toward Mr. Wilson to protect 
his handler from a threat” (Wilson v Phares, 2015, p. 6). Corporal Phares tried to 
pull and order Kazan off of Mr. Wilson, but the dog continued biting Mr. Wilson. In 
this case, the court concluded that Corporal Phares did not intend to seize Mr. 
Wilson even though Corporal Phares intentionally released Kazan to search the 
office space (Wilson v Phares, 2015). According to the court in Wilson (2015), 
Corporal Phares’ intention to release Kazan and search the building is not 
pertinent in determining if a seizure occurred; rather, the crucial issue is whether 
or not Corporal Phares intended to seize Mr. Wilson via Kazan. Furthermore, in 
response to Mr. Wilson’s false arrest claim, the court concluded that a false 
arrest claim requires a seizure just like an excessive force claim (Wilson v 
Phares, 2015). Therefore, no seizure means that no arrest—false or otherwise—
has occurred. What canicide shows us is that the term “dangerous dog” not only 
removes the dog from its status as living property, but it also weaponizes the dog 




Analyzing the weaponization of the dog from the perspective of canicide also 
shows us that the bond between humans and dogs is weaponized as well. 
Weaponized Pets 
The rise of the “pet” signaled a change in the human-dog relationship 
(Ritvo, 1986). Defining what the term pet means is difficult. The term has its 
origins in the French word “petit” which means little (Grier, 2006). Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (2008) defines “pet” “2: a domesticated animal 
kept for pleasure rather than utility” (p. 926). From this definition, the primary 
distinction demarcating an animal as a pet is that the animal is kept for purposes 
other than utilitarian purposes such as hunting, protection, and herding (Ritvo, 
1986). A pet, then, is an animal that is subjugated (i.e., domesticated) by 
humans, and whose interaction with humans is defined by the involvement of 
touch and the ongoing care of the animal by humans (Grier, 2006). Yet, this 
definition of a pet does not fully capture what the relationship between humans 
and dogs which led to the use of “companion animal” to describe a pet (Grier, 
2006). The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), 
defines a companion animal, although they do use the term pet for general 
discussion, as a “domesticated or domestic-bred animals whose physical, 
emotional, behavioral and social needs can be readily met as companions in the 
home, or in close daily relationship with humans.” In this definition, we see that a 




definition does not focus on the necessities of life (e.g., food, water, and shelter) 
being provided by the human. 
Although fulfilling these basic needs for the animal is implied, the concept 
of a companion animal focuses more on the relationship between humans and 
animals (e.g., fulfilling the animal’s emotional and social needs). Wood and 
colleagues (2015), in a study of 2,692 participants spread over two countries, 
found that approximately half of the respondents “got to know people in [their] 
neighborhood as a direct result of their pet” (p. 8). In fact, dog guardians were 5 
times more likely to meet other people from the neighborhood through their 
companion animals with approximately one-quarter forming a friendship with the 
person they meet (Wood, Martin, Christian, Nathan, Lauritsen, Houghton, 
Kawachi, & McCune, 2015). Parish-Plass (2008) examined the effectiveness of 
animal assisted therapy (AAT) in helping children recover from sexual abuse and 
found that animals act an “icebreaker” between the abused child and their 
therapist. “When the child observes the authentic, positive, nurturing way the 
therapist relates to the animals, the child often perceives the therapist in a more 
positive light and feels less threatened” (Parish-Plass, 2008, p. 13). Companion 
animals oftentimes become surrogate children (Veevers, 1985; Flynn, 2000b). A 
deputy from an East Tennessee sheriff’s department made the following 
statement regarding the sudden death of his wife’s (also a deputy sheriff) K-9 
partner, “[My wife] and I don’t’ have any kids of our own. She [the police K-9] was 




incorporation of non-traditional animals (e.g., livestock and wild animal) to be 
deemed a pet. Dogs used for utilitarian functions, such as hunting or protection, 
may be considered a companion animal. Society, though, does not refer to a 
police canine as a “pet.” 
The judiciary refers to police canines as canine partners: “Jet, Deputy 
Money's canine partner, apparently got so excited by all the yelling and pulling 
that he bit Deputy Hakker without being commanded to bite anyone” (People v 
Henderson, 1999, p. 458; emphasis added); “Corporal Phares and his canine 
partner, Kazan, and Officer Chris Miller responded as Officer Hunt's backup” 
(Wilson v Phares, 2015, p. 4). The use of the term “partner” appears innocuous; 
however, it is subtle way of reinforcing the dominant power structure that situates 
the police at the center of American life. The term partner is defined as “2 a: one 
associated with another esp. in an action’…and as…‘d : a person with whom one 
shares an intimate relationship” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 2008, 
p. 904). These definitions and the others associated with the term partner and its 
derivatives hold at their core a social relationship between two or more people. 
The National Sheriffs’ Association (n.d.) has even put together a protocol for 
burying K-9s that have died either on active duty, in the line-of-duty, or post duty 
(after the dog is retired). The protocol allows and encourages departments to 
provide as many honors as possible when burying a police canine. These honors 
include having an honor guard present to guard the body or ashes and-or the 




allowing for the playing of “taps”— “the 24-note melancholy bugle call (Veterans 
Affairs, n.d.)— at the deceased dog’s funeral; a 21-gun salute; and even allowing 
for the dog’s casket to be draped in the flag of the state for local and state 
agencies or the national flag for federal agencies (National Sheriffs’ Association, 
n.d.). Referring to the police canine as a “canine partner” automatically elevates 
the dog from mere property and bestows personhood onto the police canine 
since the term situates them as equal to the human officer. 
Even when a police canine is viewed as property, they still receive the 
similar benefits as humans. For instance, Tennessee Code Annotated (TCA) 39-
14-205 (Intentional Killing of an Animal) makes it illegal to kill the animal of 
another without that person’s consent. Although a person is justified in killing the 
animal of another if that animal is an immediate threat to the human or their own 
animal, this justification is invalid when the individual is committing a crime or kills 
a police dog in an attempt to evade capture (TCA 39-14-205). In the case of a 
police dog’s death, determining the appropriate charge is contingent on the value 
of the police canine including the value of its training (TCA 39-14-205). The cost 
of starting a K-9 unit is approximately $20,000 (Basich, 2003). According to the 
Glendale Police Department (2021), “The current price for a police dog is 
approximately $12,000, not including the training.” This price increases 
depending on if the dog will be single purpose (i.e., patrol, narcotics, bomb 
detection, cadaver, etc.) or if the dog will be multipurpose (i.e., trained in two or 




“the total average cost of a successful canine police program is $55,672.42” 
(Wing, 2004). 
Reviewing TCA 39-14-105 (Grading of Theft), indicates that the value of 
the dog alone is a Class C felony (property or service valued between $10,000 
and $60,000). Putting this into perspective, voluntary manslaughter—“the 
intentional or knowing killing of another in a state of passion produced by 
adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational 
manner”—is also a Class C felony (TCA 39-13-211). In the eyes of the law, then, 
killing a police dog is just as appalling as killing a human in a state of passion. 
Therefore, the judiciary’s use of the term “canine partner” weaponizes the social 
bond that exists between humans and dogs by recognizing the bond only when it 
manifests itself as a form of labor power (e.g., colleagues). 
When Adam Smith penned The Wealth of Nations, he set into motion an 
economic ideology that would forever change the face of the world. Smith’s work 
focused on the benefits of dividing labor. In its simplest form, the division of labor 
takes the skills developed and honed by a craftsperson over many years, 
reduces these skills to their basic movements, and divides these skills among 
several workers (Smith, 2003). Once this division is accomplished, a worker only 
needs to learn one repetitive task instead of having to learn an entire skill set. 
The capitalism that we know today, however, was “painstakingly built by the 
invisible pens of lawyers and judges that created over time broader and bolder 




2019). As the United States Supreme Court said over 100 years ago regarding 
the unintentional death of a dog by a cable car, “while private interests require 
that the valuable ones shall be protected, public interests demand that the 
worthless shall be exterminated, they have, from time immemorial, been 
considered as holding their lives at the will of the legislature” (Sentell v New 
Orleans & C.R. Co., 1897, p. 694). Therefore, property, in any form, cannot exist 
without police violence (Correia & Wall, 2018). Similar to the weaponization of 
the dog and the associated social relationships, the dangerous dog construct 
operates on various levels as well. On a direct level, the dangerous dog construct 
refers to a living animal that is an actual threat to the safety of humans and pets. 
On a more subtle level, though, the dangerous dog construct operates in the 
form of the cur. 
Curs, Criminals, and Culling 
Curs are typically associated with inferior bloodlines. The American 
Kennel Club’s (2021) online glossary informs the reader to “see crossbred” as 
their definition for cur. Crossbred is defined as, a “dog whose sire and dam are 
representatives of two different breeds.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 
(2008) defines a cur as “1: a mongrel or inferior dog 2: a surly or cowardly fellow” 
(p. 305). In both definitions, the defining feature of the cur is having bloodlines 
from different breeds. A cur is simply a mix bred dog. Merriam-Webster’s 
definition goes a little further and highlights the zoomorphic use of the term cur. 




the Victorian era who would trace their genealogy to demonstrate that their 
bloodline was not tainted by someone from the lower-class (Ritvo, 1986). 
Animals were bred based on the specific skills that humans desired, such as 
hunting or protection (Tenner, 1998). As time passed, the purity of an animal’s 
blood became more important than the animal’s, or breed’s, skills (Ritvo, 1986). 
The obsession with breed and blood was related to the desire to find 
“indigenous” breeds (Skabelund, 2008). According to Ritvo (1987), many breeds 
were oftentimes promoted by breeders as being the “indigenous” breed of that 
region or descended from the region’s indigenous dogs. This allowed local 
communities to place regional pride in the breed, and sometimes “elevated these 
animals as national symbols” (p. 356) with loyalty and bravery as the two most 
common characteristics (Skabelund, 2008). Many police departments spend 
thousands of dollars to acquire German Shepherds that have been specifically 
bred and trained in Germany due to the belief that these dogs have stronger 
bloodlines (Tenner, 1998). 
Unlike other nations, America does not have a dog that is “indigenous” to 
the nation which may explain why “Americans seem to reserve their affection and 
enthusiasm for mixture itself” (Tenner, 1998, p. 79). Yet, American society does 
have a displeasure for race mixing and canine “mongrels” (Dickey, 2016) which 
seems at odds with their love affair for the “great American mutt” (Tenner, 1998, 
p. 79). Therefore, if “we treat blood and property as metaphors crucial to defining 




forfeiture of property could become operative components of divestment” (Dayan, 
2011, p. 45; emphasis added). That is, individuals with contaminated blood are 
not considered pure persons and are culled from the rest of society. The 
application of the term cur to humans, though, is not positive or uplifting; rather, 
the term is used as a method for marginalizing the individual and differentiating 
the person from the other members of the group. Cur, then, is a derogatory term 
that strips someone of their personhood just like the terms “thug,” “white trash,” 
“cow,” or “bitch.” Just like the image of blackness transformed from the docile 
slave of the 19th-century into the menacing superpredator of the 20th-century, 
the pit bull transformed from America’s dog into a four-legged serial killer stalking 
the city streets and rural back roads (Junod, 2104). Therefore, “if a pit-bull-
Labrador mix bites, then the pit bull is always what has done the biting, its portion 
of the blood—its taint—ineradicable and finally decisive” (Junod, 2014). Likewise, 
a person of color has long been seen as a “thug” (i.e., criminal) in the eyes of 
society when they interact with the police (Smiley & Fakunle, 2016). An officer 
may truly believe that their life is in jeopardy at that moment of they take a life; 
however, it is how the living and dead is constructed as a threat to society in the 
aftermath of a shooting that constitutes the culling process. 
Culling refers to removing those beings from a population who are 
deemed detrimental to the society’s survival (Derksen, 2019). However, the 
culling process may be used on the living as well in the form of mass 




stood at approximately 1,430,800 million individuals, and of these individuals, 
approximately 1,380,400 were sentenced to at least one year (Carson, 2020). 
The increase in the nation’s prison population from its pre-War on Drugs level to 
its current size is the result of changes in the nation’s laws instead of a change in 
crime rates (Alexander, 2012). This change in laws brought with it a 
transformation in the language used by the criminal justice system when 
discussing the various individuals caught up in the operation of the system itself 
(Feeley & Simon, 1992). Specifically, the language used by those within the 
criminal justice system changed from one of moral and clinical descriptions to 
that of risk management and probabilities (Feeley & Simon, 1992). Transforming 
the system’s language moved the focus of the criminal justice system from the 
individual to the functioning of a system. A result of this transformation is that the 
individual loses their humanness which allows those in power to enact laws 
targeting marginalized populations under the guise that they are targeting a 
behavior instead of the individual or group (Alexander, 2012). Similar to the how 
breed specific legislation uses the possibility of biting to justify laws targeting 
specific phenotypes of dogs, race neutral language uses the possibility of 
criminality to target people of color (Alexander, 2012). Applying the label criminal 
to someone allows the government to strip the individual of rights (e.g., the right 
to vote), deny the individual social benefits (e.g., Pell grants, housing, etc.), and it 




(Alexander, 2012). The term “criminal,” then, is a code for cur which in turn 
provides the justification for the individual’s culling from society. 
The transformation in law raises an interesting question, can the law 
interrupt police violence? Answering this question requires us to first locate the 
source of police violence. Although the police officer may use violence when 
performing their duties, the individual officer is not the source of police violence. 
The power to police is reserved only for the state. “The United States Supreme 
Court has held that a state can deprive a citizen of property when such 
deprivation is justified as a legitimate exercise of police power” (Colorado Dog 
Fanciers v Denver, 1991, p. 653). The United States Supreme Court declared 
almost 100 years before Colorado Dog Fanciers (1991) that the Court is “bound 
to consider the nature of the property, the necessity for its sacrifice, and the 
extent to which it has heretofore been regarded as within the police power” when 
determining what constitutes due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment (Sentell v New Orleans & Carrollton R. Co., 1897). Furthermore, this 
power is unevenly distributed across the three branches of government which 
protects the state’s policing power from those it is used against. In DA’s Office v 
Osborne (2009), the United States Supreme Court declared that a “criminal 
defendant proved guilty after a fair trial does not have the same liberty interests 
as a free man” (p. 68), and the individual’s innocence disappears after conviction. 




justice system was more important than providing relief for someone whose claim 
of innocence was potentially viable. 
The availability of technologies not available at trial cannot mean that 
every criminal conviction, or even every criminal conviction involving 
biological evidence, is suddenly in doubt. The dilemma is how to harness 
DNA's power to prove innocence without unnecessarily overthrowing the 
established system of criminal justice (p. 62). 
 
Like the mythical hydra, eliminating one outlet of the state’s policing power does 
not destroy the beast. Instead, new outlets of policing emerge that continue the 
sacredness of safety masking the state’s use of violence and coercion against 
the masses. 
Future Directions 
Canicide effects more people than just those who lost a dog and those 
who took the dog’s life. Understanding the function of canicide in the 
reproduction of society requires the use of data that extends beyond the law. 
One area that future research could explore regards those individuals who work 
within the animal welfare profession, specifically animal control officers. Animal 
control officers hold a unique position within American society in that they are 
situated at the intersection where the promotion of animal welfare meets the 
policing power of the state (Animal Care Center of NYC, 2018; Los Angeles 
County Animal Care and Control, 2017). Furthermore, animal control officers 
may be considered private individuals, quasi-government employees, or full 
embedded within a jurisdiction’s law enforcement agency. Like the animals these 




enshroud by the sacredness reserved for law enforcement officers and nothing 
more than a glorified dog catcher (Arluke, 2004). It is this unique positioning that 
makes the insights of this population invaluable for understanding how society 
reproduces itself through police violence against dogs. Research in this area 
could even extend out to those individuals tasked with euthanizing dogs to 
explore how euthanasia affects their lived experiences and perceptions of 
canicide. 
Another future direction for further study might be focused on popular and 
historical representations of canicide. One possible avenue would be to explore 
the way historical newspapers have constructed the police killing of dogs. 
Newspapers, historically, have the ability to allow researchers the opportunity to 
examine prevailing attitudes of a bygone era derives from various characteristics 
of newspapers. Newspapers provide a deeper contextualization of an event 
compared to television news; newspapers still influence what is deemed 
“newsworthy” for presentation on television news; and newspapers are still a 
source of information even in our technologically advanced society (Lawrence, 
2000). Newspaper articles may be better viewed as time machines since they (1) 
are symbolic representations of the time period in which they were created, (2) 
documents are independent of the researcher, and (3) “all research is a social 
activity” (Altheide, 1996, p. 8). Finally, the information contained in newspaper 
articles is generally no older than 24 hours after a newsworthy incident occurs 




source for answering the dissertation’s research questions because the short 
time between an event’s occurrence and the reporting of the event means that 
the information disseminated via an article is basically “gathered on the spot” (p. 
256) from those individuals directly involved in the event (Baumgartner, 1981). 
Finally, news articles collected for inclusion in this study will speak quite directly 
to how police violence against dogs is both understood and misunderstood as a 
“social problem” in contemporary American society. 
A third area of research that is rich for exploring the effects of canicide 
regards the way dogs and canicide are constructed by those individuals from 
marginalized populations. Not only has research shown that the police kill a 
larger portion of dogs living in communities of color (Bloch & Martinez, 2020), but 
breed, like race, is intimately linked to “state formation, class structure, and 
national identities” (Skabelund, 2008, p. 355). Even a society’s construction of 
gender and gender roles find their way into the dog’s body. Research has shown 
that men when compared to women were more likely to believe that neutering 
results in a loss of the male dog’s masculinity (Blackshaw & Day, 1994; Fielding, 
Samuels, & Mather, 2002). Likewise, both Blackshaw and Day (1994) and 
Fielding, Samuels, and Mather (2002) found that men compared to women were 
more likely to equate a dog’s sexuality to that of human sexuality. Even when the 
decision for sterilization is made, male dogs receive more beneficial treatment. 
Female dogs were more likely than male dogs to be sterilized; specifically, 91.2 




female dogs (Blackshaw & Day, 1994). Fielding, Samuel, and Mather (2002) 
similarly found that 59 percent of men and 42 percent of women believe it that 
female dogs should be sterilized rather than male dogs. This equating of animal 
abilities as indicative of human abilities underlies many social hierarchies created 
by humans. McCarthy (2016) notes that a long political history exists in which the 
dog’s body—in the form of its breed—was used as an indicator of one’s social 
status (McCarthy, 2016), and thus reinforcing the dominant class structure of that 
time period. This area of research may even branch out to examine the issue of 
canicide, as well as the role of dogs as functionaries of society, from the 
perspective of those individuals who identify as LGTBQIA, those individuals who 
work in stigmatized professions (e.g., sex workers), or even those who have 
been affected by extreme violence (e.g., refugees or sexual assault survivors). 
The focus of this research would be examining how the lived experiences of 
those individuals from these populations shapes and is shaped by the 
construction of the dog as a functionary of society, as well as the construction of 
the dangerous dog and canicide. 
Conclusion 
This dissertation began with the observation that the police kill 
approximately 10,000 dogs every year (Griffith, 2014; Scott, 2016) leading some 
to deem it an epidemic within policing itself (Whitehead, 2017). The dissertation 
then proceeded to discuss the general state of police violence before moving into 




underlying themes arising from the Sixth Circuit’s decision. From there, the 
conversation expanded outward to discuss the use of the dangerous dog as a 
folk devil to justify canicide. The purpose of this discussion was to help 
demonstrate how the themes within the Sixth Circuit’s decision are symptomatic 
of the judicial practice of excluding groups from participating in society through a 
narrowing of Fourth Amendment protections. The focus of this chapter is on the 
larger implications of canicide and the dangerous dog. 
One of the difficulties arising from trying to explore the broader meanings 
of canicide is that victim is always “armed” in the sense that it can always bite. 
The dog’s ability to bite and inflict harm provides a ready-made justification for 
officers since it is rooted in the human fear of becoming prey (Delise, 2007). The 
solution to this dilemma was simply to ground the analysis in the very social 
relations that exist between humans and dogs, specifically one’s lived 
experiences with dogs. If someone has positive experiences with a dog or a 
breed, then they will perceive the dangerousness of dogs or of that breed as 
lower than those with negative experiences (Schiavone, 2015). However, our 
interactions with dogs does more than just shape our perceptions of the breed or 
the species, it also shapes our identity. Weaver (2013) discusses how her pit 
bull, Haley, provided a sense of security during f’s transition, and how her 
“whiteness, queer identity, and middle-class status encourage other humans to 
read Haley as less threatening” (p. 689). This mutually beneficial relationship 




becoming in kind. That is, our personal identities are molded within those unseen 
spaces between humans and dogs (Weaver, 2013). Acknowledging this 
reciprocal relationship between the identities of humans and dogs led me to 
reflect on my lived experiences with canicide. 
Reflecting on my lived experiences through the lens of canicide 
highlighted instances where the shooting of a dog by police was a fundamental 
aspect of that experience. From informing two county deputies that they can 
shoot amongst me and a dog that I was trying to get on a catchpole (i.e., control 
stick) if anything went wrong to the anger and sense of injustice at discovering 
two boxers—shot by the same deputy from an adjacent county —sitting in one of 
our kennels located in the fenced in lot where we kept our vehicles and the more 
aggressive dogs. A third dog died at the location of the shooting. Making the 
discovery more infuriating was that neither dog showed any signs of aggression 
as I physically picked them up and put them in the kennels on the back of my 
work truck. In fact, they almost seemed relieved and grateful. Somewhere in 
between these two experiences is the night I got up to let my dog, Midnight (a 
Labrador-Rottweiler mix), go outside. I stood at the door contemplating if I should 
let him go run our unfenced 2 acres because after I saw the familiar blue lights of 
a county patrol car flashing approximately one-quarter of a mile from my parents’ 
home in the county. As I held onto Midnight’s collar, I thought about the likelihood 
of him meandering up the road to explore the traffic stop. I saw, in my mind’s 




foot when standing on his hindlegs—ambling out of the darkness toward new 
friends. I envisioned the officer drawing their weapon and firing because, as the 
judiciary has made clear, they do not have wait for the dog to show its intentions. 
I closed the door and told Midnight that he would have to wait. 
After reflecting on my relationship with dogs and canicide, I came to 
realize that the dog, as a construct and physical being, is an integral part in the 
construction and reproduction of American society. Dogs are not only pets, 
companions, and guardians, they are functionaries of American society as well. 
The rate at which police kill dogs reflects an overreliance on violence as a 
resolution technique as well as a continuing arrogant disregard for those beings 
upon which we rely and with whom we coexist. Biodiversity—also known as the 
“web of life” (p. 22)—consist of all living things and the ecosystems they share 
(WWF, 2018). The home page for the Great Smokey Mountains even greets 
visitors with the message, “A wonderous diversity of life” (National Park Service, 
2021). Pollinators such as flies, butterflies, bees, beetles, and even some birds 
are responsible for pollinating approximately 75 percent of global food crops 
(WWF, 2018). Yet, the overall population of wildlife (mammal, reptile, amphibian, 
aviary, etc.) has declined by approximately 60 percent in 40 years (WWF, 2018). 
Canicide reveals that a similar trend is occurring among the domestic dog 
population as well. Furthermore, this number does not include the dogs that have 




governmental policies regulating the behavior of dogs. If these current trends 
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